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Práce  se  zabývá  normativním  diskurzem  transsexuality,  a  to  jak  z  obecného  kulturně-
historického  hlediska  v  kontextu  západní  vědy  a  medicíny,  tak  konkrétněji  v  kontextu  české
sexuologie.  Na  detailním  rozboru  knihy  Transsexualita:  Diagnostika  a  léčba ilustruje  dnes
dominantní  pojetí  transgenderu  a/nebo transsexuality  jakožto  poruchy,  která  svým normativním
působením předučuje nejen možnosti  (sebe)identifikace trans* osob v České republice,  ale  také
způsob, jakým s trans lidmi nakládá společnost a státní orgány (např. co se týče podmínek pro
úřední uznání pohlaví,  jejichž součástí  je dodnes povinná sterilizace).  Metodologickým rámcem
práce je především diskurzivní analýza, ale zároveň v ní uplatňuji i  etické hledisko  ve vztahu k
situaci českých trans* osob v právním a lékařském systému. Rovněž se věnuji  faktické stránce
transgenderu  a  dalších  projevů  genderové  diverzity,  primárně  v  kritickém  vymezení  se  proti
představám  o  jejich  údajné  poruchovosti,  které  se  v  diskurzu  normativní  sexuologie  běžně
vyskytují. 
Klíčová slova




The thesis deals with the normative discourse of transsexuality, both from a general cultural-
historical perspective in the context of Western science and medicine and more specifically in the
context of Czech sexology. On a detailed analysis of the publication Transsexualita: Diagnostika a
léčba  (Transsexuality:  Diagnostics  and  Treatment),  I  illustrate  the  currently  dominant
conceptualization of transgender and/or transsexuality as a disorder, which, due to its normative
influence, predetermines not only the possibilities of (self)identification available to trans* people
in the Czech Republic, but also their treatment by Czech society and state institutions (e.g. in the
conditions to be met  for legal gender recognition,  which still  include compulsory sterilization).
Methodologically, the thesis is chiefly grounded in discourse analysis, but it also shows an ethical
standpoint in relation to the situation of Czech trans* people in the legal and medical systems. I also
consider  the  factual  dimension of  transgender  status  and other  expressions  of  gender  diversity,
primarily  in  maintaining  a  critical  distance  from  the  notions  of  their  alleged  pathology,  still
widespread in the normative sexological discourse.
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1. What Does It Mean to Study Trans* Issues?
The standard way to  conceptualize trans* identities and the place of these identities in the
world has historically involved the investigation of trans* people by third-party researchers. This
approach has made it difficult to distinguish between how trans* people have personally identified
and how they were categorized; specifically, the arbitrary nature of outside categorization has been
complicit in obscuring self-identification or actively constraining it within limiting terms. In the
context of the Czech medical establishment, these expectations, norms and methods of research are
far from being a thing of the past – quite the contrary, they have long enjoyed a near monopoly in
determining  how  trans*  issues  were  to  be  understood.  For  example,  the  medicalized  label
transsexuality can be erroneously applied even to those people who would more accurately self-
describe as transgender, trans*, non-binary, genderqueer or use another designation not supplied by
the  dominant  discourse.  In  turn,  the  implication  that  all these  people  identify  with  one  label,
transsexuality, itself creates skewed representation that nevertheless seems to be empirically sound.
Gender diversity, as opposed to gender pathology, is obscured or silenced by such a partial view.
The approach I have just attempted to sketch out can be summarized as an attempt to study
trans* people as individuals from the position of institutionalized knowledge. Its difficulties are
both epistemological and ethical. It has, due to being grounded in essentialist outlooks on gender
and  gender  “disorder”,  not  allowed  for  a  great  deal  of  critical  reflection  on  how the  guiding
concepts in such research are constructed and by whom. The question of what produces a certain
normalized package constituting trans* issues sits in a position of irrelevance in relation to Czech
sexologists, for who else could possibly produce knowledge on gender and sex? According to this
paradigm, not trans* people themselves. The result has been a form of science that draws upon an
objectified “transsexual” who exists solely to prove someone else's point by being investigated into,
not to voice their own theory or share an unmediated lived experience that might employ vastly
different terms from those offered up by the medical establishment.  The research thus operates
around “the essence of the data mine: the fact that colonised or marginalised peoples are sources of
inert, voiceless objective data that is then free to be shaped according to the theorist’s will.”1 In
Czech sexology, this problem is compounded by the fact that the field views itself as evidence-
based  and  unbiased;  it  likewise  suffers  from an  absence  of  internal  criticism/self-reflection,  is
1 Katherine Cross, “A Social Symphony:  The Four Movements of Transphobia in Theory” in Nuclear Unicorn, 
<http://quinnae.com/2010/10/29/a-tireless-waltz-the-four-movements-of-transphobia-in-theory/> 29 Oct 2010, 4 Jun
2014. The author frames her analysis around Raewyn Connell's Southern Theory in this piece, hence the conceptual 
parallels with postcolonial theory.
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unable to distance itself from its privileged position in the discourse, and generally disregards the
danger  that  particularly  feminist  methodologists  have  identified  in  attempts  to  “objectively”
research people who are underprivileged relative to the researcher,  and how such research may
entail the abuse of power and trust while downplaying the effects of unequal power distribution in
knowledge production.2
When I refer to the discourse of sexology in the context of this  study, particularly Czech
sexology, what is meant is the archaic (or perhaps self-consciously “old school”) discourse that has
resulted in the outlook on gender and trans* issues that currently dominates in the Czech Republic.
Far from becoming a niche market sustained only for its own consumption, it has arguably retained
vital influence on both the medical profession and the letter of Czech law, which has not officially
or systematically challenged its requirements and even explicitly enshrined them, most notably in
the Civil Law Code of 2014 which mandates compulsory sterilizations for trans* people wishing to
gain legal gender recognition. The centrality of gender and body policing to the running of the
Czech state cannot be fully understood without taking into account the prestigious position of “old
school” sexology in the society. With this new code of law being adopted, there is no doubt that the
gap  between the  Czech  Republic  and countries  taking  a  progressive  stance  on  trans*  rights  is
becoming  wider  rather  than  disappearing.  Analogically,  when  I  speak  critically  of  the  specific
category of transsexuality, my problem is not with some individual trans* people opting to use the
term for themselves for various reasons, but with the normative assumption, championed mainly by
cisgender academics and health care providers, that transsexuality is the only valid trans* identity
and that it universally manifests in the same way in all people “suffering” from it. In other words,
what I critique is not a particular sort of self-identification, but a tool of establishing the “normal”.
As a trans* person who does not exist in the Czech Republic according to the pathologizing
view of a singular measurable transsexuality and the law, I am interested in finding out how it is
even possible that sexological theories of gender “disorder” are still free to exercise their power to
such a totalizing extent.  My aim here is chiefly the examination of discourse, first generally in the
context of the historical development of the normative views on gender/sex in the Czech Republic
and in Western science,  and then more specifically with respect to a particular sexological text
showcasing the decades of cultivation of what is now the dominant discourse on “transsexuality”.
My main objections to this discourse and the situation it has contributed to are that 1) the needs of
trans* people as related to personal choice, bodily autonomy, and recognition of gender identity are
not being sufficiently met under the current Czech system, and 2) the justifications used by the
2 Caroline Ramazanoglu and Janet Holland, Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices (London: SAGE, 2004) 
158-159.
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Czech  state  and  medical  establishment  for  perpetuating  gatekeeping  practices  and  coercive
treatment “options” are at odds with the standards for human rights formulated by international
bodies (e.g. the EU) as well as with more complex understandings of biology than the one still
championed by Czech sexology. The codification of a discourse so patronizing that it treats trans*
people as incapable or unworthy of having meaningful autonomy in medical protocols governing
access to transition-related resources as well as in laws determining the (im)possibility of changing
one's legal name and gender marker sends a clear message that respect for people in their genders in
the  Czech  Republic  is  conditional  at  best.  In  contrast  to  the  legal  developments  in  countries
considered to be pursuing an inclusive policy in matters of gender diversity (e.g. Argentina, the
United  Kingdom,  Australia,  Sweden,  India,  Germany),  the  Czech Republic  is  being  shaped by
different values in its treatment of gendered bodily autonomy. The reasons for this, I postulate, are
not only political but rooted in pervasive misconceptions about gender and sexuality, made all the
stronger by the “scientific” stamp of approval afforded to them by this specific school of sexology.
As such, the primary function of my analysis is not to make a case-by-case record in the form
of interviews or other means of documenting the various personal experiences of trans* individuals.
Rather, I analyze the dominant discourse surrounding and shaping trans* status with its leaning on
pathologization (chiefly perpetuated by the medical establishment) and control (carried out both by
the medical establishment and the state). While interview-based research has its own immense value
in  providing  access  to  the  individual  opinions  of  the  people  being  interviewed,  analyses  of
marginalized groups should not stop at giving all their attention to the individual on the expense of
the  broader  sociocultural  context  that  these  individually  articulated  positions  are  situated  in.
Furthermore,  analyzing  the  dominant  discourse  rather  than  putting  the  marginalized  under  a
microscope is an approach that by definition changes  what can be put into question.  Though I
would undoubtedly differ in background from cisgender researchers who investigate trans* people,
there is I feel a dearth of research devoted to “studying those who would study us” in any case.
Interrogating a person's identity is in itself not transgressive of the status quo, even when done with
the intention of rectifying past misrepresentation; interrogating the dominant mode of thinking is.
This is not to say that all interview-based research is going to be fetishistic or uninterested in the
social  context;  on  the  contrary,  it  can  capitalize  on  personal  experience  so  as  to  challenge
widespread stereotypes (although, on the other hand, it can also be manipulated to only show a
sample  that  reflects  a  particular  sort  of  belief,  as  can  be  seen  at  the  end  of  the  publication
Transsexualita:  Diagnostika  a léčba  /  Transsexuality:  Diagnostics  and Treatment,  which  I  will
return to later in this work). Discourse analysis simply offers a slightly different type of focus from
field  work:  it  emphasizes  how  discourse  can  preempt  individual  accounts  and  mould  the
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expectations of what “should” be articulated and how. 
Contrary to  the beliefs  cementing the authority of the dominant  discourse of science and
“objectivity”, it is in fact important to examine how the Foucauldian “expert knowledge” is actively
produced  by researchers  with  agendas.  In  one  of  her  essays,  Anne  Fausto-Sterling  makes  this
precise  conceptual  leap  when she  explains  the  method  of  her  criticism of  the  biologization  of
masculinity (and femininity) typical of positivist accounts: 
My task [...] is to consider the truths that biologists extract from
bodies, human and otherwise, to examine scientific accounts –
some might even say constructions – of masculinity. To do this, I
will treat the scientific/medical literature as yet another set of
texts open to scholarly analysis and interpretation.3
Significantly, Fausto-Sterling takes issue with the oft unquestioned authority and primacy of
normative science. Like Michel Foucault, she has to draw attention to the fact that even “scientific”
accounts result in constructions (which then enter circulation and become “fact”) in order to make
her criticism feasible – after all, a dogma cannot be reasoned with, regardless of its exact source.
The scientific/medical literature Fausto-Sterling  analyzes  has to be put on the same level  with all
other literature produced by human beings with specific outlooks on the world, with internalized
norms and prescriptions (like the demand for a rigid gender binary), informed by specific meta-
narratives  (like  that  of  positivist  “objectivity”).  To  do  otherwise  would  be to  deny  human
involvement in knowledge production and classification. 
Following in the footsteps of Fausto-Sterling, who examined a concrete body of supposedly-
objective  medical  texts  and  found not  a  testament  to  “pure  nature”  but  a  socially  conditioned
testament to heterosexism, sex negativity, gender stereotyping, destructive binarism and purposeful
denial of inconvenient facts by medical professionals rather than their unbiased distribution among
laypeople, I make an attempt to parse and critically assess the presence of explicit and implicit
normatives in Czech medical literature on transsexuality, the only term recognized by said literature
as fully valid. The privileging of the pathology model in the literature – the “problem” addressed by
Czech sexologists in general is never gender diversity, but gender disorder – frames the discussion
in a manner that is inherently advantageous to the dominant mode of thought (gender is a binary,
transsexuality is a disordered condition where the binary has encountered a mismatch, etc.). The
distinctly bioethical implications of the present treatment of trans* people in the Czech Republic as
legal  subjects  and as  “clients/patients” of  medical  professionals  are  thus  hidden from view.  As
opposed to the essentialist paradigm espoused by the medical texts, an approach grounded in social
constructivism not only allows for considerations of how the categories of male/female (with no
3 Anne Fausto-Sterling, “How to Build a Man” in Roger N. Lancaster and Micaela Di Leonardo (eds.), The 
Gender/Sexuality Reader: Culture, History, Political Economy (New York and London: Routledge 1997) 244.
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room for blending or rejecting these categories in the dominant discourse) are established, but also
poses a challenge to the organization of legal and medical transition in the Czech Republic itself.
My outlook is not at all dismissive of biology; rather, it is informed by critical texts on the subject
that  factor  in  its  social  dimension  (revealing  how  mainstream  science  constructs  biological
“reality”) and strives to disentangle biology from hetero- and cisnormative assumption. After all,
numerous studies are now emerging that document biological diversity across the realm termed
nature, as if to begin to compensate for the historical damage wrought by the fact that “researchers
have often  silenced,  erased,  or  variously accounted  for  these [gender-diverse,  sexually diverse]
behaviors  such  that  any  confrontation[s] with  norms  are  minimized”.4 Other  considerations
important to my analysis include gender as a tool of social organization, trans* issues as discussed
outside of the pathologizing sexological  discourse of the Czech medical establishment,  and the
concept of autonomy in conjunction with human rights – and whether these rights are being upheld
by the current Czech system. The thesis should thus serve as a resource covering the current legal
and  medical  protocols,  while  at  the  same time  providing an  argument  for  their  transformation
grounded  in  conscientious  approaches  to  personal  autonomy,  gender,  human  rights  –  and  yes,
biology.
2. Methodology
Broadly  speaking,  this  study  can  be  categorized  as  following  the  paradigm  of  social
constructivism,  which  is  distinguished  by  taking  a  non-essentialist  approach  to  social  norms,
“common sense”, and other constructs largely serving to rationalize existing power structures. I also
draw upon the more specific field of feminist methodology, which seeks to maintain an approach
conscious  of  systemic  inequities  and  of  how  those  may  be  reflected  in  academic  work.  It
emphasizes  that  researchers  must  be  held  accountable  as  regards  their  relative  social  position.
Feminist methodology criticizes the myth of neutrality in research, citing that it is impossible for
any  researcher  to  be  completely  removed  from  social  reality5 and  that  the  presumption  of
“objectivity”  and  neutrality  has,  in  fact,  resulted  in  much  of  the  oppression  perpetuated  by
institutionalized academic and scientific disciplines in the modern era6 – including, in the purview
of my analysis, the policing of genders and bodies that trans* people routinely encounter. 
For  a  general  critique  of  the  scientific  establishment  and  its  notion  of  universal  and
“objective” authority, the thesis draws upon Michel Foucault's deconstruction of modern scientific
4 Myra J. Hird, Sex, Gender, and Science (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004) 117.
5 Gayle Letherby, Feminist Research in Theory and Practice (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2003) 68.
6 Shulamit Reinharz, Feminist Methods in Social Research (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 
261.
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discourse with special emphasis on the power differential generated by a system in which some
people are relegated to the role of passive “patients” of supposedly knowledgeable doctors and
institutions. The issue of power is indispensable to developing an understanding of how the present
hierarchies displace the power over trans* people's bodies – away from those bodies' owners and
into  the  hands  of  medical  and state  institutions  to  an  extent  that  is  almost  without  parallel  in
cisgender people, barring certain specific instances like forced sterilization as a consequence of
racism against some ethnic/racial groups. 
Given that  one of  the  goals of  my analysis is to elaborate upon the differences between the
non-essentialist  discourse  of  trans*  and  trans*  ally academics/human  rights  activists  and  the
essentializing,  pathology-oriented  discourse  of  the  Czech medical  system and subsequently the
letter  of the Czech law, I will be referencing a wide variety of materials ranging from medical
treatises to academic criticisms of the dominant social order. To address the discourse of pathology
critically on all fronts, it is necessary to examine it through the lens of some of the more recent
developments in the humanities (gender and queer studies in particular) as well as in the natural
sciences (particularly in light of non-normative viewpoints on biology). In analyzing the normative
texts as primary materials, it should become clear where the essentialist discourse not only imposes
restrictive norms on the population it supposedly represents, but also where it fails to account for its
own presuppositions by delivering essentialist conjecture rather than so-called objective fact.
As far as research methods are concerned, the main focus of this work is on content/text
analysis of the primary sources (laws and medical guidelines), while secondary materials will be
used to provide theoretical grounding and to aid in the assessment of the implications of the current
legal-medical system as described in the primary sources. The citation format for all the contents of
the bibliography and footnotes is MLA. Where there is a single author for multiple texts, I add the
title  of  the  text  being  cited  in  each  particular  instance  to  the  shortened  footnote  for  easy
differentiation; otherwise, the author name suffices in repeat attributions.
The majority of the secondary materials quoted are written in English, but as for the primary
sources, most have been written in Czech. All translations in such cases are mine unless otherwise
indicated. While the bulk of the secondary materials are academic texts, I have not shied away from
also  incorporating  articles  and  other  materials  produced  by  grassroots  activists,  usually  found
online.  This  is  for  two main  reasons:  firstly,  the  elitism that  sometimes accompanies  scholarly
inquiry in itself represents a barrier to the transparency of information and often disregards crucial
insights simply because they were published in the “wrong” medium. Secondly, and perhaps more
importantly in this context, considering only certain sources (the institutionally guaranteed ones) to
matter  is  symptomatic  of the very mode of knowledge that  I  aim to criticize:  the exclusionary
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“expert” discourse that is closed off even from the people it concerns. A particularly pernicious
effect of excluding online texts would be the disproportionate exclusion of precisely those voices
which are already marginalized, as the advent of Internet has made it easier than ever for “minority”
communities to reach out, exchange information, and share their outlooks and experiences – to an
extent that is not yet fully understood, but would not have been possible in the traditional media
landscape.7 To omit or trivialize the Internet then would be to gloss over a central element of the
challenge  to  the  hegemony of  the  clinic.  In  including  it,  and  treating  trans*  people's  writings
published online as serious voices rather than quaint flavour texts safely outside the “legitimate”
part of the discussion, I treat trans* people's varied identities and insights as fundamentally valid. 
3. The Use of Language
My use of language maintains a distance from the ideology of trans* pathologization, and so
the terms used in this text differ from the terminology employed by Czech sexology and law. Most
importantly,  instead  of  the  label  transsexual,  which  has  often  been  used  in  pathologizing  and
normative  ways  by health  care  providers  and  others,  I  will  maintain  consistency in  using  the
umbrella  term  trans*  (the asterisk being a  “wildcard character” that  can stand for  transgender,
transsexual, and a variety of non-binary, genderqueer and agender identities) except when quoting
or evidently referring to a text not cognizant of the fact that there can be gender identities other than
the binary. The exception to this consistency is, ironically, the title of my study, the reason being
pragmatic insofar as  transgender is a more established umbrella term that will render the subject
accessible to those not familiar with the newly coined language (or to a cursory database search). As
for why I otherwise opt for trans* inclusive of the asterisk to denote a multiplicity of identities, I am
in  agreement  with  the  explanation  of  the  difference  in  emphasis  that  trans*  (as  opposed  to
transgender or just trans) engenders that is offered by Nat Titman of Practical Androgyny:
“[T]rans*”  was  suggested  as  a  way  to  explicitly  include  the
genderqueer,  gender  variant,  gender  role  nonconforming,
crossdressing, fluid gender, agender etc people who didn’t feel
“trans enough” to know if  they would be included otherwise.
[…] It’s meant to be a shorthand when space is limited, and it’s
meant  [to]  be  backed  up  by actual  inclusion  in  both  words,
policies and actions. But it exists as a quick and easy way to
show those people who are used to being pushed out of trans
spaces that yes, this is for you too.8 
7 Věra Sokolová, “Koncepční pohled na 'sexuální menšiny' aneb vše je jen otázka správné orientace…” (“Conceptual 
view of “sexual minorities” or everything is just a matter of the right orientation…”, original author's translation of 
title) in Hana Hašková, Alena Křížková and Marcela Linková (eds.), Mnohohlasem. Vyjednávání ženských prostorů 
po roce 1989 (Prague: The Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, 2006) 254-55.
8 Nat Titman, “About that often misunderstood asterisk” in Practical Androgyny, <http://practicalandrogyny.com
/2013/10/31/about-that-often-misunderstood-asterisk/> 31 Oct 2013, 21 May 2014.
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With  respect  to  binary  genders,  trans  men and trans  women in  accordance  with  gender
identification is preferred to “transmen” and “transwomen”, the “trans” being a modifier rather than
a completely inseparable part of the man or woman in question (and also to avoid confusion with
the potentially related but conceptually distinct phenomenon of transhumanism). In general, trans*
people or trans people will be used rather than “transpeople”, “transsexuals” or “transgenders”. Not
only is the last example a total misnomer in how it only refers to gender itself and not to a person
whose status is trans*, but like “transmen/women” and “transsexuals”, all these terms construe a
category of people who are in some way trans* as a sort of separate species. By treating trans* as a
modifier to the individual person, man, or woman, it is possible to avoid some of the othering that is
so often present in the discourses surrounding trans* identity and visibility. 
With  respect  to  ethics-related  terminology  including  decision/choice,  agency,  self-
determination,  authenticity,  and  autonomy,  I  am  aware  of  the  questioning  of  these  terms  by
feminists and other theorists of power, particularly with regard to the illusions of purely individual
responsibility  for  success  they confer.  I  view these  criticisms  as  vital  as  well.  However,  there
remains the problem that in the master narrative of transsexuality, agency and its related notions are
still too often absent completely. That narrative has not even yet reached the point where there could
be a more nuanced and context-based understanding of agency, as there currently is none to speak
of.  For this  reason, I think the inclusion of agency, choice and autonomy can be productive in
challenging a broader system of insidious power dynamics masquerading as “things all transsexuals
want”, walling off meaningful choices all the while.
To return to the notion of visibility, which is both embodied and ethical, the widely circulated
term “passing” will be avoided except in direct quotations when used in reference to trans* people
being read correctly in their genders. Semantically speaking, “one passes as something one is not”.9
The requirement  to  “pass”  simultaneously exerts  pressure to  physically  conform and discredits
trans* identity as being invalid by definition:
[I]f someone tells me I am “passing” as a man, then I am being
framed as “really” a woman. I am being complimented on an
excellent  deception.  Thus  the  term “passing”  undermines  the
fundamental fact of a trans person's life: that we transition to our
true genders. […] To think of a trans man as a “fake” man is the
essence of cissexism.10 
Significantly,  there are  other  common applications  of  the term “passing” in  circulation:  a
person of colour can be “white-passing” (and have conditional privileges that even be life-saving in
some situations) if their appearance and/or cultural affiliation are perceived as “white” as a result of
9 Cary Gabriel Costello, “On Passing” in TransFusion, <http://trans-fusion.blogspot.com/2011/07/on-passing.html>, 
26 Jul 2011, 2 Jun 2014.
10 Costello, “On Passing” <http://trans-fusion.blogspot.com/2011/07/on-passing.html>.
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racial  stereotyping,11 and  a  non-heterosexual  person can  “pass  as  straight”  in  certain  situations
and/or  relationships.  Here  “passing”  clearly  denotes  a  split  between  the  given  person's  actual
identity and the way they are incorrectly perceived and categorized by others as belonging in some
other group; the usage has “a weighty history, referring to concealment of one's marginalized true
identity, in order to avoid violence and discrimination”.12 Using the same term for trans* people in
situations when they are perceived  correctly by the surrounding society and there is  no identity-
versus-perception split being experienced would make no sense; trans* “passing”, intentionally or
not, has been one of the terms that have accommodated the dominant worldview. It can even create
intra-group hierarchies among trans* people, based on “the argument that the suffering of other
trans people is irrelevant to a post-transition person who “passes,” because they are no longer trans
men  or  women,  but  “just”  men  or  women.”13 For  all  these  reasons,  “passing”  should  not  be
considered aspirationally ideal, value-neutral, or descriptive. 
In  reference  to  people  not  covered  by  the  trans*  umbrella,  the  recently-coined  term
cis/cisgender – the Latin prefix  cis- meaning “on the same side” – will be used, replacing value-
laden descriptors like “regular”, “normal”, “natural”, “biological” or “genetic” (all of which are
more or less euphemisms for “real” to start with, and therefore markers of a biased viewpoint that
construes trans* existence as invalid by definition; also, I disagree with the assumptions that genes
are always easily inferred from morphology or that trans* people are less “biological” than cis
people). The language of gender and sex in this thesis takes into account the problems inherent in
the essentialist sex/gender system and its presupposed binary, which, as the research of authors such
as Fausto-Sterling has shown, is far more a social construct than it is a biological reality. To reflect
these facts, terms such as “biological sex” or “born a boy/girl” or “man in a woman's body” will be
avoided as well. Narratives of misplacement are inherently oversimplifying when generalized to the
entire  trans*  population,  and  they  also  remove,  or  at  least  render  somehow disputable,  trans*
people's  ownership  of  their  own  bodies.  Even  in  some  well-intentioned  instances,  such  as
“male/female-bodied”,  the  underlying  assumption  is  some  arbitrary  bodily  norm (conveniently
congruent with the dominant notions of sex difference) and the end result is patronizing. On their
own,  “biological”  or  “genetic”  will  be  replaced  contextually,  or  used  in  conjunction  with
appropriate qualifiers depending on which part of sex/gender assignment and identification is being
discussed and how it actually ties into biological and social context. 
On the subject of surgeries, my tendency is to name the different procedures where pertinent,
11 For specific historical examples and a more detailed discussion of this see also Costello, “On Passing” <http://trans-
fusion.blogspot.com/2011/07/on-passing.html>.
12 Costello, “On Passing” <http://trans-fusion.blogspot.com/2011/07/on-passing.html>.
13 Costello, “On Passing” <http://trans-fusion.blogspot.com/2011/07/on-passing.html>.
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rather than subsume them under general labels that can in some cases make it difficult to see what
exactly is being referred to with respect to surgical transition. I avoid the term “gender confirmation
surgery”  because,  while  definitely  well-intentioned,  it  insinuates  that  some  manner  of  surgery
should be  the normative measure of gender status and that those trans* people who do not have
surgery leave their genders perpetually “unconfirmed”. When it comes to the surgeries that still act
as the prerequisites of legal recognition in the Czech Republic, I opt to use “sterilization” for the
removal  of  reproductive  capacity  regardless  of  the  organs  involved,  since  “sterilization  and
castration” has the unfortunate effect of making trans women sound like “castrated men”, a familiar
trope in transphobic rhetoric. Moreover, in the context I examine, it is the removal of reproductive
capacity (“being sterile”) that is  treated as the crux of legal recognition,  not the morphological
alterations of organs that can be produced in the process of rendering a person sterile.
In reference to infant sex determination,  (coercively) assigned fe/male at birth will be used.
This  term  is  perhaps  the  most  necessary  to  question  the  pathologizing  discourse  that  uses
insidiously naturalistic language to accommodate cisgender interpretations of biology:
Not only is the M or F on our birth certificates an assignment,
but it is coerced. Parents cannot say no, (just as many parents
could  not  say no  to  doctors  who wanted  to  mutilate  intersex
infants and reconstruct their bodies), and you cannot say no, can
you? The term “coercive” adds needed meaning that reveals the
truth behind natal nomenclature and assignment: the truth of its
constructed  nature  and  its  oppressive  effects.  This  is  why
language is important. To use the cis-centric language of “well I
was born male…” as a trans woman or non-binary person is to
paint one’s self into a corner before one even begins to speak at
length. It immediately sets you at a disadvantage and imports the
“truth” of cis power.14 
Indeed, for language to be inclusive and accurate, it  must resist casting oppressive gender
ideologies as “truth”. Replacing the value-laden cis discourse with a more factually correct and
respectful one is not, as some detractors would have it, a mere matter of “semantics” with a derisive
frown attached; on the contrary, inaccurate terms that devalue people's experiences in their genders
or take these experiences out of context pave the way for a whole host of human rights abuses
couched in the assumption that no autonomy is being disintegrated by state-mandated interventions
into a person's bodily structure, since no body ownership was presumed to begin with. The question
of language and its policing is a vital one  to the trans* discourse and  can alone drive home the
realization that, as Katherine Cross puts it, “the truth is, it is their [cis people's] language that is fake
when it comes to describing who we are.”15 
14 Katherine Cross, “A Cliché Trapped in a Metaphor's Body” in Nuclear Unicorn, <http://quinnae.com/2010/10/21/a-
cliche-trapped-in-a-metaphor%E2%80%99s-body/>, 21 Oct 2010, 4 Jun 2014.
15 Cross, “A Cliché Trapped in a Metaphor's Body” <http://quinnae.com/2010/10/21/a-cliche-trapped-in-a-metaphor
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II. How to Interrogate the System
1. Everything You Think You Know Is Wrong
At a cursory glance, due to the immense clout of pathologizing and stigmatizing discourses in
the present conceptualization of gender/sex dominant in the West, there might appear to be little
room for doubting what “transsexual” means and how it  as a subject position relates to the cis
“normal”. These normative ideas are nevertheless being gradually eroded by other, less totalizing
discourses. The advent of the Internet as a decentralized information venue has facilitated public
criticisms of, for example, the sort of objectifying cisgender research that treats trans* people as
medical curiosities, a “riddle” to be solved only because cis research chooses not listen when trans*
people  do  verbalize  themselves.16 Crucially,  these  criticisms  have  increasingly  been  voiced  by
trans* people. They have been aimed not only at the specific methods and designs of “research into
trans* issues” by cis  academics  and medical  professionals  unwilling to  acknowledge their  own
power,  but also at  the very paradigm that has historically allowed such a vast  body of what is
ultimately  fetishizing  research  to  develop.  It  would  seem  that  the  greatest  oversight  of  the
authoritative, “expert” discourse was the assumption that the people it researched would forever be
unable to see through the paradigm itself.  Yet, in an outspoken rebuttal to “trans studies” as an
objectifying field defined by essentially selfish outsiders, Anne Tagonist writes:
Let  me  tell  you  something:  trans  people  have  already  been
studied.  We've  been  interviewed,  sampled,  tested,  cross-
referenced, experimented upon, medicated, shocked, examined,
and dissected post-mortem. You've looked at our chromosomes,
our  families,  our  blood  levels,  our  ring  fingers,  our  mothers'
medicine cabinets, and our genitalia (over and over again with
the genitalia – stop pushing condoms on us, dumbass, we know
what  they're  for.)  You've  watched  us  play  with  dolls,  raise
children,  fall  in  love,  look at  pornography,  get  sick,  die,  and
commemorate  ourselves.  You've  listened  to  our  ears.  You've
listened to our fucking ears! But you've never listened to our
voices and you need to do that now.17 
The trappings of the discourse that only treats trans* people as valuable but silent primary
data  are  exposed  quite  well  here.  The  fact  that  its  criticism,  impossible  to  articulate  through
sexology or any other mode of knowledge production that refuses to interrogate itself, has often
been brought up online rather than in more “authoritative” settings is already indicative of one
%E2%80%99s-body/>.
16 Katherine Cross, “I Am Whoever You Say I Am” in Nuclear Unicorn, <http://quinnae.com/2010/10/01/i-am-
whoever-you-say-i-am/>1 Oct 2010, 20 Jun 2014.
17 Anne Tagonist, “Fuck You and Fuck Your Fucking Thesis: Why I Will Not Participate in Trans Studies”, 
<http://tagonist.livejournal.com/199563.html> 10 Dec 2009, 1 Jun 2014.
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persistent hierarchy. As will be seen in the Czech context, it is precisely the authority of sexology as
a discipline that decides the normative position on trans* issues and actively prevents widespread
questioning. Academic credit is neither neutral nor a guarantee of “correct” findings in this context.
In fact, it may well be detrimental to the facticity and quality of the information being presented, as
we should consider that  
[w]hat  constitutes  valid  theory is  still  often  fenced off  in  the
black  and  white  pages  of  officially  printed,  peer-reviewed
journals  still  completely  dominated  by  cis  people  who  have
either barely heard of  us or theorise against us in incompetent
ways.18 
I would draw particular attention to Cross's use of the word incompetent: she argues, against
the  grain  of  positivist  academia  that  holds  that  the  only  good  knowledge  is  allegedly-neutral
knowledge produced by disinterested experts,19 that the largely exclusionary and sometimes outright
hostile cis-dominated academic landscape cannot by definition be competent on trans* issues.  I will
apply this same criticism to tenets of Czech sexological normativity in due course. The point here is
of course not to instate some essentialist gatekeeping practice (that is, the primary message is not “if
you are cis, you should never approach trans* issues in any form”), but to reject what boils down to
“a nearly complete exclusion of trans intellectual product, and the theories we make about our own
lives.”20 This  exclusion  is  not  without  parallel  and the  many problems it  introduces  should  be
readily apparent on closer reflection,  but for the sake of establishing just why it  is problematic
beyond doubt, consider the following quote from trans* and intersex theorist Cary Gabriel Costello
on the intersection of social position with academia and knowledge production/transmission:
Should I as a Jew not be able to address religion in my courses,
because as a religious minority I am not “objective”? Should my
colleagues who are people of color not be able to teach about
race in their classes? Taken to its logical extreme, are the only
suitable sociology professors cis,  straight,  white,  middle-aged,
middle-class, Christian men without disabilities? (Of course, the
opposite is in fact true […] You won't find me taking a SCUBA
diving class from someone with only academic book-knowledge
of diving. . .)21 
Although both Cross's and Costello's analyses are addressed mainly to the social sciences, I
believe they are generalizable even to those sciences that do not share that background – or that
18 Cross, “A Social Symphony:  The Four Movements of Transphobia in Theory” <http://quinnae.com/2010/10/29/a-
tireless-waltz-the-four-movements-of-transphobia-in-theory/>.
19 On the general divisions among paradigms see Egon G. Guba and Yvonna S. Lincoln, “Competing Paradigms in 
Qualitative Research” in N. K Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research (London: SAGE 
Publications, 1994) 105-116.
20 Cross, “A Social Symphony:  The Four Movements of Transphobia in Theory” <http://quinnae.com/2010/10/29/a-
tireless-waltz-the-four-movements-of-transphobia-in-theory/>.
21 Cary Gabriel Costello, “On Teaching (Trans) Gender” in TransFusion, <http://trans-fusion.blogspot.com/2013/07/
on-teaching-trans-gender.html> 24 Jul 2013, 4 Jun 2014.
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strategically  claim,  as  Czech  sexology  can  be  seen  doing,  that  there  is  little  common  ground
between their “hard science” mode of knowledge and sociological theories. There is not much to
modify in the operation of hierarchical structures if their tacit aim invariably is to keep producing
roughly  the  same  result  across  the  board  (articulating  “truths”  about  entire  marginalized
demographics without their meaningful participation). It would no doubt make it easier to preserve
the societal status quo if all knowledge producers were of the most privileged demographic, but that
already goes to show that the knowledge gleaned from this group would be far from unbiased or
innocuously  descriptive;  rather,  it  would  be  a  dystopia  organized  around  a  monopoly  on
“appropriate” knowledge. That dystopia has long existed, however, and in relation to trans* people,
it is still largely normalized or even praised. 
Those who would argue that sexologists do not theorize against trans* people but only seek to
help and therefore their theories are for trans* people should consider precisely that theorizing “for”
someone – that is, theorizing in their place – is no less problematic than making a theory explicitly
against that person. In the case of the transphobic/transmisogynistic would-be feminists that Cross
analyzes in detail in her essay, the position of those theorists is at least obvious and proudly owned
by them. The outlook of, in my example, Czech sexologists on trans* people is not condemning in
the  same  manner.  Yet  their  authoritative  position  in  the  discourse  and  their  lack  of  personal
experience of being trans* is still a position, one that has gone largely unacknowledged for strategic
reasons, particularly with respect to effecting the “neutrality” of sexologist research and theory. The
problem with the lack of accountability of any such paradigm should be self-evident, but to give
feminist criticism of positivist academia its due, I close this section with a statement on research
ethics and integrity from Shulamit Reinharz who openly states, “I have feminist distrust for research
reports that include no statement about the researcher's experience. Reading such reports, I feel that
the researcher is hiding from me or does not know how important personal experience is. Such
reports seem woefully incomplete and even dishonest.”22    
2. Discipline and Dismiss: The Subjection of Corporeality in the Master 
Narrative
While  the  problematic  nature  of  certain  modes  of  knowledge  production  is  undoubtedly
important to call out for what it is, it only represents one part of how the dominant discourse “deals
with” trans* issues. The subject of the body and to whom that body belongs, long sidelined by a
population that has systematically been taught that feeling ashamed of and alienated from the body
22 Reinharz 263.
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was the appropriate course of action, can play an equally vital part in changing the narrative that
holds trans* bodies hostage for gender recognition and other resources. In a rewriting of what is
commonly termed the  “Trans  101”,  Asher  Bauer  effectively debunks  the  traditional  sex/gender
division and its most common uses in transsexual narratives:
The  entire  concept  of  “sex”  is  simply  a  way  of  attaching
something  social  – gender – to bodies. This being the case, I
believe the most sensible way to look at the question of sex now
is this:  a male body is a body belonging to a male – that is,
someone  who  identifies  as  male.  A female  body  is  a  body
belonging  to  a  female  –  that  is,  someone  who  identifies  as
female.  Genderqueer  bodies  belong  to  folks  who  are
genderqueer, androgynous bodies belong to androgynes, and so
forth, and so on.23 
This is a complete paradigm shift from the notion that there should only be one way for a
male and female body to be (not even to speak of any non-binary bodies) and, crucially, this shift
emphasizes  that  the  body belongs  to  the  person who is  actually  being  embodied,  not  to  some
abstract concept that would mark that body as (meta)physically “wrong”. There is no normatively
gendered  body  that  would  set  a  universal  standard  for  male  or  female  and  stand  in  eternal
opposition; rather, “self identification is the  only  meaningful way to determine gender. Any other
method is  wholly dependent upon what that doctor said way back when we were still  wrinkly,
writhing, screaming newborn messes, completely unformed as individuals and without any identity
at all to speak of [...] The fact is that cis people self-identify too – they just happen to agree with
what the doctor said all those years ago.”24 Thus the sexual/gender diversity actually found in the
population (even in areas where it is subject to exclusionary laws, such as in the Czech Republic)
should not be treated as a deviation to be hidden away or eliminated, but as the standard mode in
which something as complex as human biology and society operates. By contrast, Czech sexology
unquestioningly works with the binary concept of prescriptively “male” versus “female” bodies,
often with the intention of undermining the legitimacy and/or authenticity of trans* people's genders
by insinuating that trans* people are something other than what they say. It is important that Bauer's
rewritten “Trans 101” anticipates the tropes of that discourse and challenges them before they are
allowed to take hold again:
Who is to say we ever were the “opposite sex?” Personally I will
never again describe myself as “born female.” I was born a trans
male  and my years of confusion were due to being forcefully
and repeatedly told that I was something else. This body is not a
23 Asher Bauer, “Not Your Mom's Trans 101” in Tranarchism, <http://tranarchism.com/2010/11/26/not-your-moms-
trans-101/> 26 Nov 2010, 1 Jun 2014.
24 Bauer, “Not Your Mom's Trans 101” <http://tranarchism.com/2010/11/26/not-your-moms-trans-101/>.
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woman’s. It is mine. Neither am I trapped in it.25 
Similarly to how disability can be understood as a condition that occurs in context of the
wider society and its standards for fitness rather than any inherent individual “wrongness”,26 trans*
status can also be reframed by shifting the focus from the concept of individual abnormality in dire
need of expert intervention to the realization that gender diversity is being arbitrarily assigned the
status of a problem by the dominant social order. This paradigm shift enables the “problem” of
trans* identity to no longer be embedded within the marginalized individual and instead highlights
that the problematic nature of gender diversity only emerges during the interaction of the dominant
society with marginalized trans* identities. But what has made it possible for sexology to create and
maintain  a  narrative  of  transsexuality  that  has  steered  people,  cis  and trans* alike,  away from
recognizing facts about body ownership and agency that, once thought about, should become almost
painfully obvious? In order to begin to understand, I believe it is needed to consider not only the
intersection of gender and the body, but also of the body and science itself.
Under the paradigm of Western dualism, reflected in the  positivist approach to science, the
body has been conceptualized as something that exists apart from discourse, answering only to what
is commonly termed “the objective reality”. While this outlook is no longer difficult to deconstruct
on the intellectual and conceptual level, it remains difficult to displace due to the hegemonic power
of  positivism and  postpositivism.27 What  results  is  the  marginalization  of  nuanced thinking,  or
indeed questioning, of imparted positivist “truths”. The pernicious effects of this epistemological
framework  have  been  commented  on  by  multiple  authors,  including  Myra  J. Hird,  when  she
describes the beliefs about gender and sex held by the students in her class:
Students, echoing a modern discourse infused with a lingering
faith in science, seem to accept that “gender” is to a large extent
socialized, but maintain that the object of socialization remains
concrete, material bodies which can be neatly differentiated on
the axis of “sex.” [...] The specter of nature, through scientific
discourse, effects a continual return to hormones, chromosomes,
genitals,  gonads,  and  sexual  reproduction  as  the  material
determinants of sexual difference, and my students seem to offer
up these libations with utter confidence.28
Hird  proceeds  to  identify  this  confidence  as  an  inherently  problematic  outlook,  drawing
critical  attention  to  the  students'  “blind  faith”  in  the  tenets  of  mainstream science  and  to  the
limitations  these  tenets  impose  onto  the  possibilities  of  deconstructing  matter.29 In  short,  the
25 Bauer, “Not Your Mom's Trans 101” <http://tranarchism.com/2010/11/26/not-your-moms-trans-101/>.
26 Cross, “A Cliché Trapped in a Metaphor's Body” <http://quinnae.com/2010/10/21/a-cliche-trapped-in-a-metaphor
%E2%80%99s-body/>.




epistemology Hird criticizes posits only gender as malleable while sex is perceived as utterly fixed,
in an apparent analogy to the respective subjects of the so-called “soft” and “hard” sciences. While
the above examples are all highly specific, they all have one trait in common: they are based on a
binary structure in which two alleged opposites are placed into a relation of hierarchy as well as
mutual exclusion, which is then treated as the blueprint for all subsequent thought and investigation
into  the  categories  thus  established,  which  are  likewise  projected  onto  a  multitude  of  other
conceptual “opposites”.30 Be it sex and gender or mind and body, we are conditioned to accept that
one in no way intervenes into the other and – as Hird illustrates on her students privileging “sex”
over other considerations – that even within these allegedly binary couplings of concepts, only one
of  the  extremes  is  conceded  to  incorporate  societal  influence.  “Gender”,  it  would  seem,  is  a
concession  by which  the  terminology of  “sex”  is  able  to  constitute  itself  as  though somehow
beyond the scope of constructivism or indeed any sociological paradigm, as beyond change.31
If, as Hird succinctly puts it, “Western understandings of 'sex' are based less upon an actual
knowledge of sex 'differences' rooted in morphology than in a cultural discourse that emphasizes
sex dichotomy rather than sex diversity”,32 it  is relatively simple to deduce that there will be a
strong tendency towards  body prescriptivism masquerading itself  as  biological  fact  in  Western
culture and, by extension, in that culture's science. This normativity will obviously affect different
demographics in different ways. Early feminist theory dealt most abundantly with the effects of the
sex/gender-normative  system on “women”  as  a  sweeping category,  only later  organizing  these
women into more concrete groups demarcated along the lines of sexual identity, race and ethnicity,
dis/ability, class and other factors. While these differences can by some logic be seen as further
solidifying the problematic binaries, they still appear to be necessary in the task of analyzing the
different effects oppression takes in a system that  does presuppose each of these binaries to be
universally and unproblematically valid in reality. By the same token, while the notion of binary sex
and/or gender difference has long been questioned and even shown to be a fiction by  context-
conscious biologists such as Hird or Fausto-Sterling, it is still useful to examine how the pervasive
culturally  conditioned  idea  that  so-called  sex  difference  should  always  fall  into  two  discrete
categories affects people by way of discrimination.
When it comes to people whose gender identity and/or bodily appearance falls outside of the
dictate of the binary, body prescriptivism is not deterred. Ever since the discourse of transsexuality-
as-disorder  gained  traction,  “corrective”  narratives  typically  target  the  body  as  that  specific
30 Gerlinda Šmausová, “Proti tvrdošíjné představě o ontické povaze gender a pohlaví” (“Against a Relentless 
Conviction of Belief in an Ontic Existence of Gender and Sex”, original author's translation of title) in Sociální 
studia (Social Studies), Vol. 7/2002 (Brno: FSS MU, 2002), and Sandra Harding quoted in Šmausová, 17-18.
31 Hird 1-2, 25.
32 Hird 2.
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component of the individual  which is “wrong”.33 At the same time, it is presumed that the body
without express intervention would have no say in its strictly defined “sex” as described in Hird's
criticism above.  In  the  normative  transsexual  narrative  (which,  as  I  have  outlined,  is  not  only
pathologizing of transsexuality but also fails to account for the genuine diversity found under the
larger trans* umbrella), there is no allowance for the body to have agency in a positive sense. Quite
the contrary, the body is conceptualized as something that starts out as an obstacle to the person's
singular identity. The idea of the static, intact self is yet another cornerstone of Western thought,
where “the self''s identity is located in consciousness, and this self-reflexive consciousness comes
before, causes, and remains unchanged within the act.”34 Within this paradigm, consciousness is
active and has a determining function in relation to the person, whereas the body is fixed and has no
agency to speak of (or indeed a voice at all).  It is interesting to note that unlike the perceived
dichotomy of  sex/gender,  it  is  the  mind  that  is  perceived  as  definitive  in  the  mind/body split
described in the citation above. Against this schematicism, however, Rosalyn Diprose argues for the
notion of “performing a body-identity”.35 According to Diprose, the static identity model itself is
what solidifies oppressive social structures: it enforces homogeneity under the supposed “normal”
and maintains a status quo where people are inescapably bound to their “proper place” in their
passive bodies.36 Under the social order imposed by these fixed categories and subject positions,
Diprose concludes  that  each person is  only given a  correspondingly binary set  of  options:  “to
change my mind or to change my body.”37 
The link of this restricted choice to the issue of trans* so-called normalization is evident. If
medicine accepts the premise that the mind is solely responsible for trans* people's identification,
then every trans* body must be changed. It is this notion of uniform necessity that is problematic
and lends itself so readily to oppression, not the possibility of attaining body modifications per se.
Ideally, trans* people (and indeed all people by extension) would be free to choose whether and
how to modify their bodies, based on the same individual considerations that are supposedly  so
indispensable to  identity in  the modern  sense.  By contrast,  oppressive  practices  arise  from the
presupposition that changing the body – but only in certain predetermined ways – is a foregone
conclusion as soon as a person has been relegated to a negatively marked social category such as
“the transsexual”. In addition, the responsibility for there being such an oppressed class is diverted
33 The general idea of “wrong bodies”, which I will return to shortly, is discussed in detail by Nikki Sullivan, “The 
Role of Medicine in the (Trans)Formation of 'Wrong' Bodies” in Body & Society, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Los Angeles, 
London, New Delhi and Singapore: SAGE Publications, 2008).





from social hierarchy onto the individual, who is then asked to conform more closely to what is
presumed to be the ideal: “to 'pass' you must have the proper body, the body that signifies the
identity  desired  by  the  law”.38 The  “sex”  status  of  a  person  is  likewise  never  a  matter  of
straightforward  description  taking place  in  some universal,  unproblematic  reality.  Rather,  what
allegedly constitutes a person's affiliation with a specific normative “sex” is prescriptive, “desired
by the law” – in the Czech Republic, literally so. Along with this, the general imperative to “pass” –
that is,  to project the one appearance that is seen as the most respectable and the most  readily
intelligible  for  a  given  identity  –  has  arguably  been  a  feature  of  the  normative  discourse  of
transsexuality from its very conception. A trans* person who is happy without body modifications
or with only select ones does not “pass”  either. Although, as argued earlier, the terminology of
passing itself is misleading if it refers to society correctly gendering a trans* person, it can be useful
in identifying a set of norms for appearances and how they are policed/demanded of trans* people:
“Passing generally means 'looking cis.'”39 
Powered by the image of the inert body as something that always needs the same intervention
in  order  to  be  rid  of  its  alleged  pathology,  a  plethora of  stereotypes  that  disempower  trans*
individuals and simplify diverse experiences into one homogeneous mass emerge.  These  are  then
treated  as  somehow more  valid  than  personal  identification  or  experience.  The  concept  of  the
“wrong”  body is  also  dangerous  for  other  reasons,  all  of  which  act  together to  create  further
epistemological and physical barriers. According to Nikki Sullivan, 
in  conceiving of  the  wrong body as  merely a  thing  which  is
separate from, and at odds with, the self, such an analogy not
only  fails  to  account  for  bodily  specificity,  but  ultimately
perpetuates  the  phenomenological  conditions,  the  sense  of
profound alienation, that requires wrong body narratives in the
first place.40
As illustrated by Diprose earlier  as well,  dualism along with exclusionary binarism bring
about a situation where the mind-self is simultaneously given priority over the body and deprived
of  agency through the ideology of  the  fixity of  the body (and identity).  Significantly,  Sullivan
identifies the “wrong body” as a trope and a “required narrative”.41 It goes without saying that the
requirement to present a particular narrative is not being made by “nature” or by the body itself.
The body becomes a prime object to be manipulated not because it would be such an object “in
reality”, but because the overlapping discourses of fixity, homogeneity and arbitrary wrongness that
constitute  the  dominant  transsexual  narrative  construe  it  as  such.  The  homogeneity  and
38 Diprose 62.




“correctness” of identity are both salient to the narrative, as Sullivan notes when critiquing “the
opinion that while transsexualism is an unfortunate aberration and sex reassignment surgery (as a
corrective  procedure  that  enables  the  transition  from  one  sex  to  another)  is  acceptable,
transgenderism (or  the modification of  bodies  in  ways that  do not  render  them either  male  or
female) is a kind of madness we cannot really afford to condone.”42 Though I believe that defining
specifically and only non-binary body modifications as “transgenderism” is somewhat incorrect
since  transgender  is  an  identity  category  that  does  not  necessarily presuppose  any surgical  or
hormonal treatments, Sullivan's point goes a long way to highlight the moral panic associated with
gender transgression as well as the patronizing idea that genital surgery is only desirable when it
serves to “correct unfortunate aberrations.” The fact that “transsexualism” as a pathology is the only
category that is viewed as presenting a necessity is typical of the medical discourse as well.
A vital axiom in the sexological text I focus on in the second half of my analysis is just the
assumption that it should not be allowed for both the mind and the body to be right on some level if
a  person is  trans*.  The legitimacy of one depends on the rejection of  the other,  resulting in a
discourse that forces the trans* subject to accept some form of pathology in order to be  seen as
“correctly” articulating their identity. It is as though the normative transsexual narrative has two
subjects: the person's identity and the body, both of which are only “made subjects” through “a law
of truth” by which they recognize and are recognized,  in “a form of power that subjugates and
makes subject to.”43 The measure of correctness is thus the intelligibility of a normative trans*
identity to  cisnormative gatekeepers, policy-makers, and society at large. While adapting to this
discourse can, in the current arrangement, bring some material support to the individual  (such as
HRT or  surgery  if  desired),  it  does  so  at  the  cost  of  giving  up  the  capacity  to  describe  and
conceptualize  one's  own  body  in  a  way  tailored  to  the  person  in  question  rather  than  to  a
predetermined discursive package. In other words, “to express the ‘wrong body in the right way’”44
means to give up authority and self-determination as far as corporeality goes. HRT or other bodily
modifications “need” to be framed as a medically necessary intervention in order to be accepted by
the dominant discourse. Making them continent upon individual wishes – even though the notion of
respecting  individual  wishes  that  do  no  harm to  others  is  otherwise  a  cornerstone  of  modern
democracy  –  appears  to  be  unacceptable  to  traditional  sexology.  This  creates  the  paradoxical
situation that in a society that valorizes self-determination and autonomy, trans* people are subject
to special rules where pathology and “correctly” articulated necessity, not personal autonomy, are
42 Sullivan 110.
43 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power” in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4 (The University of Chicago Press, 1982)
781.
44 Jordan quoted in Sullivan 110.
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being viewed as the standard and valid  means to assert identity because of the way in which a
particular discourse, expecting a particular sort of subjectivity, has rendered the body expendable
and established a whole narrative that ensures that “the soul is the prison of the body”.45
It is no accident or one-purpose pun that Sullivan's title speaks of “the (trans)formation of
'wrong' bodies” by medicine: the fact is not that bodies would simply be transformed from “wrong”
to “right”, a one-way street made accessible by the miracle of the clinic. It is medicine itself that
transforms  bodies  into  “wrong”  bodies,  and  then  again  into  “right”  ones  through  normalizing
mechanisms. It bears saying that in the Czech context, this assumption is even written into common
slang surrounding medical transition, such as one phrase that roughly translates to “getting oneself
operated [into the 'opposite' gender]” (nechat se přeoperovat). This terminology goes out of its way
to  assert  that  it  is  medicine,  specifically  surgery,  that  determines  gender  affiliation.  It  also
incorporates the assumption of a simple binary switch that will, with the application of the proper
surgical method, produce a “normal” man or woman who will not trouble the binarist worldview to
which humanity is subject here. This “normal” man or woman must of course conform to what
constituted the norm in the first place: “Under the binary phallocratic founding myth by which
Western bodies and subjects are authorized, only one body per gendered subject is 'right'. All other
bodies are wrong.”46 Hence all the generic and generalizing claims about what it means to have a
“male or female” body.
While it is a credible enough claim that  some trans* people (“some” being the “forgotten
word” Sandy Stone's groundbreaking essay alludes to)47 may feel as though their body is a “wrong
fit”,  the  idea  that  all trans*  people  will  share  that feeling is  neither  empirically  provable  nor
academically sound (like any other absolute generalization). Many trans* people, for instance those
I have quoted so far, have already transparently stated that the “wrong body” trope is not how they
conceptualize  their  embodied  selves.  Some point  out  the  discrepancy between the  normalizing
discourse and their lived experience outright, as well as the entrapping nature of the narrative: “The
prison was not my body, the prison was what society was doing with it.”48 Rather than assume in
absolutes, then, it would be more constructive to ask whether the requirement to self-describe in
terms of the “wrong body” creates a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy in the extent to which it can be
internalized, which in turn appears to confirm the norm circulated in society about “wrong” bodies.
45 Foucault quoted in Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1999/2002) 172.
46 Sandy Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0 (sandystone.com under Creative 
Commons, 2014; originally published in Body Guards: The Cultural Politics of Gender Ambiguity [New York: 
Routledge, 1991]), page unnumbered in text. 
47 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text. 
48 Cross, “A Cliché Trapped in a Metaphor's Body” <http://quinnae.com/2010/10/21/a-cliche-trapped-in-a-metaphor
%E2%80%99s-body/>.
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To return to Sullivan's analysis, this norm is clearly identified as one that is tied to the provision of
medical services or their refusal:
[T]he  image  of  the  self  trapped  in  a  body  that  is  alien  and
alienating. ‘I am a woman in the shell of a man. . . . I am marked
by Nature as a male,  but I  have the .  .  .  heart  and soul of a
woman’  (letter  from  anonymous  correspondent,  cited  in
Cauldwell, 1949: 7) is a refrain with which we are all familiar.
Indeed,  this  split  between body and self,  sex and gender,  has
come to personify the transsexual condition and to be regarded
as one of the primary criteria for sex reassignment.49
The usual reference to rigid conceptual binaries is coupled with the legitimization of “the
transsexual condition” by suffering, resulting in a thoroughly negative view with a toxic potential
for being internalized by trans* people as well as turned into a homogenizing stereotype by the
surrounding world.  The  body  is  not  only  alienated  and  presented  as  pathological,  but  also
“constitute[d] as im-proper, that is, as not the property of the subject, and [...] surgery as the means
by which to overcome somatic non-ownership”.50 While surgery is being touted as the one-size-fits-
all solution to this perceived “non-ownership”, the cultural assumption that trans* people do not
own their own bodies unless they have surgery is not being interrogated either. In sum, the “wrong
body”  trope  produces  its  own  normativity  and  polarization  of  arbitrary  “right”  and  “wrong”
physical configurations just by virtue of being the dominant mode of narration that has come to
serve as the standard legitimizing device for transitioning surgically:
[T]hose  seeking  surgery  have  been  required  to  express  the
‘wrong body in the  right  way’,  that  is,  to  articulate  a  ‘wrong
body and a right mind’ (Jordan, 2004: 339). Further, insofar as
the  sex/gender  distinction  constitutes  the  body as  neutral  and
passive  with  regard  to  the  formation  of  consciousness,  it
reproduces a rationalist agenda (Gatens, 1996: 7) in which the
specificity  of  bodily  being,  the  ‘identity  of  one’s  difference’
(Diprose, 1994: 110) is, in effect, erased. 51
Again,  there  is  a  commingling  of  ideas  crystallizing as  a  normative  image  with  a
“normalizing” impact. In further contrast to the paradigm applied to non-trans* subjects that simply
privileges the mind over the body, trans* subjects (all generalized as being the same flavour of
transsexual by the medical narrative) are accorded neither body ownership nor a perceived freedom
of decision in the mind. After all, the paternalistic “correction” of the body can only occur on the
condition that a certain set of mental prerequisites is met, or at least affected for the benefit of the
doctor in order to gain access to treatment in the unequal power relations between doctors and
clients,  between  the  medical  discourse  and  stigmatized  subjectivity.  Like  the  metaphorical  rift
49 Sullivan 106.
50 Prosser quoted in Sullivan 107.
51 Sullivan 110.
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between mind and body, nature and culture, or indeed sex and gender, the separation of the self
from  the  body  performed  by  the  dominant  narrative  of  transsexuality discursively  erases  the
complex functioning of society, “nature” and identity. This is why, in cautioning against the spectre
of reifying binarism among trans* people, cisgender researchers must take into account how such
reification is actually demanded by other cis people and by the “fixations” of a discourse tailored to
their epistemology.52 It is easy and, in my view, even quite right to argue that transition options
should be available to be pursued in ways that “do not reinforce problematic gender ideologies and
binaries”,53 but the onus to make this possible is  not on the trans* people seeking out medical
transition  options,  but  on  the  health  care  professionals  and  legal  policy-makers who  act  as
gatekeepers  to  and  mediators  of  said  options.  As  the  medical  system  currently  stands,  not
performing in accordance with the binary can lead to outright refusal, whether or not the trans*
person in question feels adequately represented by binary presuppositions.
To  clarify  the  exact  point  of  contention  with  regards  to  embodiment  and  the  normative
discourse around it for good, it is not the fact that some trans* individuals might find the language
of bodily dysphoria and misalignment useful to describe their situation. Problems only arise when
this specific kind of dysphoria (or even dysphoria in general) is posited as a mandatory requirement
for “qualifying” as trans* and being worthy of respect as far as gender identity goes. Not only is
this the essence of arbitrary gatekeeping, but it also, crucially, equates trans* status with discomfort.
That is neither accurate nor ethical. The inaccuracy is obvious: it is impossible to prove that  all
trans* people will relate to their bodies in the dysphoria-determined way, let alone that they would
all  share the same kind of dysphoria even if they did.  There is  no essential  reason why trans*
people's relationships to their bodies should be any less varied than those found within any other
population; insisting that it is uniform is a hallmark of the normative transsexuality discourse.  The
ethical dimension is  a little more opaque but  no less vital  to acknowledge: the moment trans*
people are  defined solely or  mainly in  terms of  discomfort,  it  becomes  easy for  the dominant
discourse to justify causing more discomfort by making certain medical interventions mandatory –
after all, discomfort is a given for the trans* population either way according to this outlook, so
there is no body integrity to respect. (This idea of disintegration is notably echoed in the rhetoric of
a mind-body “split”, which itself posits an insurmountable “gap” in trans* existence). I point all of
this out mainly because it demonstrates that  the negative connotations of trans* identity in the
dominant discourse encompass far more than surface stereotyping that would be remedied by mere
52 Cross, “I Am Whoever You Say I Am” <http://quinnae.com/2010/10/01/i-am-whoever-you-say-i-am/>.
53 Betsy Hartmann, “Old Roots, New Shoots: Eugenics of the Everyday” in Different Takes, No. 47 (Amherst: The 
Population and Development Program at Hampshire College, 2007) 2. While extremely important in content, the 
paper itself sadly “reinforces a problematic gender binary/ideology” in the conceptualization of transition, stating on
the same page that HRT makes bodies “more biologically male or female” [emphasis mine].
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avoidance of the most blatant sorts of transphobia; rather, the negativity is foundational even to the
institutions that supposedly focus only on “helping”. It is also a strategic feature of any paradigm
that  is  predicated  on  keeping  the  stigmatized  subject  subordinate.  A condition  that  is  only
understood as a negative phenomenon can be swept into coercive “corrections” easily.  
3. Paradigms versus People
The concept of trans* identity along with its embodiment should immediately have been a
game-changer to the entire society's outlook on gender and who can “count” as a member of one.
Normative  sexology would,  of  course,  prefer  even  trans*  people  to  think  of  their  situation  as
nothing more than an exception to the rule, but this view has steadily been losing credence in the
international context, notably even in authoritative organizations such as WPATH. There is now also
a push for the trans* community, if one can be established in political terms, to mobilize along the
lines  of  a  much reconceptualized  “Trans  101” that,  instead  of  serving the  status  quo,  actually
represents the empowerment to resist and  dismantle it, as opposed to its older versions likewise
criticized by Bauer: “Trans 101 is generally not only dumbed-down, but also declawed. There are
truths that I must speak here that are incredibly threatening to a cissupremacist worldview, that
attack its very foundations.”54 This assertion is far from overstated or grandiose. If the reality of
gender diversity were less threatening, the discourses of sexology and conditional legal recognition
would not have dedicated such resources to reframing it in those “declawed” terms.
Constructivist, and particularly feminist, criticisms of positivist approaches generally point to
the problem that researchers can never completely avoid bringing their beliefs into their field, nor
should they attempt or pretend to do so: “Feminists insist that it is not possible for researchers
to be completely detached from their work: emotional involvement cannot be controlled by mere
effort of will and this subjective element in research should be acknowledged, even welcomed.”55
With  respect  to  marginalized  identities  and  social  groups,  the  question  of  why subjectivity  is
stigmatized by positivists and what effects that stigmatization has becomes even more pressing than
when  discussed  in  the  abstract. The  people  who  directly  experience  the  “condition”  and  who
negotiate  their  (trans*)gender  identities  within  the  system  laid  out  for  them  by  “experts” are
precisely those whose input is  not considered to be the authoritative one. While this is clearly a
conundrum, the illusion of expert neutrality and maintenance of the disconnect between “expert”
and “patient” are both necessary for the positivist-essentialist paradigm to function. Acknowledging
personal experience with the subject matter or its lack is viewed as impermissible  in positivism.
54 Bauer, “Not Your Mom's Trans 101” <http://tranarchism.com/2010/11/26/not-your-moms-trans-101/>.
55 Letherby 68.
29
This is precisely what feminists, as here Reinharz and others, have drawn attention to:
“Starting  from  one's  own  experience”  violates  the
conventional  expectation  that  a  researcher  be  detached,
objective, and “value neutral.” In 1971 British sociologist
Ann  Oakley  had  already  written  that  these  approaches
were themselves not “value neutral” but rather were “often
simply  a  cover  for  patriarchy.”[140]  Other  feminist
scholars challenge the concept of objectivity,  concurring
instead with biologist Ruth Hubbard, that what passes for
“objective”  is  actually  the  position  of  privileged  white
males.56
The patriarchy  is an intersectional player, not a contained one.  By demonstrating, as Bauer
does in his comments on bodies  not  running contrary to gender identity, that being a certain sex
and/or gender is not necessarily innate or immutable (or at least not the way patriarchal society and
science imagine it should be), heterosexuality – perceived as the default and most valuable sexuality
–  loses  its  symbolic  definiteness,  and  so  do  all  the  concepts  that  make  its  exclusive  position
possible, gender and sex being no exception. As Judith Butler famously urged us to realize, the
performance of gender disguised as an “organizing gender core” is intimately linked to the practice
of compulsory heterosexuality,57 and though much has been rightly argued against the conflation of
gender identity and sexuality, the problem remains that the dominant gendered order does perceive
marginalized sexualities and genders as two sides of the same devalued coin. If trans* identities did
not destabilize the entire system supporting the primacy of heterosexuality-as-norm that depends on
simplistic definitions of what it means to be a man  or a woman (and only those identities), the
backlash  against  their  very  existence  may not  have  manifested  itself  on  every  level  of  social
organization the way it has. The dominant gender order is both cissexist and homophobic  at the
same  time.  That  is  not  to  say  that  transphobia  and  cissexism  should  be  relegated  to  mere
subcategories of homophobia or vice versa, but to point out that intersectionality, conspicuously
missing from the discourse of Czech sexology, is necessary to understand not only how gender
oppression interacts with other areas of oppression, but also how it acts within itself. A potentially
infinite range of sexualities is perceived as equally undesirable as a potentially infinite range of
genders and sexes, by the patriarchal order and by the trendsetters of Czech sexology. 
That transsexuality has become the go-to category for the dominant discourse to interpret and
de facto appropriate gender diversity is not the effect of a single insular belief, as would be tempting
to  say with  restrictive  thought  systems  exemplified  here  by the  normative  sexology discourse.
Rather,  it  is  a  whole system of beliefs – which are barely  understood as such – resulting in a
56 Reinharz 261.
57 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York and London: Routledge, 
1999/2002) 173.
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multitude of effects all incorporating the dominant mode of knowledge. The obligatory treatment of
the sex binary is the central tenet of this belief system. The privileging of this model is admitted,
though without the added critical reflection, even in the  Transsexuality manual when one of the
guest authors responds to the all too common variant of transphobia that engineers a sense of moral
panic around fluctuating gender roles and designations that “no transsexual denies the dyadism of
human sex”.58 Countering the usual argument against transitioning in such a way is convenient and
safe,  of  course,  because  the  contentious  part  is  banished  to  an  area that  is  perceived as  being
secondary to the “general” issue (particular morals as being secondary to the broad two-sex system,
into which binary transition is easily incorporated), and only that specific part of the argument is
then refuted (“transsexuals” are not immoral or threatening, because they do not call the concept of
exactly two sexes into question,  ergo transition is acceptable). This kind of reasoning can be the
easy defence not only to sexology, but even to some trans* people who either want to avoid being
put into a position where the onus of  explaining why the two-sex system is  simplifying would
constantly be on them or genuinely feel  themselves to be covered by the two-sex system as it
stands.  Taking the  moral  deflection logic to its  extreme,  “transsexuals” are not a subversive or
dangerous category because their  only “sin” is  being unlucky enough to have had their  “wires
crossed” – but if they could, they too would choose the unproblematic cis designations and can be
counted on to uphold these by performing their identified gender “correctly” regardless. To what
extent all this is latently transphobic and patronizing in content would require its own analysis; for
now, in terms of how the discourse functions, the defensive strategy illustrates the broad problem
that “changing the terms of an argument is exceedingly difficult, since the dominant definition of
the problem acquires,  by repetition, and by the weight and credibility of those who propose or
subscribe  it,  the  warrant  of  'common sense'.”59 The  way the  Czech  discourse  of  transsexuality
functions is a textbook example of this problem: it is sexology that defines the terms due to its
authority, and all dissenting or “alternative” readings are either marginalized or utterly unknown.
The expectation even for critics of the dominant discourse to accept its terms – that there are only
two  easily  defined  “sexes”,  that  “transsexuality”  is  a  disorder,  and  so  on  –  in  other  words,
“perform[ing] with the established terms of the problematic in play”60 is evidenced both by the
resistance of the sexologist discourse to gender theory and/or human rights concerns and by the fact
that many trans* people never do think of themselves as anything other than “transsexuals who need
correcting”. It is difficult to abandon the coerced legitimization of trans* identities through medical
58 Jiří Skoblík in Hana Fifková et al., Transsexualita: Diagnostika a léčba (Transsexuality: Diagnostics and Treatment)
(Prague: Grada, 2002)114.
59 Stuart Hall, “The Rediscovery of Ideology” in Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (eds.), Literary Theory: An Anthology
(London: Blackwell Publishers, 1998) 1062.
60 Hall 1061.
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“common sense” reasonings, or to bypass these discourses altogether and assert that whether or not
one views human sex as dyadic, access to transition resources should be based on  a meaningful
personal decision that should not need additional legitimization from gatekeepers to begin with. 
4. The Etiology of Etiology
The drive to find precisely that additional legitimization – through “hard data”, preferably – is
arguably a mainstay in the pathologizing discourse of transsexuality. Trans* people are viewed as a
problem of insufficiently explained origin yet with potentially far-reaching consequences for the
present order,  a kind of random cancer of gender. With respect to Transsexuality in particular, the
opinion  that  “a  disorder  as  severe  as  transsexuality  doubtless  is”61 necessitates  etiological
investigation is made explicit. The placement of this assertion – and a whole chapter on etiology (an
extremely outdated and conceptually sloppy one, as I examine later on) – near the beginning of the
book speaks volumes about the authors' priorities in treating trans* people as a medical aberration
that cannot be allowed to exist without a clear etiology behind it, an etiology that would “prove”
that being trans* cannot be a “choice”, since choice is demonized as illegitimate in this context,
retroactively feeding into the broader demonization of any and all agency in conjunction with trans*
people.  My  aim  for  the  time  being  is  not  so  much  to  disprove  particular  studies  and  their
assumptions  with  specific  data,  but  to  investigate  why something as  conceptually perilous  and
empirically patchy as a supposed trans* etiology is being privileged by cisgender sexologists and
other positivists to such an extent and what effects this has on the broader  medical  discourse  of
transsexuality. On the one hand, it clearly has to do with the objectifying mode of cis research into
trans* people brought up earlier (and how that legitimizes academic exploitation), but it also seems
to function to keep the issue of gender identity apolitical and thus rendering society irresponsible for
gendered oppression (and thus legitimizing social exploitation and bigotry). 
The first question to ask is whether etiology ever constitutes a credible source of recognition
for an oppressed group. The reason I pose it in such absolute terms is not to encourage dogmatic
thinking but  to highlight  that  the answer of  “yes” or “no” to  this  question corresponds to  two
fundamentally  divergent  paradigms.  The  first  paradigm,  which  I  will  provisionally  call  the
sexological one, believes that etiology is necessary both because this corresponds to the traditional
endeavour of positivist “problem-solving” and because it views the existence of trans* people as not
a  strong  enough  indicator  of  their  place  in  the  world  by itself.  Interestingly,  trans*  people  in
particular are  not even the first  subjects  of this  sort  of etiological  legitimization of gender and
sexual diversity, as Betsy Hartmann summarizes in context here:
61 Hana Fifková and Petr Weiss Fifková et al. 21.
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[Q]ueer rights activists find themselves on tricky ground when it
comes to the search for a genetic basis of homosexuality. “Of all
the groups targeted by biological determinism,” writes Ordover,
“queers seem to be the only ones who have looked to eugenics
to deliver us from marginalization.” Ordover is referring to the
push by several gay male scientists in the 1990s to locate a “gay
gene,” partly as a strategy to win greater social acceptance and
legal rights for homosexuals.62 
Two points warrant heightened attention in this analysis: one, that biological determinism is
practically inseparable from eugenics,  especially in  dealing with marginalized  groups to  whom
negative  connotations are attached by dominant society, and two, that etiological/eugenic theories
supplant  political  and  social  activism  particularly  in  relation  to  LGBTIQ*  rights  by  safely
establishing this presently marginalized status as  a  non-choice. Sure enough, making an appeal to
“nature”  is  tempting  in  light  of  the  accusations  of  LGBTIQ*  people's  “unnatural”  behaviour
(particularly by the religious right in the US context), but it is debatable to what extent eugenic
ideology can ever come close to approximating what “nature” is, as it strives to eliminate biological
diversity.  It  is  precisely  diversity  that  is  inseparable  from  biology,  including  in  the  area  of
sex/gender, as e.g. Myra Hird outlines in her chapters on such diversity “In Nonhuman Animals”
and  “In  Human  Animals”.63 Therefore,  arguments  from  “nature”  that  only  serve  to  cement
conventional preconceptions about how sex, gender and sexuality “should” function are particularly
dangerous, because their primarily ideological slant is easily masked and can even appear to have a
beneficial telos. The illusionary quality of doing “good” through eugenics is likewise pointed out by
Hartmann and Nancy Ordover:
The  search  for  a  gay  gene  is  not  only  scientifically  flawed,
Ordover  argues,  but  politically  flawed,  reinforcing  eugenic
thinking in other arenas (race, crime, urbanization and class) and
posing  no  substantive  challenge  to  homophobia.  She  urges
queers  “to  opt  out  of  nature  versus  nurture  arguments
altogether.”[9]64
Have LGBTIQ* people opted out? On the one hand, political activism around cis people with
marginalized sexualities (gay, lesbian, bi-/pansexual, etc.) is now much less plagued by biological
determinism,  at  least  on  the  surface.  The  continuity  between  what  is  now  assumed  to  be  the
“etiology” of gender diversity and those outmoded notions of “explaining” marginalized sexualities
becomes clear, however, in the below analysis by Costello:
Once upon a time, in the fairly recent past, people often asked
what made a person gay or lesbian – taking the perspective that
62 Hartmann, and Ordover quoted in Hartmann 2.
63 Hird 90-142. In Hird's case, the reference to “animals” with respect to humans is not designed to play into 
simplifying narratives that would only serve to naturalize sexist social norms, making her use of this “animal 
language” a responsible one, unlike the various essentialist conceits of evo-psychology and/or pop biology.
64 Hartmann and Ordover quoted in Hartmann 2.
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homosexuality was a pathology that needed explanation. Various
theories  were  proposed:  psychological  (could  a  domineering
mother and passive father be the cause?); moral (was it a failure
to  embrace  “traditional  Christian  family  values”?);  and
biological  (was  there  some  hormone  imbalance  or  brain
abnormality at fault?).65
As will be shown later on in my examination of  Transsexuality, these questions are  akin to
what the authors of that publication outline as having been the major theories surrounding “the
etiology of transsexuality”, before they alight on the hormone imbalance/brain abnormality theory
as their preferred hermeneutics. The religiously moral dimension is mostly missing from the Czech
context, given that the role of Christianity in public life is much lesser there than in the US, but the
psychological and biological theories could as well have been verbatim. The notion of a “pathology
needing explanation” is central to the discourse of etiology. The sexologists' investment in being the
custodians  of   this  deterministic  explanation  of  gender  diversity becomes transparent  when we
consider, again, that etiology can easily distort or altogether supplant social and political activism.
Etiology  can  go  so  far  as  to  give even  the  marginalized  group  concerned  the  motivation  to
perpetuate the alleged necessity of explaining its constitutive “disorder”:
[T]rans people today face such virulent bigotry that many trans
people  hope  finding  scientific  proof  that  there  is  some
immutable, physical reason for trans gender identity, beyond the
individual's control, will lead to greater social acceptance. […]
many trans people (it must be clear by now that I am not one of
them) are looking for a brain structure housing gender identity.
They argue that people are born with a “brain sex,” and that if
this  “brain sex” differs from the individual's  genital  sex, they
suffer from an intersex condition that must be treated via gender
transition.66 
Along  with  the  erosion  of  trans*  people's  autonomy and  agency  from within  and  from
without,  the  instrumentalization  of  intersex  status  is  typical  of  etiological  approaches.  In
Transsexuality, the section on etiology says remarkably little on trans* identity and a whole lot on
questionably categorized intersex “disorders” as if they in and of themselves “proved” anything
about trans* status in general. Furthermore, as an intersex trans man, Costello is obviously right to
point out that intersex and trans* statuses are far from interchangeable. To equate the two means to
engage in a sort of appropriation that inexcusably erases that “the issues intersex people face center
on forced sex assignment in childhood – something which advocates of the intersex brain thesis
tacitly support when they argue that since trans status arises from an intersex brain, it 'must' be
65 Cary Gabriel Costello, “On Trans Gender Identity and the 'Intersex Brain'” in TransFusion, <http://trans-
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treated  medically.”67 In  sum,  it  is  ongoing justification  of  non-consent,  not  empowerment,  that
results from the etiological paradigm and marks it as unfit for any truly progressive agenda for
trans* or intersex issues; “[t]he solution to transphobia is not neurology, but political activism.”68 
Even when appropriation is not present, the idea that taking a stance against transphobia must
be predicated on some biological “truth” is flawed  because  it implies that unless being trans* is
unequivocally involuntary (or perhaps pre-voluntary, according to the fetal exposure hypothesis),
transphobia is not bigotry. What this says about the moral bankruptcy that  likely goes into  such
unabashed denial of societal responsibility for transphobia could easily be its own research project;
for the time being, suffice it to say that condemning transphobia only under certain conditions is not
in itself an ethical stance at all. Like in other areas where human rights considerations and their
ethical aspects have become the main reference point, one “should avoid bigotry because it’s simply
the right thing to do.”69 Demanding an additional reason to abstain from transphobia is an admission
that no ethical stance is actually being taken on its own merits.
What  other  problems  does  emphasizing  etiology  present?  As  will  be  shown  in  specific
examples from  Transsexuality later in this study, the idea of etiology espoused by the sexologist
discourse presupposes uniformity and fixity in several key areas: in the brain (disregarding brain
plasticity and the effects of experience on neurological structures)70, in developmental patterns, in
gender roles. Although my criticism of the body of research that the authors of Transsexuality rely
on as  being out of date can be seen by some as self-serving (as if just by being “old”, research
automatically became invalid regardless of its content), I do believe that using decades-old studies
to the exclusion of contemporary ones is an outrageous manipulation of the discourse in this case.
To start with, acceptable gender roles and thinkable gender identities have  observably changed in
the past decade, let alone  the past two or three. Some view these changes as positive and long
overdue while some others view them as threatening, but remarkably there is little  denial in the
discourse  of  the  popular  media  as  well  as  various  morally  normative  institutions  about  these
changes happening. To divorce them from investigations into “transsexuality” is a tactical decision
that frames an uncomfortable sociocultural truth as irrelevant to the matter being investigated, as if
there were no sociocultural components to gender identity and human development at all. Likewise,
to act as though there have been no significant developments and conceptual shifts in the fields of
67 Costello, “On Trans Gender Identity and the 'Intersex Brain'” <http://trans-fusion.blogspot.com
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sociology, biology, neurology, or indeed in our understandings of gender, sex and sexuality since the
mid-20th century  is  both  factually  baseless  and  ethically  unconscionable  if  one  purports  to  do
“good”, accountable science.
The  truly  interesting  way to  look  at  etiology would  be  to  consider  where  the  dominant
concepts – such as heterosexuality or cisgender identity – “came from” and how they ascended to
such a privileged position that all other identities are now treated as marginal and/or pathological to
keep  the  current  hierarchy  in  place  in  Western  culture.  These  research  interests  are  rendered
practically unthinkable in the sexological take on etiology: “Where are the studies that inquire why
cis  people are  cis?  Or why heterosexual  people are  het?  Because this  is  the presumed,  normal
default of society it goes unmarked and unquestioned”.71 The etiology of the normative positions
and their lack of self-reflection alike is rooted in no vaguely defined brain centres, but in society,
and the refusal to acknowledge that fact is, like most features of normative discourses, purposeful.
That heterosexuality is as historical and culturally specific as anything else, contrary to the fiction
of  its  ahistorical  nature,  was  unmasked  with  particular  efficiency  by  Jonathan  Katz.72 The
emergence of discrete sexual identities as organizing blocks of society had been mapped out by
Michel  Foucault  even  before  that  in  relation  to  the  category  of  homosexuality,  when  “the
homosexual was now a species.”73 As for the overarching model of sex all these identities become
discursively  predicated  on,  Thomas  Laqueur  concludes  from  his  analysis  of  the  differently
hierarchical one-sex model that gained currency in antiquity that
the physiology and even the anatomy of generation are but local
instances of a way of talking about the body very different from
our own. Visible flesh and blood cannot be regarded as the stable
“real”  foundation  for  cultural  claims  about  it.  Indeed,  the
interpretive problem is understanding the purchase of “real” and
the degree to which biology is only the expression of other and
more pervasive truths.74
The fact that Laqueur's observation need not be confined to the model of sex employed by the
ancient  Greeks  is  readily apparent;  it  is  social  context  that  endows biology with  meaning and
“truth”, not vice versa. That much can be said about the current two-sex model with its own host of
symbolic, not “natural”, hierarchies and preconceptions as to how humans ought to be divided. The
argument  that  the  ancient  Greeks  and their  Renaissance  followers  were  simply  wrong and our
present-day society,  being  more  advanced on some linear  scale  of  progress,  has  arrived  at  the
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“right” idea of sex differentiation (as opposed to ancient superstition) may be a beloved rhetorical
strategy in essentialist hermeneutics, but the absence of self-reflection in this outlook should not
mislead  its  audience  into  thinking  that  self-reflection is  not  necessary here.  Let  us  revisit  the
insights of Myra Hird, who has this to say on the positivist notion that the current schematics of sex
are beyond social/symbolic influence and beyond (now purportedly scientific) superstition:
Rather  than  demonstrating  the  advance  of  modern
understandings of  the body, these analyses suggest that objects
do not  express  meaning  in  and  of  themselves,  but  are  made
meaningful  in  their  interpretation;  that  we  continue  to
superimpose  dichotomies  onto  shades  of  variability.  Thus,
Renaissance drawings depicting the vagina as an interior penis
reveal  that  dominant  discourse,  not  accurate  observation,
determines how the body is seen and understood. Therefore, it is
not  that  we  now  know  the  “truth”  of  the  body:  rather  that
“gender” discourses  are already at work  on any discussions of
“sex,” before they begin.[12] In short, like “gender,” “sex” is an
invention.75
Here we thus have a genealogy – or etiology, if you will – of social forces privileging certain
constructs while ostracizing others, an observation that is of course unacceptable to any essentialist
discourse couched in the presumption of a decontextualized biological “wrong” with the people
who fall in the currently ostracized categories. Behaviours and perhaps in some differently context-
dependent way identities that would nowadays be considered homo- or heterosexual,  or indeed
trans*, likely did physically occur in history prior to the last few centuries and outside of the West.
What is fallacious is the assumption that these identities would have been conceptualized the same
way they are  today in  the  West  across  historical  periods  and  across  cultures.  In  the  hands  of
conservative theorists, such ahistorical projections usually do not serve to assert the legitimacy of
queer and/or trans* identities anyway; rather their purpose is to solidify the current norms, which
need their “others” to be intelligible in an “interdependent, hierarchical relation of signification.”76
Yet, at the same time, there is a certain internal irresponsibility, almost ungratefulness, present in
any outlook that advocates for a total  assimilation of “abnormal” bodies and identities into the
existing  order.  (With  respect  to  trans*  people,  this  position  can  encompass  anything  from the
sexological  insistence on “blending in” and not  acknowledging a  trans* identity at  any cost  to
abusive conversion “therapy” to “turn the person cis”.) Fausto-Sterling's commentary on “biological
investigators” who define intersex conditions only to pursue an agenda of engineering them out of
existence is readily applicable here as well:
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They [biologists] use the infrequent to illuminate the common.
The former they call abnormal, the latter normal. Often, as is the
case  for  [John]  Money and  others  in  the  medical  world,  the
abnormal  requires  management  [...]  management  means
conversion  to  the  normal.  Thus,  we  have  a  profound  irony.
Biologists  and  physicians  use  natural  biological  variation  to
define normality.  Armed with this  description,  they set  out  to
eliminate the natural variation that gave them their definitions in
the first place.77
 This is perhaps the most elegant summary of both the unnatural etiology of “normality” and
its destructive effect on the diversity that does occur in nature.  Another painful failure of single-
issue, single-source etiology is that it fails to account for biological diversity within genders and
within groups (including the diverse group of trans* people that it so erroneously simplifies into one
uniform aberration from the cis normal), and that it disregards the interplay of biological, social and
personal factors in its attempts to separate them from one another for an easy explanation.78 When
gender diversity, particularly of the intersex variety, is mentioned, it is conventionally misconstrued
to fit the existing sex classification, considering that “intersexuals, seen as deviations from the norm
who need to be 'fixed'  in order to preserve a two-gender system, are also studied to prove how
'natural' the system is to begin with.”79 (I will revisit this self-contradictory trope with respect to
Czech sexology in the second half of my analysis as well.) Drawing upon Fausto-Sterling's detailed
work on the subject of brain gendering in mainstream science, Cross offers a high-level summary of
the insufficiencies of the etiological outlook, particularly when it singles out intersex and/or trans*
people as problems that need to be “solved” by articulating a singular biological explanation:
I say this [that there is no universal, prediscursive, innate basis
for gender/sex] because this is true of absolutely everybody. Not
just trans people. […] Everyone’s gender is constructed, no one
is born a man or a woman. The subtle implication of a lot of
trans research is  that there  are male brains and female brains
when  reality  proves  to  be  far,  far  more  confounding  on  that
score than not. When we think we’ve found the key to gendered
brain  difference,  we  get  tripped  up.  “Women  have  a  bigger
corpus callosum than men! Wait,  no do they don’t.  Wait,  yes
they do! Sometimes! Behold my small data set!”80
The deliberate tone of ridiculousness that concludes the above quote is an effective way to
highlight that the concept of a unified trans* or cis male/female etiology is not simply lacking in
refinement or data, but that it also glosses over its own conceptual inadequacy to the task it purports
to do in order to produce the illusion that “essential” differences have already been proven and can
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be  meaningfully  generalized  to  entire  populations.  The  role  this  plays  in  the  constitution  of
authoritative  interpretations  of  gendered  belonging  should  be  obvious.  Lest  it  be  thought  that
prenatal etiology for gender/sex diversity would somehow pave the way to acceptance (as opposed
to eugenic abortion and IVF selection against these “defects”81 or tests “whereby folks in white
coats will be able to objectively prove that someone is trans”82), it should be noted that discourses
where the constructs of medical etiology are pervasive, such as the Czech sexological one, are far
from being renowned for their acceptance of gender/sex diversity as a legitimate reality in its own
right. What is absent from these discourses is the realization that research into etiology, whether
conducted well or not, “is an academic curiosity. It must never be the fulcrum upon which our rights
and dignity as human beings rest.”83 In addition, though this may be obvious, the very notion of
archetypal “male” and “female” brains is a cissexist  one at  its core,  what with being based on
theories  that  treat  a limited understanding of  cis  men and cis  women's  brains  as  the  definitive
concept. The extent to which they purportedly accommodate for the existence of trans* people only
goes so far as some study finding trans* people to share what is theoretically the cis gendered brain
structure,  only “switched”.  Projecting  this  reductionist,  cis-oriented  schema  onto  trans*  people
cannot by definition explain gender diversity in any meaningful way. All it does is turn it into an
inverted image of the “normal”.
5. Life In Between, Life on the Margins
The problem of the two normative gender identities – male and female, tied to masculinity
and femininity respectively – being extensively policed and sustained by repeated performance “as
a strategy of survival within compulsory systems” is well documented by Judith Butler in Gender
Trouble.84 Butler  draws  attention  to  the  compulsory  nature  of binary  –  heterosexuality  –
reproduction and  highlights  their  cultural  construction.  Contrary  to  the  fancies  of  those  who
downplay  gender  theory as  a  niche interest,  Butler's  analysis  is  useful  for  understanding  broad
dynamics of regulation and oppression; coercive gendering accomplishes much more besides “just”
gender policing as one distinct area of discrimination. Butler's explanation of this is concise: 
Discrete  genders  are  part  of  what  “humanizes”  individuals
within contemporary culture; indeed, we regularly punish those
who fail  to do their  gender right.  Because there is  neither an
“essence” that gender expresses or externalizes nor an objective
ideal to which gender aspires, and because gender is not a fact,
the various acts of gender create the idea of gender, and without
81 OII Australia, Submission on the ethics of genetic selection against intersex traits, <http://oii.org.au/25621/
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those acts, there would be no gender at all. Gender is, thus, a
construction  that  regularly  conceals  its  genesis;  the  tacit
collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete
and  polar  genders  as  cultural  fictions  is  obscured  by  the
credibility  of  those  productions—and  the  punishments  that
attend  not  agreeing  to  believe  in  them;  the  construction
“compels” our belief in its necessity and naturalness.85 
More  than  a  juxtaposition  of  innocent  descriptions,  “discrete  genders”  carry  the mixed
baggage of making the people who perform them intelligible (and privileging them over those who
do not) and exerting pressure to perform these genders “right” (and effectively engaging in identity
policing). The fact that gender affiliation is treated as one of the preconditions of humanity is in part
what fuels the pressure on people (whether or not they expressly identify as some subcategory of
trans*) to unequivocally “pick one” of the normative designations, regardless of how well either of
these  represents  the  person's  desired  identification  and/or  recognition  by  others  in  the  world.
Butler's criticism is crucial in pointing out that people who do not conform to normative genders
without reservation are not only derided as not being “proper” men or women, but also as not
“proper” human beings. Trans* people are viewed as less than ideally human just by virtue of not
being cis. It is  thus  not only the gendered social order that this discourse regulates, but humanity
itself. Objections to compulsory binarism need not be only social, as biology (“nature”) is no more
in favour of sex dichotomization than social constructivism is:
It makes as much sense, biologically speaking, to talk about zero
sexes  (we are much more similar  than we are different)  or a
thousand tiny sexes (to acknowledge the symbiotic relationships
bodies share with other bodies – bacterial or otherwise, as well
as  the  myriad  of  ways  in  which  we  reproduce  other  than
sexually) as it does to talk of two sexes.86 
To sum up, the notion of exactly two sexes as the way to understand biology is not sustained
in its exclusiveness by biology. Hird actually  remarks on  the productiveness of joining together
sociological,  particularly  feminist,  inquiry  with  critical  biology,  arguing  that  it  is
“counterproductive” for feminists to disregard the natural sciences because “new materialism argues
so strongly for concepts (contingency, nonlinearity, selforganization, and diversity) that are keenly
supported by social constructionist (and particularly poststructural) analyses.”87 She recognizes that
“by challenging 'sex,'  we challenge  not only assumptions about 'gender'  but the binary itself.”88
Fausto-Sterling also voices a dire warning against projecting any sort of facile separatism on the






In ceding the territory of physical sex, feminists left themselves
open to renewed attack on the grounds of biological difference.
[14] Indeed, feminism has encountered massive resistance from
the domains of biology, medicine, and significant components of
social science. […] Our bodies are too complex to provide clear-
cut  answers about  sexual  difference.  The more we look for a
simple physical basis for ‘‘sex,’’ the more it becomes clear that
‘‘sex’’ is not a pure physical category. What bodily signals and
functions we define as male or female come already entangled in
our ideas about gender.89
That these rejections of traditional “sex” concepts are grounded in biology, not social theory
that would “cede the territory of physical sex” to normative science, is an act of reclaiming biology
from those who would appropriate it for the distinctly culturally determined purpose of legitimizing
essentialism. Butler's notion of gender performance can just as easily cover sex performance, since
the prescriptive views that necessitate those performances are ultimately social in both instances. 
For  those  people  who  perform  a  gendered  category  (masculinity  or  femininity)  that  is
perceived as somehow deviant from the norm but who are still read by the discourse as “essentially”
(however debatable any such notion of essence is) men or women, gender policing and its attendant
oppression is a reality but may not completely exclude them from even the claim of being one of the
two normative genders. But what complications arise in this model when someone is not performing
a “correct” masculinity/femininity (gender)  and also not conforming with the normative  physical
expectations  of  their  “sex”?  As  my  analysis  of  the  contemporary  discourse  Czech  sexology
demonstrates,  the  missing  “correctness”  of  trans*  people's  physical  characteristics  vis-a-vis
normative sex is compensated – not on the level of every single person, but on the level of the very
same discourse that usurps the power over “approving” every single person's gender identity – by
an ever more stringent demand to adhere to the performative characteristics associated with each of
the  major  genders.  If,  since  the  advent  of  the  “sex  complementarity”  system  during  the
Enlightenment, “biology, as the purveyor of stable, ahistorical, and impartial 'facts' about 'sexual
difference,' became the foundation of political prescriptions about social order”,90 the demand for
trans* people to work especially hard to bring their divergent bodies and, if not subscribing to the
“correct” masculinity or femininity, divergent gender identities and performances into line with the
status quo  is revealed to be a line of defense against  gender/sex diversity. The myth of scientific
impartiality that Hird alludes to serves to defend the status quo particularly well, because it makes it
possible for the dominant paradigm to legitimize itself, and only itself, as a paradigm immune to
pejorative accusations of being “political”. In effect, the Enlightenment model has created at least
two fictions: the fiction of sex complementarity and the fiction of “neutral” inquiry.
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In Czech-written scholarship of the turn of the millenium, we find the article by Gerlinda
Šmausová  in  which  the  author  pulls  no  punches  in  stating  that  “gender  has  a  predominantly
normative character, since there has been no time or place where reality would have corresponded
to gender dualism.”91 In spite of this discursive origin of gender dualism (or binarism),  Šmausová
argues,  “even sociologists  often overlook hybrid forms of [gendered] behaviour […] as well  as
bodies that are unclearly defined. The existence of many [pejorative] monikers suggests that these
are not uncommon phenomena, but neither 'common sense' nor sociology has so far viewed these
'exceptions' as a regular part of reality”.92 The selective character of this silence best diagnoses it as
what Foucault  terms “a stubborn will  to nonknowledge”.93 It  is not that the people involved in
mainstream knowledge production,  be  they sociologists  or  sexologists,  would  lack  any and all
exposure  to  gender/sex  diversity,  but  they appear  to  view the  existence  of  people  who do not
embody  the  prescribed  binary  as  either  too  marginal  to  matter  in  grand  theories  or  as  being
completely in the sphere of medicalization and thus not a “regular” group to adjust the perceptions
of reality for. Trans* people are not the only victims of this erasure and willful exclusion from the
epistemological canon, considering that the existence of intersex people has historically been so
difficult to stomach for proponents of the “truth” of universal binarism that non-consenting and
usually medically unnecessary surgery became the go-to method of “managing” intersex status:
The current “management” of intersex in Western culture reveals that
the  authenticity  of  sex  resides  not  on,  nor  in  the  body,  but  rather
results from a particular nexus of power, knowledge, and truth. People
with  intersex  conditions’ experiences  of  “sex”  challenge  Western
society to the extent that society is predicated on the sex/gender binary
to operate.94
The coercive and compulsory character of the socially constructed gender binary dressed up
as “nature” should thus be clear. Being situated in the middle of these conceptual negotiations has
been dangerous ground for trans* people throughout the history of the medical establishment. At
present,  trans*  people  –  both  binary  and  non-binary  identified  –  find  themselves  facing  a
conundrum. It is simultaneously impressed upon them that they can never meet all the prerequisites
for “correct” manhood or womanhood under the binary sex system, but that even those who would
prefer not to relate themselves to the two-sex system and instead carve out different categories
altogether should refrain from doing so because manhood and womanhood are viewed as the only
categories possible. Due to the power disparity between these individuals and structures such as the
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state or the medical establishment, “should refrain” is more than a moralizing admonishment: the
non-dominant  identities  will  be,  if  not  stigmatized,  then  certainly  disregarded  on  the  level  of
administration, legal recognition (except in the minority of countries that do currently recognize
non-binary genders legally) and medical practice. The supposedly evidence-based model of science
has thus found a way to suppress precisely the evidence that stands in contradiction to its axioms.
In  2001,  a  notable  attempt  to  popularize  something  other  than  the  axiomatic  outlook  of
positivist sexology appeared in the form of a special transgender  issue (with transgender as the
blanket term) of the journal  Gender,  Equal Opportunities,  Research (Gender,  rovné příležitosti,
výzkum).  This  is  interesting  on  several  levels.  It  is,  despite  the  pressure  to  view it  as  such,  a
testament  against  the  idea  that  Czech  society is  fully  united  in  perceiving  gender  diversity  as
pathological. The impact of this text, however, was considerably lower than that of the discourse of
sexology, which shows how ingrained the normative approaches are, especially in a society where
strict binarism and gender conformity are treated as givens in the abstract sense as well as in trivial
daily interactions. It is all the more necessary, then, to devote the appropriate attention to the critical
voices that do sometimes appear, both for their actual contributions to the debate and for the insight
into how untenable the suppositions  of  uniformity in  opinion regarding gender  diversity in  the
Czech Republic really are. 
While the special issue of Gender, Equal Opportunities, Research is not the only nor, in my
view, the best executed example of resisting the dominant discourse of sexology, it was striking for
its  time in  its  attempt  to  establish  transgender  as  a  distinct  topic  worthy of  non-pathologizing
attention. The intent of the publication was unquestionably positive in this regard, though to what
extent it managed to deliver on the non-pathologization and de-stigmatization is another matter. On
a superficial level, there are linguistic issues. Transgender is often used as a noun where it would
have been more correct to say trans(*) person and is partly conflated with “transsexual” [noun] in
the volume's glossary, which also contains “transgenderist” to mean a non-op transitioner, refers to
discrete “biological sexes” as starting points for trans* people, and posits only FtM and MtF as
viable trans* identities.95 That the language is dated and and occasionally incorrect is in itself not
surprising, particularly as this may well have been the first venture to introduce more nuanced terms
into a discourse where the totalizing medical “transsexual” had been the go-to concept for decades
by the time this special issue was published. What perturbs me more is the fact that, although the
volume advertises itself as a non-sexological appraisal of its subject matter, it employs the same
mechanism of taxonomy that sexology does in much the same terms (barring transgender/-ist and
95 No author given for section, “Definitions” in Marcela Linková (ed.), Gender, rovné příležitosti, výzkum (Gender, 
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intersex which, to the authors' credit, is unequivocally preferred to “hermaphrodite” in the volume).
Still, my impression is that more or less all the core concepts of the normative sexology discourse
are  transferred  into  these  supposedly  sociological  definitions:  the  idea  that  there  are  universal
“biological sexes”, the idea that gender identification can only be binary, and the idea that trans*
people  only  perform  a  straightforward  border-crossing  between  the  major  genders.  If  the
“Definitions” section was intended to meet the people who had never heard any other terminology
than the pathologizing one halfway, it feels like it rather went the extra mile to render most of its
eye-opening value moot – or, to bring back Asher Bauer's term, became “declawed” in the struggle
against the normative discourse.
The issue also has a peculiar internal relationship to a normative sexological text, none other
than Transsexuality: Diagnostics and Treatment, which was released the following year. The editor
of the transgender issue was  Marcela Linková, the same sociologist who was included in a very
brief segment at the end of Transsexuality (I will examine all this in greater detail in my section on
Transsexuality). In the transgender issue of Gender, Equal Opportunities, Research, Linková wrote
the introduction and, interestingly, some of the language she used there made it across to her text for
Transsexuality as well. For example, the problematic reference to trans* people's lived experience
as “a schizophrenic gendered prison” persists; on the flip side, in both articles Linková comments
on the pressure for trans* people, particularly trans women, “to 'prove' that they 'deserve' to live in
their  chosen  role  by  the  ability  to  conform.”96 Between  this  volume  and  Transsexuality,  it  is
significant that only one gender theorist was consulted to participate in the latter, even though – as
is the case with the sexologists – her being treated as  the expert on trans* issues with respect to
sociology  must  have  had have  a  similarly monopolizing  effect  to  the  one  being  effected  with
sexology, whether it was intended or not. 
The second link of the special transgender issue to Transsexuality is still more troubling. After
the introduction, a passage dealing with gender identity and the short glossary, what follows is a
chapter  titled  “Transsexuality  from  the  Perspective  of  a  Sexologist”,  written  by  the  de  facto
headliner of Transsexuality, Hana Fifková. To put this in perspective between these two connected
publications: when a sociologist was invited to participate in a medical text on trans* issues, her
contribution was relegated to the very end and, as I analyze in its own section, denigrated by the
peer  reviewer  to  boot  –  but  when  a  sexologist  was  invited  to  provide  her  perspective  in  a
sociological  publication,  her  contribution  was  front  and centre.  The highly privileged status  of
sexology,  even in  publications  advertising themselves  as  alternative,  is  again  confirmed in this
scenario because rather than being a true conceptual alternative, the special issue cooperates with
96 Linková in Linková (ed.) 1.
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the sexologist discourse. This is further compounded by the fact that Fifková's name in the table of
contents is the only one that explicitly indicates the author's academic title at the first glance. 
Nevertheless, my main problem with including – and privileging – a sexological perspective
in this sort of publication relates to its necessity, since the sexological perspective  already is the
standard mode of addressing trans* issues in Czech society and does not need further showcasing.
This kind of territorial patrolling of the part of sexology is not confined to a decade ago or more,
either. One of the few autobiographical trans* narratives currently available  in mainstream media
outlets in the Czech Republic, Mike Perry's  Klec pro majáky (literally  A Cage for Lighthouses),
closes with an “Expert Opinion” by Fifková,97 clearly intended to be the last word on the author's
gender trajectory.  The year of publication is as recent as 2011.  It is as though  representatives of
sexology must always be consulted when gender diversity is discussed – even in the periodicals of
other  academic fields,  even in  books by trans* people  about  their  individual  experiences. This
marking of “the expert's territory” is a power strategy that ensures nothing can be said on trans*
issues in print without sexologists' basically unchanging essentialist input.
Though preempted by the sexological framework to a large extent, the transgender issue did
yield some writings that were pioneering efforts in the Czech context. There is a contribution by
Dominika Sandová  titled “The Subjectivity of a Transgender” that, the problematic noun form of
“transgender” notwithstanding, articulates an early criticism of gatekeeping practices in transition
services geared towards  extreme binarism:  “We [sexologists]  will  ensure your  [trans* person's]
legalization, if and only if you swear not to disrupt our view of humanity.”98 The author likewise
condemns the fact that trans* people are consistently being conceptualized from the outside by
sexologists and (cis) theorists of gender, just like (cis) women have historically been conceptualized
by (cis) men, and “seen merely as a correctable problem”.99 Like Linková  in her texts, Sandová
remarks on the pressure for trans* people to conform to conventional gender roles even more than
cis  people  are  pressured  to  do,100 only  in  Sandová's  case  the  analysis  is  grounded  in  lived
experience.  She articulates what could  nowadays be termed one potential  genderqueer or non-
binary identity in her approach to her sense of self:
I present myself as a woman because this is much closer to my
nature. […] For the hunters of perfect correctness – I am not a
real lesbian (I fall in love with women, but I wasn't born one), I
am not a real transsexual (because I don't think the appearance
97 Hana Fifková in Mike Perry, Klec pro majáky (A Cage for Lighthouses) (Zlín: Kniha Zlín, 2011) 333.
98 Dominika Sandová, “Subjektivita transgendera” (“The Subjectivity of a Transgender”) in Linková (ed.) 6. The 
translation could also go “The Subjectivity of the Transgender”, but because Sandová steers clear of generalizing her
experience or treating it as archetypal, I opt for the optimistic translation in my reading of the text.
99 Sandová in Linková (ed.) 6.
100 Sandová in Linková (ed.) 6.
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of one's genitals determines sex, let alone gender), and as I've
said,  I  don't  even go as  far  as  to  stake  my claim to  being a
woman at all. What I know is that I am not a man – I have no
doubts on that score.101
While  there  is  some residual  essentialism in  the  above  quote  (“I  wasn't born  a  woman”
[emphasis mine], not elaborating on whether the notion of “perfect correctness” is used genuinely or
in a sarcastic sense), on the whole this is in open disagreement with the sexologist discourse that has
for so long styled itself as the only manner of explaining trans* identities (or the single identity that
it posits as being valid, transsexuality). Sandová's claiming of a non-binary identity is enthusiastic
and positive, although it takes place in a discourse that would have presupposed it to be downright
impossible. She also stops short of generalizing her sense of self to the entirety of trans* people in a
way that would issue a blanket denial of their right to be men or women, a tendency that has been
criticized about a  gender outlaw of much farther-reaching English-written fame, Kate Bornstein.102
Specifically to the Czech context, the fact that Sandová resists the rhetoric of uncompromising cis
assimilation is doubly transgressive because that is precisely what the discourse of sexology does
not  want,  in  addition  to  the  general  cissexism  of  society.  Transsexuality makes  only  a  brief
acknowledgement of the fact that some trans* people may be happy without even seeking medical
assistance,  but relegates this  to a “subvariant” of situational adaptation (which clearly does not
recognize trans* identities without medically assisted transition as being valid in their own right)
and proceeds to conflate this  “adaptation” with cis-compliant “homosexual orientation”.103 After
that misleading bit of lip service, the book resumes treating only those trans* people who follow the
prescribed narrative of transsexuality as bearers of the “correct” transsexual identity. 
The sexological  argument  thus  holds  that  trans* people  should  only identify as  men and
women without modifiers and that claiming a trans* identity during or after transition, although
“not indicative or a greater or lesser success of therapy”,104 is in practice the opposite of “identifying
with the group of one's gender without problems”105 [emphasis mine]. Articulating a trans* identity
that  does  not  use cisgender  as  its  main reference point  is  undesirable,  or  at  least  suspect,  to  a
discourse that considers the state of being seemingly cis to be the raison d'etre of trans* identity.
This makes it easy for the specific human rights needs of trans* people to be dismissed (after all,
once they “become” men and women approved by sexology, they are no longer a “special” human
rights  concern).  Trans* activists  have voiced objections to  this  narrative,  particularly to how it
101 Sandová in Linková (ed.) 6.
102 See the entirety of Katherine Cross, “An Open Letter to Kate Bornstein” in Nuclear Unicorn, <http://quinnae.com/
2010/11/17/an-open-letter-to-kate-bornstein/> 17 Nov 2010, 17 Jun 2014. Credit where credit is due, Bornstein 
responded to and acknowledged the criticism publicly.
103 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 54.
104 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 99.
105 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 99.
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facilitates the development of gendered hierarchies within the trans* group and can elicit alibism
and apathy from those who are routinely taken to be cis:
I abhor the argument that the suffering of other trans people is
irrelevant to a post-transition person who “passes,” because they
are no longer trans men or women, but “just” men or women. I
agree our genders as trans people are no less real than those of
cis people – and I think that dropping the “trans” adjective in
fact suggests the opposite.106 
Insinuating that the genders of people who do intentionally keep the modifier are less valid
may well be what the cissexist paradigm of sexology needs to perpetuate its own vision of who
“counts” as having a particular gender. What is more, Transsexuality describes trans women who do
not completely assimilate to womanhood-without-modifiers as “the predominant group from which
activists in the transgender movement are recruited”107 (this is one of the few usages of the term
transgender in the book, strictly confined to a political sense; the gender identities of these trans
women are still being given as “transsexual” by the authors). Although in Czech the reflexive form
of the verb “to recruit” (rekrutovat se) does not evoke a third party plucking out trans women to be
activists  but  rather  implies  that  these  trans  women  recruit  themselves into  the  trans*  rights
movement, the military metaphor clearly labels this type of situation a disturbance. (Trans men are
not even thought of as potential activist “recruits” in the book, because the hegemonic masculinity
they  should  “ideally”  assimilate  to  is  hostile  to  marginalized  genders  and  necessitates  both
misogyny and an anxious identification only with itself. The authors perpetuate this idea in stating
that trans men “very easily forget their personal history [...] Memories of this [pre-transition] time
are  humiliating  and unpleasant  to  most  of  them,  proportionally to  the  degree  of  complications
brought on by transsexuality. The vast majority rank themselves among men long before surgeries
and unequivocally afterwards.”108 In this outlook, ranking among men is mutually exclusive with
trying to effect social change around gender and gender roles, because not being a cis man already
counts as a “humiliating” factor and a liability in personal history to be kept under wraps.) When
viewed in this context, Sandová's article is decidedly radical because she does not eschew her trans*
history and integrates it into her identity, which enables her to do what the “correctly” behaving
transsexual subjects of sexology cannot, as “it is difficult to generate a counterdiscourse if one is
programmed to disappear. The highest purpose of the transsexual is to erase h/erself, to fade into the
“normal”  population  as  soon  as  possible.”109 Czech  sexologists,  as  we  have  seen,  would  add
“without problems” to this fading process to further mark it as the most desirable experience of
106 Costello, “On Passing” <http://trans-fusion.blogspot.com/2011/07/on-passing.html>.
107 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 99.
108 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 99.
109 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text. 
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gender diversity. What Sandová embodies in her responsible counterdiscourse is the reality of how
tenuous any presumption of uniformity or even adherence to a strictly binary identity in all trans*
people  is  doomed  to  be.  Much  as  the  sexologist  discourse  may  hold  that  there  is  only  one
“transsexuality” that is the most correct and worthy of recognition, even in the Czech Republic over
a decade ago any claim that  only those “correct” identities existed does not hold water. On the
contrary, at least one trans* theorist was already speaking from what Sandy Stone's aptly named
“Posttransexual  Manifesto” identifies  as  “a life  grounded in  the  intertextual  possibilities  of  the
transsexual body.”110 
Articulating non-binary and/or intertextual trans* subjectivities is important because it shows
that binary categorization is not necessarily synonymous with “reality”. Universalizing the cissexist
vision of a gender binary can only wind up perpetuating a method of explaining the world at large
which, as Asher Bauer argues, “has no room in it for us [trans* people]” since it is construed to
always retain some degree of excluding trans* people, binary-identified or not, from the allegedly
ideal  forms  of  the  approved  binary  genders.111 Assimilating  to  it  without  interrogating  how  it
functions  as  a  regulatory  mechanism  can  only  be  a  self-defeating  endeavour,  since  it  grants
symbolic primacy to all the metaphors of body wrongness that in themselves add to larger systems
of oppression. At the same time, this does not mean that no trans* people should ever identify with
binary genders  if  those genders were conceptualized as  being inclusive of  trans  men and trans
women along with their cis counterparts. It is imperative to steer clear of essentialism even on the
non-binary  side,  as  ironically  that  would  also  contribute  to  reifying  binary  cissexism  and
transphobia,  both  societal  and  internalized.  There  is  sometimes  a  fine  line  between  liberating
departures from the binary and unwitting legitimization of precisely the line of thinking that works
to bar trans* people from accessing male and female identities altogether. 
The text “Life In Between” by Mirek Vodrážka, the longest article featured in the special issue
of  Gender, Equal Opportunities, Research, straddles precisely this fine line. On the one hand, the
text succeeds in challenging the perceived necessity of the gender binary in many ways: it points
out  the  futility and the  oppressive  application  of  “sex  testing”  in  sports  and elsewhere,  argues
against  the  primarily  pathologizing  outlook  on  trans*  identities  and  their  exotification  by  the
mainstream discourse, brings up some of the biological objections to the binary sex model as well
as to the dichotomous compartmentalization of “nature” and “culture”, and finally points to the
effects  of  power on gender  identity and presentation.  That  the  language is  not  always  ideal  is
something of a problem, but in the chronological context of the publication, the lack of refinement
110 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text. 
111 Bauer, “Not Your Mom's Trans 101” <http://tranarchism.com/2010/11/26/not-your-moms-trans-101/>.
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in terminology in all the contributions is understandable. Where the text runs into problems is the
entire assumption that the life of  all trans* people, irrespective of where they fall on the gender
continuum,  is  always essentially  non-binary  and  not  allowed  to  partake  in  the  binary  genders
available  to  cis  people.  Vodrážka  unfortunately  perpetuates  this  in  uncritically  quoting  Tereza
Spencerová,  one of the few Czech media personalities whose trans* status is publicly known, as
saying that
I no longer care about any proclamations of what real sex is; it's
more about the courage to admit reality to yourself. […] It really
is a question if, for example, after an operation from a girl to a
guy  you  really  do  become  a  guy.  You  have  no  penis,  you
produce no sperm, nothing. And I'll never know what it's like to
menstruate or get  pregnant. I haven't become one with women,
but I have become one with myself. That's enough.112
My purpose in rejecting the above quote is not to assert that Spencerová's sense of self is
“wrong”; her identity is hers to own and articulate. To what degree the above quote may represent
an internalization of quite a few of the cissexist tropes regarding what “counts” as sex could be a
separate debate, but not to undermine Spencerová's agency in forming her own identity. What I do
have the right to take issue with, however, is the generalizing and essentialist tone of her comment.
Being “in between”, in her apparent outlook here, is an inescapable state of not matching normative
gender definitions. This logic operates in precisely the paradigm that arbitrarily attaches gender to a
set of prescribed physical traits clustering together in the cis-centric imagination, which is then
assigned the status of “reality” that trans* people can either “admit” to themselves or not, but not
fundamentally  challenge.  “In  between”  identification,  then,  becomes  not  a  radical  objection  to
compulsory binarism but a kind of consolation prize for not being an “ideal/real” man or woman.
That Spencerová goes so far as to call the absence of a sperm-making penis “nothing” (completely
devaluing all other genital configurations) and to bind sex to reproduction is not only cissexist, but
ableist as well in presupposing only one kind of “correct/healthy” body that should always be off
limits  to  trans*  people.  Bauer's  “Trans  101”  highlights  these  conceptual  fallacies  with  such
exactness that he may as well have been commenting on Spencerová's generalization:
“Female” in sex binary terms means having breasts,  having a
vagina, having a womb, not having a lot of body hair, having a
high-pitched  voice,  having  lots  of  estrogen,  having  a  period,
having XX chromosomes.  “Male”  means  having  a  penis,  not
having  breasts,  producing  sperm,  having  body hair,  having  a
deep  voice,  having  lots  of  testosterone,  having  XY
chromosomes.  Yet  it  is  possible  to  isolate,  alter,  and  remove
many of these traits. Many of these traits do not always appear
together, and before puberty and after menopause, many of them
112 Tereza Spencerová quoted in Mirek Vodrážka, “Život 'mezi'” (“Life In Between”) in Linková (ed.) 4.
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do not apply.  And what about women who get hysterectomies?
Or  who  have  had  mastectomies  for  reasons  related  to  breast
cancer? Are they not women? What about a soldier whose dick
gets blown off by a mine? Is he not a man?113
There is one obvious explanation for the analogies between transphobia and general ableism
not quite clicking in some commentators' minds, and that is the discursive othering of trans* people.
If trans* people's genders are perceived as “self-identified” while cis people's genders are “self-
evident”,114 cis bodies will not be totally de-gendered by selective modifications or “lacks” while
trans* bodies will. This is one of the double standards constitutive of a cissexist discourse, and it
ties  into  the  rhetoric  of  not  owning  one's  body (Vodrážka  speaks  of  trans*  people  as  literally
“foreigners in the lands of their bodies”115 almost immediately after the quote from Spencerová). In
the assumption that all trans* people, including trans men and trans women whose genders  are
binary, will always unconditionally “live in between”, the “in between” space loses its liberating
and/or  subversive  potential.  (This  is  not  even touching  upon the  fact  that  “in  between”  is  not
necessarily the best way to frame the many possible objections to binarism: “Being trans is not
always about falling “in between” binary genders, and as often as not, it’s about being something
too expansive for those ideas to have meaning at  all.”116 Articulating “in between” as the only
possible alternative is still heavily dependent on the gender binary for its definition, rather than
deconstructing the binary from the ground up.) Instead, “in between” merely becomes a less policed
variant  of  transsexuality,  perpetually  kept  separate  from  “just”  male  and  female  by  design.
Conveniently for the cis-centric gender order, this makes it impossible to redefine the categories of
male and female in ways that would be more inclusive than their current normative contents. 
Notions of some essential or, in Vodrážka's terms, “quite existential”117 in-between-ness of all
trans* people can come both from sexological narratives that presuppose sex dichotomy and from
equally generalizing counter-narratives that presuppose only non-binary identifications are possible.
Either reasoning effectively reduces trans* people to cannon fodder, be it in the cis establishment's
effort to protect the territory of its definitions of male and female at all costs or in the efforts to
dismantle them (without factoring in the fact that for some segments of the trans* population, being
recognized as male or female is a necessary component of well-being). Ultimately, the assertion that
trans* people are by definition  never male or female legitimizes what has long been done by the
transphobic  identity  police.  If  cis  theory  of  trans  people  is  analogous  to  colonialism,  then  its
policing of bodies and the categories “man” or “woman” is territorial, making sure that no one who
113 Bauer, “Not Your Mom's Trans 101” <http://tranarchism.com/2010/11/26/not-your-moms-trans-101/>.
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has not been preapproved can infringe on that beloved territory. In an analytically precise takedown
of a transmisogynistic diatribe by Elizabeth Grosz, Katherine Cross notes that in arguments that
utilize this type of essentialism, “'the transsexual' becomes a kind of third gender, which is itself
something  that  completely  disregards  the  lived  and  embodied  reality  of  trans  men  and  trans
women”.118 The disregard of lived realities is a key concept here, as it is trope that returns time and
again  in  the  discursive  strategies  of  both  sexology  and  the  Czech  law,  ascribing,  just  like
transphobes of the sociological persuasion, mutual exclusion and “universality to three concepts:
woman, man, and transsexual”119 in marking trans* people as distinctly and inevitably “other” from
a position of authority.
This othering causes harm on a symbolic level, but that is not the full extent of its reach. In
contrast  to  other  European  countries  that  have  been  making  legal  gender  recognition  more
accessible and divorcing it from mandatory surgical interventions (such as the UK in 2004 or more
recently Sweden),  the current  Czech code of law instead goes on to codify the requirement  of
sterilization and dissolution of any existing marriage or registered partnership as prerequisites of
achieving legal recognition under “the sex change of the human being” (změna pohlaví člověka).120
There is no room for legal quibbling with definitions here, given that the definition of the subject is
as all-encompassing as “the human being”. That the law can engage in this is actually somewhat
strange even in the Czech context alone, since the Czech Constitution or, more accurately, Article 3
of the Declaration of Basic Rights and Freedoms (Listina základních práv a svobod) that is part of
the constitutional order of the Czech Republic,121 forbids discrimination on the basis of sex/gender.
In a broader interpretation of its vague terms, sex/gender discrimination could indeed be extended to
discrimination on the grounds of one's assigned versus identified sex/gender, especially considering
that the Czech language subsumes both sex and gender under a single term (pohlaví), but such a
claim is not being made anywhere in the primary sources I have touched upon so far. Viewing this
legal  code  side  by  side  with  the  medical  normativity  imposed  on  trans*  people  reveals some
examples of how both discourses go hand in hand and how the pathologizing discourse has, in fact,
succeeded in pushing trans* issues outside the purview of human rights as far as the Czech state is
concerned. There is as of yet no lawsuit against these specific requirements,122 suggesting either a
118 Cross, “A Social Symphony:  The Four Movements of Transphobia in Theory” <http://quinnae.com/2010/10/29/a-
tireless-waltz-the-four-movements-of-transphobia-in-theory/>.
119 Cross, “A Social Symphony:  The Four Movements of Transphobia in Theory” <http://quinnae.com/2010/10/29/a-
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120 Občanský zákoník 89/2012 Sb. §29.
121 My interpretation is that the inclusion of this document among the basic documents of the Czech Republic should 
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included in the Declaration of Basic Rights and Freedoms.
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sense of futility in attempting to change the Czech bureaucratic system (possibly coupled with fears
for personal safety) or a profound internalization of the pathologizing norm on the part of most
Czech trans* people who have no choice but to navigate this system. This does not mean that there
has been zero criticism of the new law. All the way back in 2011, before the current law code had
been implemented, the nationwide LGBTIQ* organization PROUD published a report condemning
its discriminatory contents, pointing out, among many other things, that the sterilization of trans*
people  before  gender  recognition  “represents  the  only  state-enforced  sterilization  in  the  Czech
Republic at present” and that coercive sterilization is “incompatible with every person's right to
have their body integrity protected” as likewise stated by the Council of Europe.123 We are seeing
Czech  law  outright  resist  human  rights  recommendations  that  have  already  been  accepted  by
authorities pertinent to the EU, of which the Czech Republic is a member as well.
The letter of the law is not to the end all, be all of trans* oppression, of course. We need not
look any further than naming conventions. In addition to the Czech Republic openly policing which
given names can or cannot be used by individuals,124 there is also a convention to attach the suffix
-ová to denote the feminine form of surnames. In my view, this practice cannot be anything other
than  sexist  because  it  designates  women  (and  people  mistakenly  believed  to  be  women)  as
inherently derivative from (primarily) cis men, whose surnames are permitted to use the base form
with no qualifying suffixes. The hierarchical discrepancy is actually enforced by the Czech law on
naming  under  the  banner  of  grammatical  purism,  going  as  far  as  to  define  the  base  form of
surnames as “male.”125 A few exceptions from the -ová suffix occur through marriage or civil union
with a national of another country and taking that name, or through being a foreign national living
in  the  Czech  Republic  in  the  first  place,126 but  apart  from  this,  its  enforcement  is  virtually
unavoidable. Likewise egregious is the tendency to employ the -ová suffix even in reference to non-
Czech surnames  in  most  mainstream media,  including in  print,  effectively renaming people  to
preserve a gendered double standard. The lack of respect in that instance is both towards individual
(usually)  women  whose  names  are  edited  without  their  knowledge  or  consent  and  towards
languages and cultures that do not share this linguistic grounding of binary gender, implying that
they  “should”  share  it  or  that  they  implicitly  do  and  just  fall  short  of  marking  it  for  effect.
Additionally, when the culture/language being thus changed is non-Western, using these specifically
123 PROUD – Platforma pro rovnoprávnost, uznání a diverzitu, o. s. (The Platform for Equality, Respect and 
Diversity), “Nový občanský zákoník je diskriminující a nesystematický” (“The New Civil Law Code is 
Discriminatory and Unsystematic”) in a press release (Prague: PROUD, 2011), section 4).
124 For an overview of the areas that are policed see Matriční zákon 312/2013 Sb. (Law concerning the register of 
names) sections “Name”, “Surname” and “Changes to Name and Surname”.
125 Matriční zákon 312/2013 Sb. §69.
126 See the entirety of Matriční zákon 312/2013 Sb. §69 for the specific instances.
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Czech suffixes to modify (usually) women's surnames is nothing short of colonialist re-inscribing.
The  fact  that  it  still  commonly  occurs  and  is  largely  viewed  as  normal  or  even  necessary
demonstrates the power of binarist thinking, particularly in the institutions that encourage or even
mandate it.  
I  say all  of the above to  make clear  that  I  do not  hold  an especially  favourable view  of
mandatory binarism, nor do I believe that the existing symbolic structure around naming is worthy
of being preserved indefinitely, or at least not as the only way naming should be done (it would be
easy, for example, to make the suffixes optional and employ them only with consent). Regardless of
that, while the structure is in place and bestows symbolic legitimacy on names and related language
use, it is striking in how trans* people are explicitly excluded from it under most circumstances by
the very same structures that enforce it for cis men and  cis  women (and for trans men and  trans
women if they follow the only transition path considered “full” by sexology/the state and actually
manage to achieve legal gender recognition). When it comes to naming, nothing has changed since
the  publication  of  Transsexuality in  that  during transition  (at  any point  before  being surgically
sterilized), it is only acceptable for trans* people to choose expressly gender-neutral names,127 even
for those who  do identify in binary terms and would prefer a binary name to go with this.  It is
expressly stated in law that if anyone who is legally regarded as male or female requests a name
change to the “opposite” legal gender, the request will be refused.128 At the same time, none of this
offers trans* people  any protection from having their birth assignment (legal gender along with a
“birth  number”  that  has  sex  assignment  coded  into  it)  revealed  to  others  from a  multitude  of
documents starting with mandatory ID cards, since legal recognition is contingent upon sterilization
and requests to amend any of this information without undergoing one will be refused  as well.129
This lack of privacy protection is compounded by the fact that although trans* people in transition
can only access name change to a gender-neutral form, no complementary gender-neutral identifier
in documentation exists,  although introducing  could  reduce discrimination  in this area if handled
appropriately.130 
Irrespective of how it is legally codified or not, enforced neutrality in a binary system cannot
be liberating. The internal fragmentation of this mandatory “in between” position hints at the fact
127 Fifková in Fifková et al. 45.
128 Matriční zákon 312/2013 Sb. §72 (3).
129 Working Group for the Issues of Sexual Minorities of the Minister for Human Rights and National Minorities, 
Analysis of the Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Minority in the Czech Republic (Prague: Office 
of the Government of the Czech Republic, 2007) 38-39. This is the official English version of the document, which 
also exists in Czech as Analýza situace lesbické, gay, bisexuální a transgender menšiny v ČR. The full list of 
contributors is printed in the volume.
130 Working Group for the Issues of Sexual Minorities of the Minister for Human Rights and National Minorities 39-
40. 
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that any sort of non-binary existence is a profoundly troubling thought for medical and legal norm-
makers,  though.  The  authors  of  Transsexuality believe  that  all  trans*  people  will  be  binary-
identified,  yet  they  have  no  issue  with  expecting  all  trans*  people  to  use  non-binary  naming
conventions  unless  or  until they obtain  legal  gender  recognition.  Czech law,  regarding naming
policy,  explicitly states that “incorrect, diminutive or familiar forms of names” cannot be used as
official given names131 or requested as part of a name change,132 yet in the case of trans* people,
familiar  and  diminutive  forms  (or  else  non-Czech  names)  are  almost  the  only  names  allowed
because few others  are  gender-neutral  in  Czech.  Explicitly gender-neutral  suffixes  are  the only
surname changes allowed by law during transition not inclusive of sterilization,133 even though the
binary forms are otherwise required in almost all instances. This is othering for the sake of othering.
The discourse breaks its own main rule (the presupposition of universal binarism) just so no trans*
people  can  be  recognized  as  men  or  women  without  following  every  transition  requirement
arbitrarily laid out for them by the legal and medical systems. Those who would wish to be known
as another gender than male or female lack the tools to accomplish this on all counts, since the
mandatory gender-neutral naming does not affect legal gender or the gendered numerical identifier
given at birth. This is not even touching on the fact that in a society as relentlessly binarist as the
Czech one is, having a name that is recognizably “other” in terms of gender paints a target on trans*
people's back regardless of how well it  represents their  sense of self.  Requiring this  effectively
approves discrimination, contributing to all the other areas where trans* oppression occurs. Last but
not least, although for some trans* people, the means to change their legal gender and use a desired
binary  name  may  become  accessible  with  legal  gender  recognition  (that  is,  after  a  surgical
sterilization procedure), there is still the problem of being expected to change one's name not once,
but twice, inclusive of all the bureaucratic difficulties in obtaining a name change. In a society
where names are viewed as central sources of identity, it is alarming that certain segments of the
population are expected to attach so little value to theirs.
Such a  multifaceted  denial  of  self-determination  would  never  have  been possible  without
being grounded in deeply held ontological convictions (which, ironically enough, can only be so
deeply held under a particular epistemology, such as the whole patriarchal-essentialist set of beliefs
about  “men and women” or  “gender  and sex”).  If,  as  Butler  brings  up,  being  recognized as  a
member of the “correct” socially approved gender is what “humanizes individuals”, then here we
can clearly see how the lack of strict adherence to a gender binary is being used to  dehumanize
trans*  people  relative  to  their  cis  counterparts.  This  gendered  non-belonging  is  established  on
131 Matriční zákon 312/2013 Sb. §62.
132 Matriční zákon 312/2013 Sb. §72 (3)
133 Matriční zákon 312/2013 Sb. §75 (5) a).
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several levels. There is the cis-centric notion of “biologically male/female” bodies, according to
which trans* people are viewed as deficient members of their identified gender. There is also the
discursive othering, particularly with respect to language, used to emphasize the idea that trans*
people should not “belong”. It is this deep-seated delegitimization of trans* experience, coupled
with an objectifying vision of trans* people as “problems” to be addressed by power-wielding cis
specialists, that results in the state of things where it is acceptable for trans* people to be treated as
deserving of something less than full  human rights. A person who is automatically expected to
change  their  name  multiple  times  and  to  undergo  major  surgery  just  to  obtain  legal  gender
recognition is being held to standards that would without doubt be unacceptable if they were viewed
as a human rights concern, but the conceptualization of trans* bodies as intrinsically “wrong” and
of trans* people's identities as basically expendable ensures that a distinctly human rights prism is
not applied to this situation by the state, period. 
In observing that a human rights approach is a marginalized one (though not nonexistent, as
evidenced by some emerging Czech non-profit organizations that either dedicate themselves to the
struggle for trans* rights, such as the recently founded Trans*Fusion, or that include trans* rights
among  their  activities,  such  as  the  major  LGBTIQ*  organization  PROUD),  we  hit  upon  a
specifically Czech situation. In the EU context, after all, the conceptualization of trans* people as
people with rights has increasingly been the strategy for effecting change in the fields of legal
recognition and medical assistance. It is also endorsed by important international bodies such as
FRA, ILGA, TGEU or  indeed WPATH. The admission  of  rights  for  trans* people  ushers  in  a
breakdown of the notion that such individuals should only be described in terms of pathology and
treated  only  to  some  normatively  prescribed  “correction”.  In  the  human  rights  outlook,  trans*
people's  identities have inherent validity and should not be used as an alibi  for exerting undue
control over people's physical as well as social selves. That the Czech Republic is moving in the
other  direction  and,  instead  of  dissolving  the  time-honoured  barriers  to  health  care  and  legal
recognition, actually codify them even more drastically than they were before is an aberration in
much of the international context and definitely in the EU context. It would appear that, according
to Czech law and medicine, whatever trans* people have in terms of sexual/gender identity is not
the hallowed phenomenon of “sex” but something more malleable and, as a result, disposable to a
binarist discourse. Rather than having a sex/gender that entitles them to certain protections, trans*
people are seen as “giving up” whatever sex they could have had if they were cis. 
There should in fact already be a legal argument against  the compulsory sterilization law
based on existing documents in the Czech Republic. One of these documents is of course nothing
less than the Czech Constitution inclusive of the Declaration of Basic Rights and Freedoms, which
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prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex/gender. It is due to the othering mechanisms I have
described that in practice it only appears to be cis people who are entitled to these protections. It
would  only  take  a  quick  exercise  in  deductive  reasoning  to  conclude  that  trans*  people  are
systematically discriminated against on the basis of their state-assigned sex by being denied access
to a number of legal and social rights (naming options comparable to those of cis people, legal
gender recognition complete with matching documents, non-coercive choices between degrees and
kinds of bodily modifications,  the freedom to enter marriages and civil  unions as one's  correct
gender and not having them dissolved against one's will, the freedom to decide whether or not to
have genetic children, etc.). Denying trans* people rights based on their state-assigned sex and its
relation to the person's gender identity can thus be framed as unconstitutional. The whole battery of
disadvantages being unequally bartered for compulsory sterilization – presented as the one-size-fits-
all solution to all of the disenfranchised trans* person's troubles, without regard for where these
troubles may actually be originating from – should be our first warning against assuming that there
are  no elements of systemic coercion present in the “choice” to undergo the prescribed surgical
procedure(s). Given the extremely taxing nature of living in a non-recognized legal gender,  the
“choice” of sterilization may seem appealing even to those trans* people who would otherwise not
opt for it. Unperturbed by this ethical concern, even Fifková et al.'s canonical text on transsexuality
goes as far as to state that it is not recommended to stay “in between”; that is, to follow a different
transition trajectory from the one that is perceived as “complete” by the legal and medical systems
or to keep the trans* identifier post-recognition. It is becoming clear how all of this adds up to form
what might facetiously be called the  anti-social model of gender, power, and disenfranchisement.
The “problem” of being trans* is seen as a strictly individual trait, divorced from the broader social
structure and perceived to be pathological independently of the social norms that surround it. This is
both  implicit  in  the  discourse  as  a  whole  and  occasionally literal  in  sexological  texts:  “if  one
member of a family  has the transsexual problem”134 [emphasis mine]. The “management” of this
decontextualized “problem” is presented as nothing more than a likewise individual choice that is
part and parcel of “curing” the alleged pathology and would always be the optimal solution. No
elements of systemic and/or implicit coercion are acknowledged as playing a part in the decision-
making process, rendering it comfortably apolitical.  
My position is that using a strict set of arbitrary and even biologically doubtful categories to
legitimize human rights abuses is an ethically indefensible act  regardless of how each individual
trans* person conceptualizes their identity, regardless of whether sterilization or another surgery is
desirable to a particular individual or not. Both the trans* people who wish to avoid such procedures
134 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 55.
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and the trans* people who wish to have them are being decided for under a compulsory sterilization
system; both groups are  denied meaningful agency in fundamental  ways.  While the procedures
should be available – without arbitrary policing – to those interested in having them, they should not
be the presumed default or the prerequisite of being recognized in one's correct identified gender by
the  state  or  by  any  other  institution.  Under  the  current  Czech  system  where  not  undergoing
sterilization  is  effectively  grounds  for  extended  punishment  through  systemic  discrimination,
othering,  and  non-recognition,  reaching  a  decision  on  this  matter  entirely without  coercion
influencing the process along the way is impossible even for those who really might have opted for
genital surgery and/or sterilization under a non-coercive system voluntarily. The coercive character
of state-demanded sterilization actually works to obscure the critical distinctions between desiring a
certain kind of bodily modification (be it surgical, hormonal or other) to facilitate a greater sense of
well-being and being coerced into modifying a body one is happy with as it is. When this distinction
is obscured, the former of the two situations – the one that the entirety of the sexologist discourse is
predicated on – becomes the only one imaginable. Sterilization becomes legitimate not because
some trans* people choose it but because, allegedly, they all  have to “choose” it in order to be
considered men and women by experts and the state.
6. The Birth of the Expert and the Creation of the Transsexual
Before progressing further in my analysis, I will consider a question that may emerge from the
context, namely, that I am mainly relying on English-written criticisms informed by theoretical as
well as human rights concepts popularized by American and British academic/activist discourses to
theorize about  trans* people and sexologists  in the Czech Republic.  How well  does all  of this
translate, if it translates at all? The question in my view is not so simple as to label all English-
written  criticisms  imperialism towards  Czech culture  since,  for  one  thing,  this  would  trivialize
global instances of imperialism and colonialism that are simply not paralleled in the contemporary
relationship between the Czech Republic and the US or the west of the EU. The critical theories I
drawn  upon  are  not  more culturally  imperialist  than  the  “expert”  discourse  that  they  seek  to
displace,  which  is  itself  a  Western  phenomenon  based  on  distinctly  Western,  yet  mistakenly
universalized,  symbolic  categories.135 In  terms of political  affiliation as  well  as in  terms of  the
general characteristics of its culture, the Czech Republic is indeed part of the global West and, I
would argue, cannot be exempt from participating in broader Western imperialism just by virtue of
being  a  “small”  country  (even  the  text  of  Transsexuality conveys  some  manner  of  Western
universalism  of  gender/sexual  identity).  The  oft-quoted  argument  by  various  Czech  political
135 Šmausová 17-18. 
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conservatives  and,  poignantly,  sexologists  that  feminism  and  gender  studies  are  alien  and
inappropriate to Czech culture (a red herring I will examine further in this work) can hardly be
accepted  when the  dominant  discourse on  gender  roles  and designations  that  these  reactionary
critics champion is already rooted in Western symbolic hierarchies. In short, the conceptualization
of the Czech Republic as “not Western [enough to apply Western academic criticisms to]” is in itself
largely appropriative  of  postcolonial  criticism.  On a  separate  note,  the  idea  that  gender  theory
should not apply to Czech culture (or that it  has no proponents in Czech academic and activist
spheres) does little more than paint a stereotypical picture of the entire society as one destined to
remain  uniformly  patriarchal,  hetero-  and  cisnormative.  The  interplay  between  the  Western
Enlightenment model of science, the “old regime” marking the history of the Czech Republic, and
the  present-day tensions  between the positivist-essentialist  paradigm of  Czech sexology and its
critics takes place within a dynamic far more complex than a struggle between two opposites could
capture. What is designated as “Czech” is both specific to Czech culture and produced within the
broader Western mode of thought. 
The currently normative texts representing Czech sexology, most importantly the publication
Transsexualita: Diagnostika a léčba (Transsexuality: Diagnostics and Treatment) by Hana Fifková
et al., are partly derived from some outdated international norms such as previous versions of the
DSM  and  the  WPATH  (then  HBIGDA)  Standards  of  Care,  but  it  would  likewise  be  an
oversimplification  to  claim  that  their  problematic  nature  is  entirely an  American/Western
sociocultural export or that their incorporation of international scholarship only started happening
after 1989 with the change in the political regime. As pointed out by  Věra  Sokolová, “unlike its
counterparts  in other East European countries,  [pre-1989 sexology in Czechoslovakia] followed
international trends, was familiar with cutting edge research, and discussed developments in the
field  in  the  'western'  countries.”136 To  maintain  that  the  Czech  context  now  is  somehow
fundamentally different and historically fully separate from Western scientific production and its
conceptual frameworks would be a disservice to the fact that Czechoslovak sexology was informed
by that international context even in the era of the Iron Curtain. However, Sokolová also argues
elsewhere in  relation to  the discourse of gender  and sexuality in  pre-1989 Czechoslovakia that
discussion of diversity in this area was a taboo topic in general society while at the same time being
considered a legitimate matter of  medical concern, leaving indelible marks on the perception of
LGBTIQ* issues in the Czech Republic today.137 The pervasiveness of the “medicine first” outlook
136 Věra Sokolová,  State Approaches to Homosexuality, Sexological Discourse and Non-Heterosexual Lives in 
Socialist Czechoslovakia, 1948-1989 (Prague: Faculty of Arts of the University of Pardubice, 2013) 85. Unpublished
thesis as of this writing, lent to me by the author.
137 Sokolová, “Koncepční pohled na 'sexuální menšiny' aneb vše je jen otázka správné orientace…” 251.
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in the culture cannot thus be sufficiently explained by Czechs' slow adaptation to current Western
standards of care alone (which, as of WPATH  SoC Version 7,  are in line with the discourse of
human  rights  much  more  than  they  would  support  the  discourse  of  pathologization  like  the
HBIGDA SoC Versions 1-6 did). Unlike homosexuality, which was finally removed from the Czech
classification  of  diseases  in  1992,138 “transsexuality”  (transsexualita;  sometimes  alternatively
termed transsexualism) remains “diagnosis F 64.0” in the Czech Republic to this day. The framing
of trans* people as patients is predictably at the core of their patronizing treatment,  a situation
shared with other contexts of scientific subjugation:
Since the seventeenth century, science has “owned” the study of
the body and its disorders. This proprietorship has required that
the body's meanings be utterly transparent and accessible to the
qualified specialist (aided by the appropriate methodology and
technology) and utterly opaque to the patient herself.139  
Susan  Bordo's  assertion  here  is  primarily  about  women,  but  it  holds  relevance  to  all
marginalized gender identities, including trans* people of various genders – the particulars may
differ,  but  the  base  mechanism of  this  strain  of  gendered  oppression  is  the  same in  principle.
Categories of pathology coupled with “the appropriate methodologies and technologies” of their
management are instrumental in the expropriation of those bodies which diverge from a certain
normative  standard;  they  are  no  longer  owned  by  the  people  who  inhabit  them,  but  by
institutionalized medicine. In the case of trans* people, even many of the formal measures that
could  mitigate  the  impact  of  this  expropriation  are  still  absent  or  actively  undermined.  In
Transsexuality, the voices of trans* people are only tangentially present while graphic pictures of
genital surgeries along with their results occupy a central place in the book for the curious reader to
peruse.140 This fetishization of stigmatized genitals is not unique to the oppression of trans* people.
Intersex people, particularly those identified at birth or early childhood, have been subject to similar
treatment at the hands of the medical establishment, though much more often outright physically
abusive  beyond  “just”  the  gawking  component.141 In  both  these  cases  (and  they  are  not  an
exhaustive list), the matter of sex and gender is perceived as only being sufficiently comprehensible
to medical professionals who follow certain conventions of their practice.
It  is  with  the  tacit  assistance  of  these  discursive  mechanisms  of  expropriation  that  “the
transsexual” as  a medical entity in need of management by outside specialists is constituted; “the
138 Sokolová, “Koncepční pohled na 'sexuální menšiny' aneb vše je jen otázka správné orientace…” 251.
139 Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2003) 66.
140 Several pages dedicated just to these pictures are inserted, unnumbered, between pages 88 and 89 of the main text 
(see Fifková et al.). One more is appended to page 90.
141 Cary Gabriel Costello, “The Intersex Peep Show” in Intersex Roadshow, <http://intersexroadshow.blogspot.com
/2009/05/intersex-peep-show.html> 20 May 2009, 18 Jun 2014.
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transsexual body is a tactile politics of reproduction constituted through textual violence. The clinic
is a technology of inscription.”142 The extreme metaphor of creation I used in the title of this section
can be applied in the symbolic sense, but in some texts – both generally Western and Czech – it is
invoked literally.  In what Sandy Stone terms “the earliest partially autobiographical account [of
what the medical establishment would come to call transsexuality] in existence”, the book Man Into
Woman written by Niels Hoyer in 1933,143 this rhetoric is the lynchpin of the story. The publication
presents a binary transsexual narrative of Lili Elbe in relation to her doctor, “whom [Elbe] calls The
Professor, or The Miracle Man. The Professor is He Who molds and Lili that which is molded”.144
Already we have a hierarchical relationship between “the expert” and “the patient”, in which the
agency of the transsexual subject is zero. The book's author, who is not Elbe herself, goes to great
lengths to present this hierarchy as not only desirable but as in some manner esoteric, unfathomable
except  through  its  constant  manifestations,  and  in  the  final  instance  even  erotic.  The  extreme
language of medical as well as personal objectification is utilized to drive these points home on a
level that purports to be existential:
It seemed to her as if she no longer had any responsibility for
herself, for her fate. For Werner Kreutz had relieved her of it all.
Nor had she any longer a will of her own...there could be no past
for her. Everything in the past belonged to a person who...was
dead. Now there was only a perfectly humble woman, who was
ready to obey, who was happy to submit herself to the will of
another...her  master,  her  creator,  her  Professor.  Between
[Andreas]  and  her  stood  Werner  Kreutz.  She  felt  secure  and
salvaged.145
The transsexual here is incapable of existing without “her master, her creator, her Professor” –
but even with him she only exists as an extension and living reminder of his creative power. Why
resort  to a  1933 text  about  a trans  woman who had not  come from the Czech  environment to
illustrate a point about the Czech Republic and the discourse of its sexology? The answer sits in
plain sight in the following quote from an autobiographical book by Mike Perry, a Czech trans man,
narrating his “mystical transformation” at the hands of his own Professor:
All afternoon I gazed at the email from Radka [the sexologist's
codename in the book], all afternoon I soaked up the greeting
“Dear Mike”. For the first time someone was writing to me like
that, for the first time I existed to someone in my new name; it
read to me like Holy Scripture, although it was only two banal
words. Suddenly I was “that Mike” […] It was so incredible and
so very intoxicating. And it was She who had made me into this
142 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text. 
143 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text. 
144 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text. 
145 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text. 
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man,  who  flung  open  the  doors  to  my  new  identity  while
infallibly leading me towards realizing who I  was and who I
wanted to be.146 
The only salient difference between Perry's first-person account and Elbe's mediated narrative
is  the  fact  that  Perry's  “creation”  is  not  explicitly  tied  to  surgery.  The rest  of  the  discourse  is
conceptually identical, particularly concerning the godlike character of the “expert” who enjoys a
blessed monopoly  on  all  the  guiding,  creating,  intoxicating  and  salvaging.  The  sensual  and
somewhat  sexualized  relationships  between  the  “Professors”  and  their  transsexuals  are  mirror
images of each other, both adding up to binary heterosexual fancies, although it is interesting that,
as it turns out,  there may not  always be a male “Professor” moulding a female subject towards
proper embodiment in this type of transformation narrative. Stone points out regarding  Man Into
Woman that “[t]he British sexologist, Norman Haine, wrote the introduction, thus making Hoyer's
book a semi-medical contribution”;147 likewise I noted earlier that the afterword (“Expert Opinion”)
to Perry's A Cage for Lighthouses is supplied by the ubiquitous Hana Fifková, safely incorporating
the text  into the medical  discursive apparatus again.  Let  us imagine for a moment an alternate
universe where Perry is a cisgender gay man writing about his experience coming out, and his book
closes with an “Expert Opinion” on how best to “treat” the “disorder” of being gay. In 2011, the
odds of this would not have been high in the mainstream media of a country where civil unions,
though  still  kept  symbolically  and  legally  apart  from  marriage-as-defined-through-
heteronormativity, are practiced with little impediment to cis gay and lesbian couples in affirming
public ceremonies where no one feels compelled to verify whether a medical doctor is present to
“set the record straight”. Accounts of pathologized transsexuality, by contrast, remain discursively
trapped in a 21st century enclave of the 1930s, where every text needs to be at least quasi-medical.
Generally speaking, the similarity between the two primary texts (Man Into Woman and  A
Cage for Lighthouses) is one made possible by social, cultural and historical context rather than by
any  essential  property  of  transsexual  subjects  in  the  institution  of  medicine.  Stone's  erstwhile
summary of the forces at play in this entire power ecosystem still holds almost uncannily true in the
present Czech context, further showing that what is happening in the Czech Republic is linked to
the entire enterprise of the Western medical establishment and how it “treats” gender:
“Making” history, whether autobiographic, academic, or clinical,
is  partly  a  struggle  to  ground  an  account  in  some  natural
inevitability. Bodies are screens on which we see projected the
momentary settlements that emerge from ongoing struggles over
beliefs  and  practices  within  the  academic  and  medical
communities. These struggles play themselves out in arenas far
146 Perry 165.
147 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text.
61
removed  from  the  body.  Each  is  an  attempt  to  gain  a  high
ground  which  is  profoundly  moral  in  character,  to  make  an
authoritative and final explanation for the way  things are and
consequently for  the  way they must  continue  to  be.  In  other
words, each of these accounts is culture speaking with the voice
of  an  individual.  The  people  who  have  no  voice  in  this
theorizing  are  the  transsexuals  themselves.  As  with  males
theorizing about women from the beginning of time, theorists of
gender have seen transsexuals as possessing something less than
agency.148 
“Something  less  than  agency”  is  actually  an  understatement  with  respect  to  the  primary
sources cited above; their elision of trans* agency is absolute. The issuing of normative directives
regarding  gender  identification,  proper  embodiment,  and  proper  articulation  to stigmatized
individuals from authority figures/institutions who usurp for themselves the power to validate or
dismiss  identities  is  nonetheless  dispersed throughout  the medical  transsexuality discourse.  The
very fact that there  is a designated authority for the “proper management” of trans* status lends
credence  to  the  observation  that  “transsexuals  are  infantilized,  considered  too  illogical  or
irresponsible  to  achieve  true  subjectivity,  or  clinically  erased  by  diagnostic  criteria.”149 The
invisibility of this discursive strategy that systematically undermines the independent validity of
trans* existence – and of the fact that it is discursive rather than demanded by some “natural” order
– is at the heart of the almost uninterrupted operation of the sexological framework of transsexuality
in  the Czech Republic. Věra Sokolová comments  that  “the  persistent  monopoly of  sexologists,
psychologists and psychiatrists, who have dominated discussions of homosexuality (and sexuality in
general, for that matter) at the expense of qualified gender analysis by sociologists or historians”
owes its development both to the repressive pre-1989 political regime and to a general climate of
“virulent anti-feminism”150 (where we must remember that the rejection of intersectional feminism
includes the rejection of gender theory that could be useful to trans* people, among other distinctly
marginalized groups). That analyses couched in history and/or sociology are disparaged as being
unnecessary or “less than” the the dominant essentialist discourse is exactly what works to make
sexology seem critique-proof. Interestingly, critique from the field of biology is likewise omitted;
Transsexuality:  Diagnostics  and  Treatment does  not  cite  researchers  like  Anne  Fausto-Sterling
whose chief complaint concerns the dearth of nuanced and accurate representations of biology in
influential theories of gender, sex and sexuality. 
As I proceed to examine the prime example of the sexological management of trans* identity
148 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text.
149 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text.
150 Věra Sokolová, “Identity Politics and the (B)Orders of Heterosexism: Lesbians, Gays and Feminists in the Czech 
Media after 1989” in Jiřina van Leuween and Nicole Richter (eds.), Mediale Welten in Tschechien nach 1989: 
Genderprojektionen und Codes des Plebejismus (Munich: Kubon und Sagner, 2005) 32.
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in the Czech Republic, the aforementioned monograph Transsexuality: Diagnostics and Treatment,
I would like to draw attention to one more parallel between the oppression of cis women and the
oppression of trans* people of all genders. We have already seen in the applicability of Bordo's
commentary  concerning  doctors  and  patients  that  the  mechanisms  involved  in  medical
objectification are similar across marginalized genders; conversely, Stone links the “infantilization”
of  trans*  people  and  the  erosion  of  their  agency  to  the  same  being  done  to  cis  women  by
institutionalized cis  male-centric theories.151 In the context of what is now the Czech Republic,
infantilization has historically taken on the form of literal commissions/committees that regulate
various  aspects  of  embodiment,  supposedly  for  the  subject's  own  good.  The  right  to  have  an
abortion, for example, was to be granted by an officially appointed committee in the past, which,
like in the case of trans* people seeking surgical transition procedures to this day, was supposed to
gauge the “necessity” of the request on the basis of arbitrary medical and moral criteria, not on the
basis of the right to bodily self-determination and freedom of choice, which was instead presented
as  “selfishness”.152 Radka Dudová elaborates that  the discourse embraced the notion of  women
seeking abortion as “in need of education, resocialization/re-education  (převýchova) and help”;153
she also notes  the  framing of  women “as  objects  of  care,  decision-making and control,  not  as
independent actors” in the texts of gynecology and psychology.154 As with trans* people seeking
medically  assisted  transition  and/or  legal  gender  recognition  today,  the  medical  discourse
surrounding  abortion  during  the  years  of  abortion  committees  preempted  human  rights
considerations.155 The overall patronizing tenor of the discourse along with its power to discipline,
to  allow or  to  deny,  is  shared between the treatment  of abortion in  recent  history and the still
practiced  “management”  of  medical  transition  and  gender  recognition  in  the  medico-legal
establishment. The discourse produces a situation where, regardless of the declared or implied intent
of these normative institutions and authority figures, “there are no subjects in these discourses, only
homogenized, totalized objects.”156 I believe that it is precisely the suppression or outright absence
of genuinely emancipatory efforts, as opposed to practices of pathologization and control, that play
a central role in the invisibility of trans* status as a site of human rights in the Czech Republic
today. 
151 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text.
152 Radka Dudová, Interrupce v České Republice: zápas o ženská těla (Abortion in the Czech Republic: The Struggle 
for Female Bodies) (Prague: The Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, 2012) 47-50. Because 
the discourse was hetero- and cisnormative, it is not clear how people who could get pregnant but did not identify as 
women could have been affected by the legislation, or if such cases are documented at all. Even Dudová's critical 
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III. Discourse Analysis: Through Theory to Practice
1. The Text Body of Normativity
If anything traps us, it is that cliché of being trapped in the “wrong” body. In 
the end, the phrase is not ours, it was developed by a few well meaning cis 
people to render our experience patriarchally intelligible. 
— Katherine Cross, “A Cliché Trapped in a Metaphor's Body”
Patriarchal intelligibility may well be the underlying idea of all normative “explanations” of
gender diversity. That any notion of a unified, existentially “wrong” trans* existence is much more
a cultural construct than it can be a useful descriptor of the varied experiences of trans* people
should now be sufficiently established. At the same time, it does bear acknowledging that some of
the now increasingly rejected concepts of trans* identity and how it should be “managed” may
originally  have  been  well-intentioned:  for  example,  construing the  body  as  the  only  site  that
“should” need treatment  aided in  the abandonment of  “reparative” therapies.  However,  if  good
intentions  are  to  be  maintained  by sexology,  this  necessarily  has  to  include  reconsidering  and
reflecting  upon  the  dominant  narrative  so  that  it  can  be  prevented  from becoming  a  form of
enforced  normativity  for  the  only  “correct”  trans*  identity  in  turn.  That  is  exactly  what  has
happened in the Czech discourse, where sexology's erstwhile vision of “true transsexuality” has
become the hegemonic narrative that now generates further oppression. To my mind, the only way
to  meaningfully  reinstate  an  ethical  goal  would  be  for  sexology to  take  a  step  back,  leaving
gendered and bodily self-determination up to trans* people and providing individualized support
when  requested  without  arbitrary  prescriptivism  and  without  disseminating  overly  simplistic
stereotypes in the media and society at large. So far, the codification of sexological normativity that
treats sterilization as a foregone conclusion into coercive law has accomplished the opposite.
In this section, I will attempt a more detailed analysis of how an authoritative text presents
itself and what strategies it employs to achieve the  look of absolute credibility and “objectivity”
characteristic  of  its  genre.  The  collective  monograph  Transsexualita:  Diagnostika  a  léčba
(Transsexuality:  Diagnostics  and  Treatment)  by  main  authors  Hana  Fifková,  Petr  Weiss,  Ivo
Procházka, Ladislav Jarolím, Jiří Veselý, and Vladimír Weiss is primarily designed as a text to be
read by the general public – which demands that the attitudes presented therein be fairly unified –
but it is also clear from its contents and structure that it popularizes at least some of the categories
and practices that have long been employed by discourse of sexology behind closed doors. At the
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same time, it is intriguing that this essentialist version of sexology resistant to meta-criticism has
come to represent the dominant take on sexology in post-1989 Czech Republic, as Věra Sokolová's
comprehensive study of pre-1989 sexological texts found that 
official sexological writings from the socialist era also contain
arguments,  which  one  would  not  expect  from  the  allegedly
strictly  essentialist  and  heteronormative  medical  discourse
during the communist regime. For example, in 1976, sexologists
Eva Brauerová, Viera Satková and Antonín Topiař astonishingly
started their article by arguing that the “relative insignificance of
the  biological  differences  between  the  sexes  … mean[s]  that
“male” and “female” are in the end nothing more than erotically
conditioned  ideals,  which  are  subordinated  to  historical  and
individual changes.”[121] In other words, sexological discourse
was far  from uniform and much more liberal  than it  is  often
presented.157
In  light  of  this  information,  it  would  be  irresponsible  and  indeed  misleading  to  treat
Czechoslovak/Czech sexology as a discipline that has been uniform at  every point in time and
across research teams. All the same, the level of context-awareness and interdisciplinary openness
exemplified by Brauerová, Satková and Topiař does not seem to have “made it” to the discourse that
is at present the normative sexological viewpoint – or perhaps we may further speculate that it had
been characteristic of a separate school within sexology all the while and thus espoused by authors
whose views did not ascend to the same plane of privilege in subsequent years as those of Fifková
and colleagues. Why is it that the current, post-1989 paradigm of Czech sexology as presented in
this influential text appears to be more essentialist and heteronormative than at least some strains of
sexology under the former regime? For that matter,  why is the text by  Brauerová,  Satková and
Topiař absent from the bibliographical section of Transsexuality, considering that many if not most
of its sources are by now decades old and a Czech article from 1976 would have fit right in? 
I do not believe that all of this can be answered through examining a finished product of a
particular sexological school. Sokolová remarks that the article quoted from above was “rather an
exception” and that the majority of sexological texts “build their study of human sexuality on the
presupposition of stable and oppositional male and female body, and thus also gender”, that being
“the view that sexology was trying to sell to the public.”158 In this context, the primary reason  I
focus  on  Transsexuality is  precisely  that it  remains  the authoritative  text  on  gender  diversity
(subsumed under “transsexuality”) in the Czech Republic to this day and may very well constitute a
“view to sell” in its drive to showcase largely unified arguments. The fact that this text is the target
157 Sokolová, State Approaches to Homosexuality, Sexological Discourse and Non-Heterosexual Lives in Socialist 
Czechoslovakia, 1948-1989 71-72.
158 Sokolová, State Approaches to Homosexuality, Sexological Discourse and Non-Heterosexual Lives in Socialist 
Czechoslovakia, 1948-1989 96.
65
of the majority of my criticism thus corresponds to its normative function and to the fact that it
contains almost every major trope related to the  master narrative of transsexuality as a medical
condition. A critique of these tropes can be generalized to other contexts, even if they are embodied
by a particular publication; that is, if transsexuality is a “genre”,159 it pays to investigate who has
enjoyed the most power to determine what this genre should be comprised of.
On an institutional level, the authors themselves are or have been active practitioners who
directly deal with trans* people as “clients/patients”, which endows their normative definitions with
considerable practical power (although we cannot surmise from their collaborative writing alone
that they all share the exact same views, as Transsexuality must have been negotiated to an extent
within the team behind the scenes). The publication is peer-reviewed by Jaroslav Zvěřina, another
eminent Czech sexologist, suggesting that the discourse formulated in such a closed group will be
fairly resistant or perhaps even impermeable to substantive dissent. This concentrates  the “expert
knowledge” on gender diversity (“transsexuality”) into the hands of a small group of people. What
is  being presented as an objective and universal account is  limited already by the exclusionary
manner in which contributors were selected and their work incorporated. The fact that this is largely
not perceived as a problem – instead, it can be seen as a guarantee of quality by positivist standards
– illustrates the privileged position the medical discourse occupies among the sciences in the Czech
context. Rather than engaging in an open discussion, Transsexuality presents a series of “facts” to
be taken at face value; it essentially showcases one possible interpretation of gender diversity to the
exclusion of all others. The damage done is compounded by the symbolic value ascribed to the
“hard sciences” in the Western worldview.
I hope to show in the following pages that the textual as well as epistemological strategies in
Transsexuality total up to a discourse that conceptually destroys any authority, autonomy or agency
trans* people could have had over their own gender identity and lived experience. Gender diversity
is  simultaneously  established  as  a  diagnosis/disorder  and  as  a  rarity  (this  latter  is  further
compounded  by  the  fact  that  sexological  surveys  on  the  “prevalence”  of  gender  diversity  or
“transsexuality” are limited both in what they recognize under the transsexuality label and in their
contact with only those trans* people who seek access to medical transition in institutions). I also
note that the framing of trans* people in the publication is  overwhelmingly negative,  their key
associations  being  with  disorder,  helplessness,  self-loathing  and  other  pathologizing  and/or
patronizing concepts. The image of uniform “transsexual” that emerges is so compelling because it
mixes two hallowed notions: authority (because “expert knowledge” was involved in its production)
and general applicability (because almost every trait that the authors ascribe to trans* people is
159 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text.
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uncritically generalized in the book). All this crystallizes as a norm – abstract, static, generic – that
corresponds with the depoliticized and stigmatized approach to gender diversity and trans* identity
in the dominant Czech discourse,  both medical and legal. To put it in the crudest way possible: if
you do not own your body (since some imaginary man or woman does), then it might as well be
owned by the state and by medicine, both of which will then feel entitled to mandate their own
interventions. The tacit belief that  trans* people do not own their  own bodies can only emerge in
specific discursive contexts; these will be further detailed below.
2. The Paradigm of Reality
Though academic discussion couched in the constructivist paradigm has long included trans*
status as  a  subject  of  inquiry with  a  great  level  of  complexity,  the  same cannot  be said about
approaches based on positivism. This paradigm is evidently the prevailing one in Czech medicine,
and it itself constitutes a particular discourse. The defining trait of positivism is the belief that there
is  a  single reality which  is  observable and can be examined “objectively”.160 The  conventional
association of positivism with the so-called “hard” sciences contributes to its prestige and enduring
authority which, at least in the Czech context, manifests itself as a remarkable resistance to criticism
(and  when  criticisms  are  raised,  they  are  often  arbitrarily  discredited  due  to  their  provenance
without  engaging  the  actual  argument  they  make).  As  a  result,  the  assumption  that  positivist
findings  equal  “objective”  ones  is  widespread.  Texts  founded  on  sometimes  outright naïve
positivism are  often  treated  as  if  exempt  from criticism and  uninfluenced  by the  many social
phenomena  that  shape  discourse;  their discourse  becomes  near invisible  as a  discourse.  The
consequences  of  this  are  far-reaching:  not  only  does  an  uncritical  acceptance  of  essentialist-
positivist conclusions stifle discussion and prevents said conclusions from being held up to scrutiny,
but entire areas such as health care can become subject to policing. 
 It is not quite enough to point out that the position occupied by the medical establishment,
represented in this case by sexologists  with vested institutional power,  is based on a positivist-
essentialist paradigm: it is also the position with the power to define how “transsexuality” will be
treated and which gender roles and gender performances will be considered legitimate. While the
tone of  Transsexuality masquerades as descriptive, it should not obscure the fact  the authoritative
background of the publication endows it with the power to prescribe. Jana Dvořáčková specifically
addresses this problem in Czech medicine:
As a result of its scientific authority, sexology establishes [its]
discourses as discourses of truth, strengthening their normative
aspects  considerably  in  the  process  –  it  delineates  the
160 Ramazanoglu and Holland 12.
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coordinates within which it is still possible to lead livable lives,
and  it  pathologizes  behaviour  that  is  nonconforming  with
them.161
Dvořáčková  provides a  well-founded  overview  of  the  way  the  discourse  of  medicalized
transsexuality operates, which is characterized by both paternalism and identity policing. Because
of  the  privileged  position  of  this  perspective,  it  purports  to  be  “objective”  and  even  helpful,
although  like  all  normative  outlooks  in  post-Enlightenment  science  it  is  a  product  of  specific
discourses  showcasing  systematically  privileged  opinions.162 In  a  broader  sense,  the  paradigm
espoused  by  sexology  assumes  the  ideological  role  best  exemplified  by  Stuart  Hall's  triad  of
“common sense” –  “naturalistic illusion” –  “reality effect”.163 The role that sexology plays in the
normative  constitution  of  “reality”  becomes  difficult  to  discount  once  its  typically  undisclosed
modus operandi  is acknowledged. Firstly, “transsexuality” is established as a category signifying
disorder and a deviation from what is “normal”. Secondly, all trans* identities are presumed to be
part of a single, universal “transsexuality”, already labelled as a pathology. Although both of these
conclusions are effects of discourse and at best “reality effects”, their authoritative position makes
them foundational to the discussion. The  pathologized  status of  gender diversity is not only the
underlying assumption of Transsexuality, but also overtly emphasized in key phrases: “a disorder as
severe as transsexuality doubtless is”.164 The illusion of certainty the text consistently goes out of its
way to  impart ranks among its most powerful  textual strategies. However, as history should have
taught us many times over, “[n]o image, verbal or visual, of 'the facts of sexual difference'  exists
independently of prior claims about the meaning of such distinctions”.165 These prior claims, rather
than an empirical bedrock of unbiased data, primarily underline the discourse of Transsexuality.
3. Intimating the Intended Audience
Besides discourse itself, the issues of interpretation and reader reception are crucial to any
text,  particularly  since,  as  Roland  Barthes  admonishes,  these  are  not  controllable  by  authorial
intent.166 Some authors may nonetheless attempt to steer the reader towards certain conclusions
through introductory sections and other inserted commentary, which can be seen in Transsexuality
as well. Speaking on behalf the collective of authors, Hana Fifková describes the intended reading
of the book in the Foreword:
161 Jana Dvořáčková, „Diagnóza F 64.0: Transsexualita optikou sexuologie“ (“Diagnosis F 64.0: Transsexuality from 
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The monograph is intended for experts dealing with the problem
of  transsexuality  across  medical  fields.  It  can  be  a  guide  for
colleagues  on the  front  lines  as  well  as  for  other  assisting
professionals,  who are often the first  to encounter transsexual
clients  and  whose  attitudes  can  determine  the  fates  of  these
clients.  There  is  also  ample information  for  students  in
secondary  and  tertiary  education;  the  monograph  is  a
comprehensive study material as well as a source of knowledge
for their future academic practice.167 
Whether the book actually delivers on its ambitious promises will be examined at length in
the following sections; for now, it should be noted that “experts and students” constitute the primary
audience. They are implied to be unfamiliar with the subject matter and expected to learn about it
chiefly  if  not  only  from the  publication  presented.  As  such,  they  are  not  likely  to  be  trans*
themselves or have meaningful relationships with trans* people in their lives. The text clearly bills
itself as a normative one with its certainty of meeting academic criteria and becoming the go-to
publication on its topic. As the intended usage is both as a study material and as a manual, the reach
of the text is expanded on two fronts: as a field guide for practitioners and as a textbook for people
being educated in the field. The normative influence arising from such monopolization is obvious.
Another alarm bell rings when Fifková phrases this segment as though the book will never need to
be  updated  (although  many  of  its  source  materials  were  already  dated  in  2002,  the  year  of
publication). This lack of self-reflection and downplaying of the need to update and amend existing
bodies of knowledge represents a fatal flaw in the authors' presentation of the subject matter: the
assumption that the book as presented in 2002 is a conclusive look. This aversion to the necessity of
keeping  up  to  date  and  responding  to  new  developments  will  be  shown  to  have  particular
repercussions in the chapters on etiology and whenever formulating overt taxonomies.
The expression “[our] colleagues from the front lines” is  likewise of interest  with how it
paints sexology's treatment of transsexuality as a battle. It is not clear from the text what this battle
is being waged against. It is most likely not the existence of “transsexuality” itself, as the concept is
central to how sexology manages gender diversity by transforming it into a diagnostic category.
Perhaps more probable is the explanation that these “front lines” refer not to battle but are instead
an  open  analogy to colonialism,  reaching  out  to  colleagues  who  are  on  the  “front  lines”  of
transmuting the wild expanse of gender diversity into clearly demarcated “transsexuality”. There is
a clearly identifiable parallel to historical and current colonialism and its “universalising vision of
gender, one we still live with, where a hegemonic Western gender ideal is now popularly believed to
be culturally and temporally universal”, which at the same time perpetuates the “exclusion […] of
167 Fifková in Fifková et al. 12.
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any theory generated by the colonised people.”168 While in some forms of pretend-universal theory
generated by the privileged about  the marginalized,  such conceptual  exclusion is  central  to  the
enterprise but remains implied, in the case of Transsexuality it is acknowledged and positive value
is ascribed to it: 
Last but not least,  we kept our current and future transsexual
clients in mind. Hopefully, the book will help them in finding
themselves and offer guidance along the difficult path to solving
their problem. It can also provide support to their loved ones in
understanding  and  accepting  how  transsexual  people  are
different.169
The paragraph may be intended as a gesture of goodwill and reassurance, but the normative
aspect becomes sinister in the suggestion that trans* people should invariably “find themselves” in
the definitions outlined for them by a limited group of cisgender authority figures  rather than in
anything else. Identifying “correctly” in the vision of normative transsexuality that Fifková et al. lay
out means  internalizing  a  whole  paradigm that  rests  on  having  a  “disorder”,170 suffering  from
overwhelmingly negative feelings about  one's  body,  presenting in a  strictly gender-stereotypical
fashion,  abstaining  from certain  sexual  practices,  not  wanting  to  have  genetic  children,  etc.  In
addition, Fifková et al. presuppose that all trans* people will exhibit at least some of the above traits
(and all for the same reasons) without regard for individual identification and preference. Likewise
striking is the fact that any possible utility of the book to trans* people is relegated to the very end
of the introductory section,  allowing  for little critical  engagement with  the content after  all the
“experts” have already defined and streamlined it as they saw fit. Judging from Fifková's division of
“transsexual clients” from “experts and students”, there is discursively no overlap between the two
groups, further cementing the notion that trans* people can never be the ultimate authority on their
own identity  and  lived  experience  –  quite  the  contrary,  future  cisgender  “experts”  need  to  be
appropriately educated by the current ones without any substantive input from trans* people so that
the discourse can continue to keep its subjects in line. Trans* people, meanwhile, are explicitly
asked to be spoken for.
These are things that the introduction states quite clearly. Trans* people have a “problem”, to
which the book is a solution. They cannot communicate their lived experience to their partners,
friends and relatives; instead, they should rely on the book to “explain” them. The path of transition
is described as “difficult” without taking into account how much of the difficulty may stem from
having to navigate a prescriptive legal and medical system in a cissexist society, instead insinuating
168 Cross, “A Social Symphony:  The Four Movements of Transphobia in Theory” <http://quinnae.com/2010/10/29/a-
tireless-waltz-the-four-movements-of-transphobia-in-theory/>.
169 Fifková in Fifková et al. 12.
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that being trans* is in and of itself synonymous with toil and trouble.  Under these conditions, we
can only hopelessly echo Sandy Stone's old question: “How, then, can the transsexual speak? If the
transsexual were to speak, what would s/he say?”171
4. The Structure of the Sexological Argument
In text analysis, content and form are not necessarily separable from each other. Assessing the
structure of the argument is useful in that  it  reveals how the structure  itself  can be manipulative,
whether this is done in a deliberate way or works more subtly through discursive practices that may
not be fully realized even by the author. It is, after all, neither testable nor too relevant whether the
imposing of a particular structure upon  the text by its author is always fully deliberate – yet the
structure informs how interpretation is produced and which meanings are privileged in its context,
what reader responses are invited and what parts of the text are made important.
In terms of structure, then,  Transsexuality strives to appear neutral. Its chapter list is fairly
comprehensive in that it covers more or less all of the major categories employed by the medical
discourse. The chapters (not yet inclusive of the introductory section, sub-chapters, appendices and
bibliography) are as follows: 
• Sexual Identity (pages 13-19, 4 sub-chapters)
• The Etiology of Transsexuality (pages 21-23, 2 sub-chapters)
• The Diagnosis [or diagnostic method] of Transsexuality (pages 27-37, 1 sub-chapter)
• Differential Diagnostics (pages 37-42, 8 sub-chapters)
• The Basic Stages of the Sex-Change Process (pages 43-49, 8 sub-chapters)
• Psychotherapy (pages 52-59, 3 sub-chapters)
• Endocrinological Aspects and Hormonal Therapy (pages 60-67, 4 sub-chapters)
• Surgical Procedures in FtMs (pages 67-80, 3 sub-chapters, the last with additional 4 sub-
chapters)
• Surgical Procedures in MtFs (pages 83-90, 2 sub-chapters)
• Differences between FtM and MtF Transsexuals (pages 91-98, 7 sub-chapters)
• Transsexuality and Parenthood (pages 101-106, no sub-chapters)
• Legal Aspects (pages 107-111, no sub-chapters)
• Transsexuality and Religion (pages 112-117, no sub-chapters)
• Sociological Aspects (pages 118-122, no sub-chapters)
171 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttransexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text.
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It  would  appear  from this  overview and the  section  names  that  the  book attempts  to  be
balanced and even take into account some societal aspects of its subject matter, which is probably
the goal of the ToC. However, the lengths and detail given to the individual chapters are far from
even. Judging from the number of sub-chapters as well as their page counts, the most detailed are
the  chapters  dealing  with  “technical”  information,  such  as  surgical  procedures,  the  prescribed
trajectory  of  transition,  and  a  taxonomy  of  sorts  that  outlines  some  supposedly  characteristic
differences  between trans  men and trans  women.  This  corroborates the preoccupation positivist
accounts have with “hard fact” and with categorization, although the arbitrary criteria of gendered
“difference” assigned to trans men and trans women by cis sexologists present a decidedly different
category from directly measurable and concrete objects of particular surgeries. According to the
positivist-essentialist paradigm, though, there is no significant difference between these areas of
inquiry, and hence the chapters are all treated similarly. This is not only misleading in that it puts the
gender  stereotypes  imposed  upon  trans*  individuals  on  the  same  level  as  precise  surgical  (or
surgically precise?) interventions, but it also prevents the positivist discourse from conceptualizing
the category of gender as anything other than an inborn “essence” divisible into neat categories. 
From further comparison of the individual chapters, it appears that the least detailed ones are
those  which,  if  approached more  deeply,  would  inevitably trouble the straightforward  narrative
presented  in  the  “core”  chapters.  The  chapter  titled  “Sociological  Aspects”  [of  transsexuality],
arguably  a  field  which  would  warrant  a  far  more  thorough  examination  given  its  immediate
relevance to the social standing of trans* people, spans a grand total of four pages. Moreover, the
chapter is slotted at the very end of the volume, just before the bibliography and appendices, further
compounding  its  marginal  status.  Similarly  marginal  is  the  chapter  titled  “Legal  Aspects”  [of
transsexuality], again a subject which could be troubled with questions regarding the human rights
of  people  who  are  legally  required  to  undergo  surgery  and,  if  living  in  a  state-recognized
partnership,  a  divorce  as  well,  in  order  for  the  state  to  recognize  their  gender  as  valid.
“Transsexuality  and Parenthood”,  along with  “Transsexuality  and Religion”,  are  also  brief  and
disconnected from the other chapters in the book. 
Aside  from length  and detail  level,  what  also  signals  the  marginal  status  of  the  chapters
without a primarily medical subject matter is their grouping towards the end of the volume, as if
they merely constituted an afterthought to the “objective” findings in the previous sections. This
interpretation is  supported by the fact that there is  no logical progression among the final four
chapters.  They are  fragmented,  unlike  the  previous  ones,  which  follow  a  clear  chronology of
etiology – “diagnosis” – treatment – details of treatment and its outcome – legal recognition and
assimilation into society. It is to the detriment of the minimum of  non-medical perspectives that
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appear in the publication that they are not granted similarly logical tie-ins. Sociological and legal
aspects could have been, for example,  brought together to form a more in-depth analysis and to
achieve a greater cohesion of the subject matter (insofar as they could have been a coherent whole,
being written by different authors), but they are separated by the chapter on religion, which actually
precedes sociology in the book's structure. 
Of  great interest is the juxtaposition of the introductory section and the appendices. By way
of introduction, the book opens with “Excerpt from Peer Review” by Jaroslav Zvěřina, designed to
provide the authoritative foundation upon which the rest of the publication builds. The content of
this  short  segment  will  be  examined  further  in  a  later  section,  as  it  offers  a  fascinating  –  if
unintended – insight into the ideological operation of the normative discourse when confronted with
counterdiscourses.  At  the  other  end  of  the  book,  after  the  bibliography,  we  finally  find  the
appendices: The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association  Standards of Care
(Appendix 1), the informed consent forms for sterilization (“sex change”) surgery and for HRT
(Appendix 2), Testimonials of Transsexual Clients (Appendix 3) and Contacts (Appendix 4). With
the exception of Appendix 2, which does not have a unified title, these are the actual titles of the
individual sections  when translated. As we can see, it is  only in the second-to-last appendix that
some select trans* people are formally granted some space in which to express their views. 
5. The Content That Is Shaped
While structure shapes its content in many ways, the content itself is indispensable. A closer
look will be taken here at the language used in the publication, the actual message conveyed by the
authors and, finally, the implications and broader context of this message. 
As a preliminary note on the language, it can generally be described as clinical, pathologizing,
and not in accordance with the preferred usage in the LGBTIQ* community today. Transsexuality is
the  accepted  name  of  the  subject  matter  in  the  publication,  a  few  times  complemented  by
transsexualism  and  transvestitism;  transgender is  never  used  as  the  normative  category.  With
regards to the people concerned, in a minority of cases the adjectival phrase “transsexual person
(people)” is used, but the majority of usages is the noun “transsexual(s)”. Other currently preferred
terms like “transgender/trans/trans* person (people)” or “trans man/trans woman” are not employed
in the normative definitions. All this suggests that the linguistic grounding of the text is located in
the medical register, which is in this case closed off to other available discourses, such as self-
description by trans* people,  the language of  human rights  activism, or the critical  vocabulary
employed  by  researchers  and  theorists  whose  work  interrogates  the  discourse  of  biological
essentialism. 
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Among the pathologizing terms we find “disorder” (porucha in Czech), “disease/illness” and
its related adjectives (choroba, nemoc, nemocný), “diagnostics” and “diagnosis”, “fetish/fetishistic”,
“patient”  (sometimes  alternated  with  the  less  pathologizing  “client”  but  not  consistently),
“dysphoria”  (dysforie,  rozlada),  “disgust/distaste”  (odpor),  “problem”,  “syndrome”,  “handicap”,
being  positioned outside of “the normal population”, something to be “admitted to”  or “suffered
from” (trpět,  trýzeň), at  odds with  “classic  heterosexuality”,  etc.  This  framing creates  a  strong
negative  connotation  around  gender  diversity,  strengthening  the  already  polarizing rhetoric  of
gender “disorder”.
Fifková et al. devote several chapters to describing the various ways in which the trans* body
“should” be made to better comply with the preconceived norms of what a male or female body is
supposed to look like.172 Not only that, the authors do not conceive of those trans* people who have
not undergone all of the prescribed procedures as “really” being their identified gender, as shown
even by such trivial indicators as chapter titles. In the section “Differences Between FtM and MtF
Transsexuals” (notice the noun form of “transsexual” and the conspicuous absence of “people”),
there is  a sub-chapter  titled “Sexual Life in the Role Psychologically [the person's]  Own  After
Completing the Sex Change Process” [emphasis mine].173 Clearly, according to the authors, the male
or female sexual role cannot be “psychologically one's own” until the individual has been through
all of the prescribed physical interventions. Aside from being obviously normative and dismissive
of even the option of there being an individual component to sex life or to one's preference in bodily
configuration,  this  phrasing does away with the possibility of being respected as a person of a
certain gender/sexual role purely on the basis of  identity and agency.  It  also confuses its  own
body/mind dualism by making the mind suddenly read as dependent on first modifying the body.
Similar examples of conditional would-be acceptance litter the pages of Transsexuality. Diversity is
thoroughly  undermined by pathology, and pathology can only be navigated by “agreeing” to follow
a predefined transition  path  ending in  compulsory sterilization,  a  de facto eugenic requirement
being exerted over an entire demographic subsumed under one pathology-insinuating umbrella.
6. The Seductive Truisms of Biological Determinism
The  overall  view  of  “sex”  as  a  biological  category  in  the  publication  is  in  the  vein of
simplistic binary categorization: the existence of exactly two sexes is considered to be a given, and
to each sexes a set of normative characteristics is attached. The resultant blueprints for each “sex”
are treated as pre-discursive and defining for what it means to be a man or a woman in general. The
concept of “biological sex” the authors outline in the beginning presumes an uncomplicated and
172 Fifková et al. 43-90, spanning multiple chapters with various combinations of the individual authors.
173 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 94.
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uniform relationship between chromosomes, fetal development, sex organs, and hormones. Not all
of these “facts” are clearly sourced in the text; for example, the chapter “Sexual Identity” where the
normative definition of “biological” (as in chromosomal) sex is provided does not appear to source
any  of its claims about fetal development. Worryingly, there is no direct mention of any of the
scholarship that has challenged the notion of “sex” as a clearly divisible binary that can be applied
universally (e.g. Thomas  Laqueur and  Anne  Fausto-Sterling's  major works in the field,  both of
which had already been published by the time Transsexuality hit the shelves). Transsexuality further
presupposes that there is a clear distinction between “culturally specific differences between the
sexes” and “biological and psychological differences” which, the authors claim, “are preserved”
even as  social  changes  happen.174 This level  of simplification,  along with the assertion that the
spheres of society and biology can clearly be separated,  is  a textbook example of what  Hood-
Williams and Hird call into question about the ingrained notions of “biology” and “biological sex”
as something that precedes society/culture (a “natural” phenomenon), is in no way shaped by it,
and, unlike gender,  “is immutable”.175 The question is less  of  whether the outline of “sex” and
“biology” in Transsexuality is insufficiently complex and non-exhaustive – there can be no question
that it is – but what purpose the simplification serves in the overall narrative of the publication and,
by extension, of the very medical establishment that takes it upon itself to regulate gender identity.
While  biological  essentialism  is  obviously  problematic  in  itself,  its  effects  in  relation  to
“transsexuality”  as  the normative  framework  under  which  all  gender  diversity  is  fallaciously
subsumed legitimize a practice that, as will be shown in the following sections, ultimately hinges on
gender policing and on systematic denial of trans* people's agency in their gendered development,
not on medical beneficence.
The uncritically defined “biological sex” of Transsexuality (the authors' consensus is that sex
chromosomes constitute “the basic sex”)176 will develop into a kind of default reference point in the
book, whether it be in contexts of general biological determinism (which, somehow, always seems
to be in convenient agreement with heteronormative institutions despite sexology's insistence that
“humans are closed units, the social being relegated only to their surface”)177 or while emphasizing
how trans*  people  supposedly fall  short  of  the  binary  ideal.  This  of  course  presupposes  “that
biology itself consistently distinguishes between males and females”, when “shades of difference
and  similarity  [occur]  much  more  often  than  clear  opposites”178 would  have  been  a  far  more
descriptive (as opposed to prescriptive) assertion. 
174 Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 14.
175 Hird, and Hood-Williams quoted in Hird 25.




It  is  precisely  the  institution  of  “opposite  sexes”  that  is  so  vital  to  Transsexuality.  It  is
repeatedly stressed that even for those trans* people who choose medical transition inclusive of
surgeries, the procedures “will not be able to create the organs of the opposite sex perfectly” and “it
cannot be guaranteed that the new tissues will fully conform to anatomical, functional and aesthetic
norms”179 in  an  unacknowledged  nod  to  eugenic  classifications  of  “ideal”  bodies.180 The  HRT
consent form the authors provide reads as almost sarcastic in this regard, telling the prospective
client that “the effect [of HRT] cannot be perfect” and that “in men, there will not be a complete
cessation  of  facial  hair  growth.”181 The  signal  words  “perfect”  and  “norms”,  along  with  the
reference  to  “biological”  sex  in  trans  women,  are  all  symptomatic  of  one  larger  problem:  the
discourse of transsexuality seeks to avoid or  to  rephrase gender diversity rather than to affirm it.
Rather than conceding that the categories of “man” and “woman” are in reality not as simple as
matching up  uniform  chromosomes to  uniform  genitals,  the discourse is  framed  so that  people
whose bodies are not within the normative blueprints into a position of only partial legitimacy. What
makes this tactic particularly egregious is that it  is not, as  Transsexuality itself will continue to
betray over and over, due to some simple ignorance of gender/sex diversity existing:
[S]cience  has  historically  recognized the  diversity  inherent  in
“sex” diversity across many animal and plant species, including
humans.[68] Despite this, modern discourses produce a specific
knowledge about  what  is  “natural” about  “sex.”  That  is,  that
“sex” consists of two mutually exclusive typologies: female and
male. This sociopolitical belief “is maintained and perpetuated
by the medical community in the face of overwhelming physical
evidence  that  this  taxonomy  is  not  mandated  by  biology”
(Hausman, 1995: 25).182
So, although reality here makes a case for “sex” being, to use the cliché, a spectrum, the
discourse still wilfully pretends that it is a rigid binary and that trans* people are in the wrong for
not matching this imposed binary in every respect. This is of course assuming that “sex” exists at all
as something other than a socially mandated construct: “Despite growing scientific evidence to the
contrary, sex must exist.”183 To further this perceived necessity of binary sex, then, instead of being
treated as a valid identity in its own right, trans* status is regarded simply as partial assimilation to
cisgender maleness or femaleness (one of the guest authors of Transsexuality even mistranslates sex
reassignment as “creating a likeness” [připodobnění]184). The very premise of there being an “ideal”
cis blueprint of unproblematically delineated “sex” for trans* people to assimilate to (and fall short
179 Fifková et al. 159.
180 Hartmann 2.
181 Fifková et al. 160.
182 Hird 136.
183 Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body 192.
184 Skoblik in Fifková et al. 112, 115.
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of) marks trans* existence as somehow inherently deficient next to that normative blueprint. 
Intersex (incorrectly referred to as “true hermaphroditism” or “pseudohermaphroditism” in the
book) is mentioned only in passing among the various definitions, predictably treated as an anomaly
and a disorder.185 I note here that the concept (and, in some usages, actual term) of “Disorders of
Sexual Development” is controversial at best in light of major intersex organizations and even some
world legislature now recognizing that intersex  status  is not a disorder at all.186 The dictum of a
disordered anomaly makes intersex, too, into an exception that supposedly proves the rule, based on
the authoritative notion that “doctors know better. With Science they can tell the 'true sex' of these
people, and eliminate the challenge to sex dyadism.”187 In effect, this prevents intersex status from
being  recognized  as  just  another  case  in  point  that  “sex”  is  not  as  straightforward  as  binarist
impositions would have it. This non-recognition is, again, a discursive strategy, or as Costello puts
it, the “belief that intersex people 'really didn't exist' when they were standing right there was like
some oddly theoretical genocide.”188 His is not a lone voice to this effect; for example, Myra Hird
would concur that “it is ironic that biology is routinely used in contemporary society to sustain the
cultural notion of sex dimorphism” [emphasis mine].189 
One  more  use  of  intersex  in  Transsexuality and  by  extension  the  sexological  outlook  –
literally use,  as  it  entails  the  instrumentalization  of  intersex  status  to  further  the  discourse  of
normative transsexuality – appears in etiological theories, where the outcomes of studies of intersex
people  are  treated  as  though  they  simultaneously  proved  something  about  trans*  people.  The
premises the authors use to further that claim are riddled with contradictions. At one point, they
reference a study carried out by Imperato-McGinley et  al.  in the Dominican Republic in 1979,
which followed a group of 33 XY people with deficiency in 5-α reductase, 19 of whom had been
“mistakenly”  raised  as  girls  before  developing  sexual characteristics  regarded  as  male.190 The
authors, both of the original study and of Transsexuality, operate on the premise that said intersex
people were “really” male (because genetic sex criteria are privileged), a questionable assertion in
and of itself given the non-correspondence of intersex status with the binary genders/sexes. The
resolution of the study was that 17 of those 19 “mistakenly raised” people came to identify with a
normatively  male  gender  role  post-puberty,  one  continued  wearing  feminine  clothing  “but  his
185 Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 13.
186 OII Australia, Submission on the ethics of genetic selection against intersex traits  <http://oii.org.au/25621/
submission-ethics-genetic-selection-intersex-traits/>.
187 Cary Gabriel Costello, “On Being Called a 'True Hermaphrodite'” in Intersex Roadshow, <http://intersexroadshow.
blogspot.com/2009/05/on-being-called-true-hermaphrodite.html> May 14 2009, Jun 1 2014.
188 Costello, “On Being Called a 'True Hermaphrodite'”, <http://intersexroadshow.blogspot.com/2009/05/on-being-
called-true-hermaphrodite.html>.
189 Hird 151.
190 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 24.
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mannerisms and behaviour were male and he provably had [sexual] contact with women”, and one
“lived as a woman, got married […] denied any attraction to women, desired genital surgery  to
female, and wore a faux bust.”191 Fascinatingly, instead of concluding that this last person may have
after all been a heterosexual trans woman – because, despite being classified as male by the medical
establishment,  she  openly  identified  as  female  –  the  authors  contend  that  such behaviour  “is
consistent with the assumption that in the cohort of men, there will be at least one homosexual.”192
Being intersex and being trans* are perceived as mutually exclusive, just as it is stated in the ICD
10 definition used by the authors elsewhere,193 and so the only explanation that remains by their
logic is being an “effeminate” gay man. The authors are simultaneously under the impression that,
somehow, trans women enjoy unquestioned social acceptance as opposed to “a homosexual boy
who was raised as a girl […] being stigmatized by society as a gay man”.194 While,  of course,
homophobia remains a real problem and should not be diminished, pitting it against transphobia and
claiming that the latter is less stigmatizing or easier to live with on a social level indicates profound
ignorance of oppression dynamics. The most ironic part of this supposed morality tale of intersex
status as a vehicle for binary cis gender based on genetics, though, is that the original study was set
in the Dominican Republic, which, although dismissed by the authors as “conservative”195 and thus
implicitly backwards next to “our” Western society, is actually among societies that do not exclude
or  intervene into intersex bodies  in  the same way that  “our” society customarily does.  Fausto-
Sterling clarifies that deficiency in 5-α reductase in XY children is common in certain geographical
areas and that
in  both  the  Dominican  Republic  and  New  Guinea,  DHT-
deficient  children  – who  in  the  United  States  are  generally
operated on immediately – are  recognized as  a third sex.[82]
The Dominicans call it  guevedoche, or “penis at twelve,” while
the Sambians use the word  kwolu-aatmwol,  which suggests a
person’s  transformation  “into  a  male  thing.”[83]  In  both
cultures,  the DHT-deficient  child  experiences  ambivalent  sex-
role socialization. And in adulthood s/he most commonly – but
not  necessarily  with  complete  success  – self-identifies  as  a
male.196
Thus the attempts to describe the experience of intersex people in the Dominican Republic in
the binary terms that Transsexuality champions as the supposedly universal terminology for gender
diversity  is  not  only  cis-  and  heteronormative,  but  also  socioculturally  misplaced  (and  indeed
191 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 24.
192 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 24.
193 Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 17.
194 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 24.
195 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 24.
196 Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body 109.
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symptomatic  of  Western  imperialism).  The  existence  of  dedicated  language  for  the  condition
suggests  that this  particular  form of  intersex  is regarded  as  an  integral  part  of  the  societies  it
frequently occurs in, and the “ambivalent sex-role socialization” of these people evokes a rather
more complex process than “boys mistakenly raised as girls”. As for the resignification of the one
person  in  the  studied  group  who  identified  as  female  rather  than  male  as  the  token  “male
homosexual”,  Dvořáčková  describes  the  attitude  (and  illustrates  it  with  a  different  quote  from
Transsexuality in her text, no less) as “a way in which the mechanism of repression operates […]
which  rests  on not  recognizing  the  situation  as  one  of  transsexuality,  but  translating  it  into  a
different terminology – on classifying the desire to transition as a desire to solve one's problem with
homosexuality.”197 Both  intersex  and  transsexuality  are  thus  instrumentalized  to  further
heteronormative thought patterns.
A similar case of comparing the incomparable occurs in the example of a group of 27 children
surveyed at the Johns Hopkins Hospital. The children had been born with XY chromosomes, testes
and androgens, and without a penis. They were operated on (with two exceptions) and raised as
girls (with the same two exceptions), and they all went on to identify as male. 198 While this example
is yet another compelling case against infant genital surgery, it is clearly not equivalent to trans*
identity. For all intents and purposes, if these children had been left alone and assigned male straight
away,  they would have effectively grown up cisgender  (with a  somewhat  atypical  body).  They
would have identified with their birth gender/sex assignment as well as with the chromosomal sex
privileged by the authors of Transsexuality themselves. Their example is thus hardly analogical to
anything that would have had to do with trans* people's experience of the medical system. The last
example  the authors use of an intersex child who was raised female but “correctly”  went on to
identify as male regardless199 would have been the equivalent of assuming gender identity from
chromosomal sex, and therefore distinct from “transsexuality” yet again. It is indeed a positive point
that the authors do not support non-consenting genital mutilation in intersex infants (although they
do not use the terms I use in doing so) and the attendant attempts to indoctrinate intersex people into
gender  roles  arbitrarily picked for them by practitioners,200 but they compare incomparable and
often questionably construed categories in their arguments. If they emphasize Stoller's 1968 belief
that “in hermaphrodites [sic] raised in the opposite sex role than the one corresponding to their
chromosomal  sex,  the  success  rate  of  changing their  gender  identity  falls  dramatically  in  later
months of life”,201 they have  still  not managed to explain how  any of  that should be relevant to
197 Dvořáčková 62.
198 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 25.
199 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 23.
200 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 25.
201 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 26. Stoller's assertion is paraphrased in the book, not a direct quote.
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trans* people. After all, it is usually assumed that the identified gender of most trans* people is
precisely  the  one  that  is not  congruent  with  their  “chromosomal  sex”,  making  Stoller's above
quotation completely moot in said scenario. (There is also no demonstrated “upper limit” on when a
person may come to realize their trans* status and the associated gender identity.) In their eagerness
to make an airtight case for biological determinism with “hard data”, no matter how old or how
ambiguously categorized, the authors confuse and conflate their own categories of analysis.
The conflation continues,  as has already been hinted at  in some of the previous citations,
when it  comes to  sexuality and gender  identity.  Heterosexuality in  particular  is  suggested as  a
method to “diagnose” trans* people multiple times,  which is troubling not only because of the
implication that a gender identity is only valid when it adds up to heterosexuality in the end, but
also because it is repeatedly proposed that heterosexuality should be determined not by the person's
own estimation, but through phallo- or vulvoplethysmography.202 Aside from the fact that trans*
people have the same range of sexualities as cis people available to them and thus heterosexuality in
itself  can hardly be a reliable indicator of gender identity,  it  is particularly  unethical that  gross
violations of bodily integrity are suggested over listening to how the people in question define their
sexual identities and/or preferences. One available criticism of the plethysmograph is telling: 
The only places where this device is still used on gender-variant
people are countries where [Kurt] Freund worked. A transgender
activist in the Czech Republic writes: “This machine is used in
diagnostics of transsexuals (both Females to Males and Males to
Females) here in the Czech republic. Some of the doctors ask the
clients to undergo the test with PPG as the obligatory test for
making a diagnosis of transsexuality! They show erotic photos
to transsexuals. Of course, we transsexuals consider this to be
total nonsense. They think it is science... We consider this test to
be very humiliating and at the same time absolutely useless in
these cases.” (Carroll 2003)203
Further  criticisms  of  plethysmography  have  included  scientific  unreliability,  lack  of
standardization of the testing, lack of accuracy in results, vulnerability to “faking”, openness of the
data to interpretation and manipulation, and outright abuse of the technology by practitioners.204 All
these are major issues that should have prevented the authors from claiming that plethysmography
is “one of the most important psycho-physiological diagnostic methods”;205 such a statement implies
a consensus where there clearly is  none.  Neither  PPG nor  VPG is  recommended as a  relevant
procedure  even  by  the  otherwise  extremely  gender-policing  and  pathologizing  HBIGDA SoC,
202 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 28; Procházka in Fifková et al. 39; Fifková in Fifková et al. 44.
203 A.J. James, “Plethysmograph: a Disputed Device” in tsroadmap.com, <http://www.tsroadmap.com/info/
plethysmograph.html>16 May 2004 (revised 12 Apr 2006), 12 May  2014.
204 James, “Plethysmograph: a Disputed Device” <http://www.tsroadmap.com/info/plethysmograph.html>.
205 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 28.
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which are translated and reprinted in full in the volume.  While  Transsexuality does not insist that
PPG/VPG  necessarily  be  done  in  all  cases  and  only  suggests  it  as  “an  auxiliary  differential
diagnostic method”206, the ethical concerns around the procedure alone should have prevented its
inclusion in what is intended to be a serious “diagnostic” manual. The methodological difficulties
only add to this point.
Another  problem  with the line  of  reasoning  that  ties  gender  identity  to  sexuality,  both
conceptual and ethical, is the sexualization of trans* identity that is inevitably created when sexual
arousal is used as a method of differentiation. While the historical explanation of why the method
has  retained  such  befuddling  clout in  the  Czech  Republic  is  a  compelling  one,  a  significant
contributing factor may be the authoritative position of sexology in the Czech medical context.
Already Foucault comments on “the functional requirements of a discourse that must produce its
truth” in  the  relation  between  sexuality  and  the  scientia  sexualis.207 The  discourse  of  the
phlethysmograph  vis-a-vis  “transsexuality”  easily  fits  in  as  another  transmogrification  of  the
Foucauldian obligation to “produce a truth” that fits into the discourse's axioms. In practice, the
result is the belief that it is not enough to trust people with their own genders and sexualities; there
must  be  some authoritative  “expert”  knowledge  that  “objectively”  verifies  these  identifications
based on some other data, even when the data is itself easily discredited and collected via unethical
as well as methodologically unsound means to boot.
To return to the heading of this section, it is a disconcerting feature of the book that many
essentialist claims are provided as “facts” with zero sourcing and zero openness for debate. Many of
these  incidences  are  casual,  which  compounds  the  observations  of  critics  that  positivists  “treat
masculinity and femininity as commonsense ideas that don’t require explicit definitions.”208 They
include  pleas  to  “the  testosterone  of  male  values  and generally  the  more  instinctual  biological
component  of  male  sexuality”209 or  to  “biologically  oriented  men  [as  opposed  to  emotionally
oriented women]”,210 not to mention sweeping statements hinging on problematic  classifications
such as that “there is practically zero predisposition in majority men to accept a male body in a
potential [female] partner.”211 These ideas are virtually indistinguishable from the pop psychology
books of the Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus variety, both in their  candid absolutism
206 Procházka in Fifková et al. 39.
207 Foucault, The History of Sexuality 68.
208 Rebecca Jordan-Young quoted in Bridget K. Gorman, “Book Reviews – Brain Storm: The Flaws in the Science of 
Sex Differences and The Mirage of a Space between Nature and Nurture”  in American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
116, No. 6 (The University of Chicago Press, 2011) 2020. The comment originally relates to scientists in the field of 
brain organization, but as my analysis here demonstrates, the belief is not unique to scientists whose only research 
interest is the brain. 
209 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 100.
210 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 32.
211 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 31.
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and in their touting of binary ideology as indisputable and correct, a tendency which has already
been unmasked as  “how science is  being  used  and abused to  legitimise  gender  stereotypes.”212
Except, in many cases in this  book, the authors do not even go the extra mile towards cherry-
picking  a  study  for  said  legitimization;  they  simply  state  that  there  is  an  innate  “biological”
difference  that  conforms  with  Western  gender  stereotypes  and  leave  it  at  that.  It  will  be
demonstrated many more times that this facile biologization of masculinity and femininity is among
the  cornerstones  of  the  normative  transsexuality  concept,  since  it  provides  both  the  post-
Enlightenment ideological framing of “men” and “women” as non-overlapping categories213 and
props up all the notions of trans* “diagnoses” and “sex changes” needing to be standardized and
policed so as not to conflict with that deterministic narrative. The binary-generating stereotype itself
is  occasionally  repurposed  to  serve  a  cis  (healthy)  vs.  trans*  (disordered)  binary  instead,  for
example,  when  the  authors  argue  that  trans*  people's  “psychosexual  development  is  delayed
compared to their [cis] peers on average” – and then proceed to detail some of the ways in which
trans* people can have relationships before transition, suggesting that no “delay on average” might
actually happening as a result of not (yet) having transitioned.214 The adage that discourse actively
shapes reality is old and worn in sociological theories, but the above statement is nothing if not an
unintentional testament to it.  The researchers'  perceptions of reality are actively engaged in the
production of  their  findings  here,  but  instead  of  engaging  in  critical  reflection  of  this  fact
(developing  a  “theorized  subjectivity”),215 their level  of  involvement  is  denied  or  conveniently
omitted.
The academic cherry-picking occurs reliably whenever etiology is mentioned,  however,  and
also  whenever normative  definitions  and  taxonomies  of  the  (exactly  two) different  types  of
“transsexuals” are laid out. The area of etiology is a notoriously contested one, but the authors limit
their  coverage of these  controversies to dichotomizing “the etiology of transsexuality” into two
oppositionally construed paradigms: “psychological” and “biological”  theories. By psychological
theories,  they chiefly mean behaviourism,  which,  it  later  turns  out,  they oppose because of  its
(demonstrably damaging) tendency to take on the form of conversion therapy.216 Meanwhile, the
rest of the etiology chapter is devoted to making a case for biological essentialism, much of which
is based on the conflation of intersex status with trans* status as discussed earlier. Aside from this
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misappropriation  of  intersex,  the  authors  also  point  to  a  1959  study  in  guinea  pigs,  which
supposedly proved a causal link between fetal testosterone exposure and later “male behaviour”
(which they fail to explicitly define in the book,  lending yet more credence to the observation,
quoted earlier, that researchers treat masculinity and femininity as self-evident realities).217 Without
a single sourced footnote, the authors quickly add that this particular observation in guinea pigs had
been corroborated in “dogs, mice, sheep, monkeys and some birds”.218 They go on to state that the
same premise has been proven in humans, but instead of identifying whether at least one analogical
study exists at all (or admitting why a truly analogical study of this sort would be highly unlikely to
be approved in any present-day institution), they deflect attention to the  hypothesis of three brain
centres  that  supposedly  take  part  in  some  unspecified  “prenatal  programming”  that  could
theoretically play a role in the formation of sex difference (or its “disorders”), and they present all
this as empirical fact that “leaves no room for doubt”.219 While the authors are free to subscribe to
any theories they wish, presenting these theories as evidence-based  and final is  unconscionably
misleading. Dvořáčková points out that any possible analogy between those animal experiments and
effects of prenatal testosterone in humans are merely extrapolated by sexologists, to whom the idea
of  a  brain  centre  for  gender  identity  that  forms  safely  “before”  any  sociocultural  influences
represented the last  chance to  submerge gender identity  in some allegedly universal  essence  of
masculinity and femininity.220 More damningly still, Fausto-Sterling ventures facts that undermine
the whole idea of transferring methodologically ambivalent research in rodents to humans:
Humans  are  learners,  and  proudly  so.  [...] It  seems  ironic,
therefore, that our most prominent and influential accounts of
the development of sexual behaviors in advanced mammals omit
learning  and  experience.  Because  the  control  of  hormone
synthesis differs between primates and other species,[181] a case
can  be  made  that  studies  on  the  hormonal  basis  of  sexual
behaviors  in  nonprimates  tell  us  little,  if  anything,  about
primates, including humans.  […]  I make a broader claim: that
the theories we have derived from rodent experimentation are
inadequate even for rodents.221
One of the reasons Fausto-Sterling calls (among other things) determinism through prenatal
hormonal levels insufficient even in the context of the original studies is that there is no reason why
factors of experience and socialization should be excluded in rodents either: “Even rodents engage
in extensive periods of social play, activities that influence the development of the nervous system
and future behaviors. It is at least plausible that play activities alter hormone levels and that the
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developing  brain  can  respond  to  such  changes.[180]  Hormonal  systems,  after  all,  respond
exquisitely to experience, be it in the form of nutrition, stress, or sexual activity (to name but a few
possibilities).”222 Incidentally,  the particular 1959 guinea pig study the authors of  Transsexuality
base their etiological argument on failed to follow up on its results throughout the guinea pigs'
lifetime and thus did not  prove “permanence” of  the prenatal  changes  it  documented or verify
whether the original findings still  held in varying situations years later.223 Yet the  assumption of
permanence  and comparability  to  humans  is presented as  a  given,  including  at  the  end of  the
“Etiology”  chapter, where the  authors stress that behavioural theories have been inconclusive or
disproved, while remaining completely silent about that same inconclusiveness being exhibited by
their theories of choice. More than that, they assert that there is “no reason for doubt”  of those
biological  theories  and that  their  supposedly  uncontested  status  in  the  academic  sphere  is
“evident.”224 Both of the implications of this – that several highly idiosyncratic experiments have
definitive and generalized validity in “the etiology of transsexuality”, and that the only alternative to
poorly  formulated  biological  determinism  is  equally  poorly  formulated  behaviourism  ergo
conversion  therapy  –  are  prime  examples  of  engineering  “science”  to  create  a  false  sense  of
indisputable  facticity  out  of  inconclusive  data  or  out  of  patchy  bodies  of  research  whose
methodological and  conceptual  relevance  to  “transsexuality”  is  debatable. It  is  yet  another
application  of  the  repurposed  binary  (here  it  becomes  “fully  inborn/fully  environmental”),
functioning  analogically  to  what  Eve  Kosofsky Sedgwick  identified  in  the  homo-/heterosexual
binary  as  a  “master  cultural  term  marking  not  only  sexual  definitions  but  [other]  categorical
pairings” that underline Western culture.225 That the multifunctional binary applies itself so readily
and often to my analysis could mean that it may not even be the specific contents of this binary that
matter  but  the  structure  of  thought  they  engender;  homo-/heterosexual  can  just  as  easily  be
trans*/cisgender. In sexology, medicalized transsexuality is repurposed to serve as a component of
the broader discourse of binarism, which is envisaged as a blueprint for society as a whole.
In addition,  as ever  in  the discourse of transsexuality,  sexology posits  itself  – not human
rights, not self-determination, not personal autonomy – as the benevolent saviour of trans* people
from  abusive  conversion  and  aversion  “therapies”,  as  though  acknowledging  that  gender
identification  is  complex  somehow legitimized  another  extreme  of  simplification (that  people's
identities are “convertible” under duress). What does the rejection of experience as a factor in trans*
people's  (or  anyone's)  gendered  development  accomplish,  exactly?  Contrary  to  the  belief  that
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arguments  from  prenatal  hormone  exposure  are  beneficial  or  offer  protection  from  unethical
discourses and practices, I return to what Katherine Cross has to say on her personal trajectory
versus the discourse of a singular etiology:
Accepting myself as a woman, as a person of trans experience,
has had profoundly positive effects on my life.  It would be a
colossal  misreading  of  my  difficult  and  painful  [prior]
experience to say that I “woke up one day and decided to be
trans” as some transphobes might have it.  But that is  not the
only  alternative  to  saying  that  I  was  ineluctably  and
unproblematically “born this way” with some purely biological
cause  that  was  not  in  some  way  socially  and  personally
mediated.226 
Interplay, complexity, and mutual permeability of factors would seem to add up to a much
more  sophisticated  understanding  of  gender/sex  development  than  resorting  to  the  notion  of  a
prenatal  etiology.  That notion is in fact quite patronizing,  suggesting that trans* people (in this
application of the theory) are completely at the mercy of factors beyond their control, and if they
had agency, they would no longer be worthy of respect. Projecting the etiological premise beyond
sexological clinics and treatises fuels legal systems that demand that trans* people jump through
highly invasive arbitrary hoops (e.g. coercive sterilization) before achieving formal recognition. An
added mechanism securing the primacy of this status quo is that criticisms of such gross biological
determinism – even criticisms by trans* people who disagree, as Cross above does, with the way it
relegates identity into the realm of congenital “defect” – are misconstrued as the suggestion that
trans*  people  should  instead  be  “cured”  psychologically  or  give  up  medical  transition  options
altogether.  Not  internalizing transphobic-ableist notions of how trans* identity is not “really” an
identity  but  a  “defect”  is  perceived  as  something  that  can  do  harm  to  trans*  people  by  the
sexological discourse. That belief, of course, is a political position, not a scientific one.  The idea,
grounded purely in one sub-field of positivist inquiry, that gender and/or sexual diversity can be
explained  through  some straightforward  chemistry contained in  the  womb ignores  e.g.  Fausto-
Sterling's caution that “[o]nly nonhierarchical, multidisciplinary teams can  devise more complete
(or what Sandra Harding calls 'less false')[94] knowledge about human sexuality.”227 
Beyond  what  the evaluation  of  the  material  covered  in  Transsexuality says  about  the
privileging of positivist, “commonsense” research in the discourse, it is also symptomatic of another
dichotomy: the idea that if it  was asserted  that trans* identity  can have some social or voluntary
elements to it, it would no longer be acceptable to support individuals' transitions, because transition
is only justified if it is perceived as a necessity according to normative medical criteria that by and
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large exclude social context. This is more or less the basis of the now notorious “born this way”
argument, already critiqued at some length above, which seeks validation in the alleged helplessness
of  LGBTIQ*  people  before  their  identities  and  lends  itself  easily  to  the  internalization  of
pathologization, which is also one of the “rules of diagnosis” in the transsexuality discourse.228 This
rationalization of equity does not address the underlying social reasons for inequity, and employing
it is at best conceptually equivalent to being “sidetracked into asinine arguments about how some
people are born Jewish and have Jew brains and, y’know, they just can’t help it and that’s why we
should  be  'tolerant.'”229 In  addition  to  its  derailment  of  primarily  ethical  considerations,  the
definition of medical necessity-through-helplessness is grounded in the notion that there must be an
“objective”  reason  why an  individual may want  to  transition,  failing to  take  into  account  the
“subjective urgency” of the wish to transition and the fact that “although discursively constituted
subjectivity is  inherently unstable  […] this  does not  take away from its  [individual]  depth and
realness.”230 The dichotomy that the authors construe between “real” (sexological) necessity versus
“false” (subjective) necessity does not exist, because an individual's subjective wish to transition
ultimately is what determines their personal motivation  to do so, much as mainstream sexology
would like to convince even trans* people themselves that their subjectivity in the area of gender is
nothing more than a disorder of brain development “preceding thought.”231 The demonization of
agency that  arises  here then prevents  the mobilization of identity politics  against  the dominant
discourse, to which the patronizing dismissal of meaningful trans* agency is central.
I  have  drawn upon Fausto-Sterling's  work heavily in  this  section,  not  only because  it  is
factually  pertinent  but  also  because  her  insights  should  have  been  known  to  the  authors  of
Transsexuality,  having been published two years prior.  Instead,  the authors chose to  selectively
follow experiments that do not seem to have withstood the test of time and additional research too
well. This brings us back to the observation that what may have been cutting-edge research in the
1960s is not cutting-edge, or even acceptable standard, in 2002 and later. The tendencies Fausto-
Sterling notes  in her  analysis  of  a different  segment  of  the medical  discourse that  uses,  again,
intersex conditions to argue for the innateness of binary and heteronormative gender categories are
remarkably similar to what  Transsexuality  produces in using intersex to explain away stigmatized
identities, most commonly homosexuality and transsexuality. While the particulars of the studies
done  in  women  with  CAH  and  whether  their  CAH  caused  a  “masculinization”  of  their
sexual/gender  identity  (e.g.  lesbianism when  perceived  as  a  “masculine”  identity)  that  Fausto-
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Sterling covers are not directly relevant to my subject here and are better appreciated in full in her
book, she traces a common thread between those theorists who seek to pathologize lesbian identity
and  the  logic  showcased  in  Transsexuality  in  its  pathologization  of  trans*  status  through
misrepresentations of intersex:
Thus, a critical look at the studies of masculine development in
CAH girls reveals a weak, problem-ridden literature. Why, then,
do  such  studies  continue  to  appear?  I  believe  these  highly
skilled,  well-trained scientists,[133] return  again  and again  to
drink from the well of intersexuality because they are so deeply
immersed  in  their  own  theory  of  gender  that  other  ways  of
collecting and interpreting data become impossible to see. They
are fish who swim beautifully in their own oceans but cannot
conceptualize walking on solid ground.[134]232
In other words, these scientists are “highly skilled and well trained” in what is ultimately a
solipsistic discipline. This is part of why discourse analysis, rather than a decontextualized concept
of individual culpability for how the dominant discourse functions, should be employed to explain
just what is happening here. Sexologists and other specialists who pursue etiological and similarly
pathologizing arguments to classify and interpret gender diversity act in accordance with what their
field has deemed to be the best practice in such scenarios. What is missing from this picture is a
meta analysis; without it, questionable categories and methods go unremarked on as if they really
were the only concepts possible. This seems to be a key area in which self-reflexive constructivism
offers an epistemological advantage over essentialist truisms. From text analysis alone, it is difficult
to determine whether the authors' beliefs in the framework of sexology really are as deeply felt as
Fausto-Sterling would argue, but insofar as the book represents – both implicitly and by design –
the  definitive  statement  of  their  field  on  trans*  issues,  the  end  result  might  as  well  be  fully
compliant  with  Fausto-Sterling's  estimation.  Whether  these  researchers  are  actors  with  genuine
beliefs  in  their  interpretation  of  data  as  the  most  valid  or  whether  they  perform  within  “the
functional requirements of a discourse that must produce its truth”,233 the “truth” they anchor in
normative claims becomes the “truth” of power.
7. The Pathology of Discourse
A potent textual strategy in Transsexuality is the framing of the pathologizing discourse as a
transcendent  one  while  leaving  out  the  voices  that  dissent  from  it.  A  read-through  of  the
bibliography  reveals  that  the  authors  are  far  from  only  using  Czech  sources,  but  whatever
internationally available texts they use exemplify medical/pathologizing terminology with a heavy
slant towards normativity. The majority dates from the period before 2000, although research into
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trans* issues has become much more prolific in recent decades than the authors' silence on that
matter would suggest. The general choice of materials, most in the positivist paradigm and some
dating as far back as the 1950s and 60s (while those “classics” that paint a less convincingly binarist
picture, such as Kinsey's iconic reports,234 are conspicuously absent) conveys a persistent sense of
traditionalism and an unwillingness to incorporate new, updated, or dissenting material. A notable
exception to this tendency are texts dealing with surgery and other medical procedures, in which the
latest available methods are included along with the older ones, likely due to the “technical” nature
of the field demanding a constant “improvement” of results. Significantly, there is no real mention
of pain as part and parcel of any surgery there. This may be because the knowledge that surgery and
recovery entail pain may appear obvious or – more probably in my view – it is yet another example
of the attitude to trans* bodies as automatically open to anything that “needs” to be done to them as
determined by doctors. While I do not wish to make a blanket argument against surgery “because it
hurts”, it does bear pointing out that the idea that trans* people should always and without a second
thought tolerate not inconsiderable levels of pain is a pernicious one. 
The authors  make a  concerted  effort  to ground themselves  in  international  authority  that
shares the same understanding of transsexuality as a disorder. There is an entire appendix dedicated
to the standards of care formulated by what was then known as the Harry Benjamin International
Gender Dysphoria Association. What particularly suggests a shared vision between the authors of
Transsexuality and the sixth version of the Harry Benjamin standards is their conceptualization of
trans* identity as GID (Gender Identity Disorder). The Standards of Care as presented at the time
are problematic for largely the same reasons as the main text body of this publication: they actively
enable trans* pathologization and gender policing which is then internalized by its subjects in what
has been termed the “Harry Benjamin Syndrome (HBS)”.235 While these SoC themselves could be
critically analyzed in much the same way as the main text of  Transsexuality, I will omit a more
detailed examination because my main purpose is to examine the pathologization of trans* identities
in the Czech medical establishment in particular. The same reservation applies to the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) and the now outdated fourth version of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM-IV), both of which are invoked by the authors as the definitive, “official”
documents  for  the conceptualization of gender  identity and its  “disorders” (notwithstanding the
status of the HBIGDA SoC as guidelines, not hard-and-fast rules). 
While  the then-HBIGDA  SoC  did represent  the same problem as I  have identified in the
Czech medical discourse in their sixth version, they have since evolved in a way that puts them very
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much at odds with  Transsexuality. The organization responsible for publishing the  SoC has been
renamed  to  World  Professional  Association  for  Transgender  Health  (WPATH),  dropping  the
authoritative reference to Harry Benjamin and the conceptual grounding in gender dysphoria while
simultaneously making  transgender  the new umbrella term. Its updated  SoC “are intended to be
flexible in order to meet the diverse health care needs of  transsexual, transgender, and gender-
nonconforming  people [emphasis  mine].”236 The  broad  inclusion  of  “transgender  and  gender-
nonconforming people” is a far cry from the notion of a singular “transsexual” identity presumed by
the previous versions of the  SoC as well as by Fifková et al., who have not issued any amended
version of their normative text since the publication of the new WPATH standards in 2011 or since
WPATH's statement “urging the de-psychopathologization of gender nonconformity worldwide” in
2010.237 There is  now  also  a clear  acknowledgement  of “the diverse needs” of different  trans*
people (whether based on each subgroup or on individual wishes) and an emphasis on flexibility.
The updated SoC are a good example of authoritative bodies responding to evolving knowledge on
a previously stigmatized subject, which is actually pointed out in the SoC themselves: 
The Standards of Care (SOC), Version 7, represents a significant
departure from previous versions.  Changes in this  version are
based  upon  significant  cultural  shifts,  advances  in  clinical
knowledge, and appreciation of the many health care issues that
can  arise  for  transsexual,  transgender,  and  gender-
nonconforming  people  beyond  hormone  therapy  and  surgery
(Coleman, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d).238 
While the authors of  Transsexuality obviously cannot be faulted for not knowing how the
international  SoC would develop ahead of time,  the problem remains that  the book they wrote
firmly on the premise of pathologization has remained the authoritative text on “transsexuality” in
the Czech Republic, and there is no concerted effort on the part of the medical establishment to
rectify this situation now that WPATH has altered its norms (and name) dramatically. The shift in
the  Standards  of  Care –  from  HBIGDA to  WPATH,  from  being  predicated  on dysphoria  to
recognizing individual transition processes and even using the words “gender diversity” – amply
demonstrates that the pathologizing discourse cannot style itself as the last word, especially when
even  organizations  that  were  previously  its  champions  are  now  abandoning  that  sinking  ship.
Unfortunately, the development WPATH has been through is not reflected in the Czech medical
establishment  or in the Czech legal system. For this reason, an analysis of  Transsexuality as the
flagship text of Czech sexology on the matter of gender diversity can still offer useful insights into
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the operation of the normative medical discourse. 
Returning to the main text of the publication, special attention should be paid to how the
discourse on trans* people is gendered,  especially given the gender constraints  imposed by the
Czech  language.  In  the  Foreword, Hana  Fifková  actually  elaborates  on  the  terminology  used,
although she makes no mention of potential  alternatives to the terms ultimately chosen for the
publication. A few are mentioned later in the chapter titled “Sexual Identity”, but not used  by the
authors themselves further; these terms are “transgenderism” (equated with gender dysphoria in the
paragraph)  and “transpeople”,  who are  described as  “bearers  of  not  entirely determined sexual
identity disorders” with “transsexuality” being “the most obvious form of gender  dysphoria.”239
Thus even “alternative” terms like transgender are co-opted and medicalized as being identical with
dysphoria and only a lesser form of “true” transsexuality. This is at odds with the WPATH definition
of dysphoria and, if  counting all the dates related in the  following quotation from the  SoC V7,
possibly  even  with  the  old  HBIGDA definition  of  dysphoria.  The  current  WPATH  standards
unambigiously state that gender dysphoria 
refers to discomfort or distress that is caused by a discrepancy
between  a  person’s  gender  identity  and  that  person’s  sex
assigned at birth (and the associated gender role and/or primary
and  secondary  sex  characteristics)  (Fisk,  1974;  Knudson,  De
Cuypere,  &  Bockting,  2010b).  Only  some  gender-
nonconforming  people  experience  gender  dysphoria  at  some
point in their lives.240
“Only some people” at “some point in their lives” is vastly different from making dysphoria
the  sine  qua  non of  all  trans*  and/or  gender  nonconforming  identities (gender-nonconforming
seems to be used as the broadest term in this section of the WPATH SoC, probably on the premise
that gender-nonconformity is at least perceived in all trans* people due to society's privileging of
birth  assignment).  Additionally,  the  WPATH  definition  of  dysphoria  relates  primarily  to  a
discrepancy between gendered self-identification and birth assignment, while “the associated gender
role and/or primary and secondary sex characteristics” are possible but not inevitable components of
dysphoria. Needless to say, identifying birth sex assignment as the source of potential dysphoria
offers a much more nuanced understanding of dysphoria itself than  Transsexuality's presumption
that dysphoria lies in the divergence of identity from a simple “biological sex.”241    
Eliding nuance in favour of building a more binary or more simplistic system is a frequent
problem in Transsexuality, although in some cases, it could have been preempted by a conscientious
approach to language per se. Still in the introductory part, Fifková makes a point of justifying the
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collective choice to use the generic masculine and to ignore gender suffixes altogether in Czech:
We  decided  to  prefer  the  term[s] transsexual  people  and
transsexual  clients.  This  is  why,  in  this  context,  we  use  the
masculine animate form in the past tense. We have thus avoided
the  complications  and ambiguities  that  would  inevitably arise
had we tried to widen these suffixes depending on gender. Both
groups  of  transsexual  people  are  also  referred  to  by  the
abbreviations FtM (female-to-male) and MtF (male-to-female).
We tried to avoid the terms transsexual [noun, masculine suffix]
and transsexual [noun, feminine suffix], particularly because it
would always be necessary to explain whether the gender chosen
referred to biological  or psychological  gender,  before or  after
transition.242 
It is no surprise that the label “transsexual” prevailed over transgender or another modern
term, but Fifková's other assertions are intriguing on multiple levels, and not all of them turn out to
be corroborated in the text that follows. For a start, the noun “transsexual” with the masculine suffix
is  a  mainstay in  the  book,  regardless  of  Fifková's  opening assurance  that  “transsexual  person”
would be consistently preferred. She simultaneously argues that differentiating between trans men
and trans women would create “complications and ambiguities”, which might not necessarily be the
case either. A staggering example of textual ambiguity arising from  not using identity-compliant
language is the chapter dealing with surgical  procedures  in trans women (“Surgical Procedures in
MtFs”),  where the terms “patient”  [both male and female suffixes],  “male transsexualism” and
“male transsexual person” (mužská transsexuální osoba) are used throughout. At the start of the
chapter, we even see “the sick [person]” in reference to a trans woman undergoing genital surgery,
also with the masculine suffix at the end.243 (By contrast, the chapter “Surgical Procedures in FtMs”
contains no explicit misgendering. It also refers to surgically-created genitals in trans men opting
for phalloplasty as penises – which is what they are – whereas the result of vaginoplasty in trans
women is  termed  a  “neovagina”  instead  of  being  acknowledged  as  just  another  vagina.  These
discrepancies suggest that both transmisogyny and the generic masculine are clouding the issue.)
Textually, it would have been much clearer to use the term trans women in the “Surgical Procedures
in MtFs” chapter (or, if the authors insisted on transsexuality as their term of choice,  transsexual
women), which would have aided reading comprehension as well as affirmed trans women's status
in their correct identified gender. Nevertheless, they are incongrously treated as men whose genitals
are  being  altered,  even  though  the  presumed  reason  for  said  alteration  is  their  female gender
identity. 
Another  interesting  point  is  that  almost  every time  whenever  both  the “MtF” and “FtM”
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groups are mentioned in conjunction in the text (or even in the table of contents), “FtM” is the label
that comes first as if echoing the stereotypical phrase “men and women.” It appears that in the case
of group references, the group is actually judged on the identified gender of its members, unlike in
reference to individuals where identified gender is more often suppressed in the text. This is not to
mention the fact that we frequently find the generic masculine suffixes in reference to specifically
“MtFs” in the book,244 or the unbelievably self-contradictory sentence “[FtMs'] social stigma was
likely lower than that of their male counterparts [this actually refers to trans women], because they
were usually already living in a  male  social role in their personal as well as professional lives”
[emphasis  mine].245 None  of  this  is  an  example  of  textual  integrity  or  clarity;  rather,  it  is  the
arbitrary assignment of gender identifiers,  coupled with frequent misgendering,  that creates and
actively perpetuates confusion here.
The  deliberate  refusal  to  acknowledge  any individual  trans*  people,  at  least  the  binary-
identified ones, as men or women is typical of the entirety of the book. The words “man” and
“woman” are reserved for those whose gender identity matches their birth assignment. Additionally,
Fifková concedes right  at  the start  that  the authors  are  conflicted on whether  to  respect  trans*
people's identified genders or refer to them by birth assignment (“it would always be necessary to
explain whether the gender chosen referred to biological or psychological gender, before or after
transition”). She does not reflect upon the fact that this alleged conflict is largely manufactured as
well as internalized by the authors themselves, given their (and everyone else's) grounding in a
cissexist/transphobic  society  that  a  priori  treats  trans*  people  as  frauds  whose  gender  cannot
“really/biologically” be what it is. (As for how cissexist interpretations of biology determine the
terminology of the transsexuality discourse, this sentence illustrates it quite well: “FtMs are more
similar in temperament to the men they identify with than to the women  they biologically are”
[emphasis mine].)246 The authors' uncertainty is also evidenced in Appendix 3, where a small sample
of trans* people is finally given voice. These respondents, instead of being referred to by their now
valid names, are all identified as [birth name]-[current name], again hinting at an obsession with a
“before-after” narrative predicated on rigid binary divisions between which the trans* subject is
perpetually trapped, even after taking the prescribed transition path. Moreover, although Fifková
mentions in her foreword that some trans* people “allowed us to quote from their fortunes”,247 there
244 The individual examples are too numerous to list, but an instructive one appears on page 96: “'post-op' MtFs are 
better socially integrated [masculine adjectival suffix] than 'pre-op' ones.” Note that “MtF” appears to be mutually 
exclusive with “woman” in the discourse, even in cases when the normative transition requirements have all been 
met. 
245 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 96.
246 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 97.
247 Fifková in Fifková et al., page unnumbered in text (Acknowledgements).
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is no way of knowing whether they consented to their birth name being freely printed along with
their current one as well. The omission of surnames may offer some degree of anonymization, but if
the first names were not changed in any other way (we cannot know), it is obviously still inadequate
for the purposes of privacy protection, especially when readers are given two first names to aid in a
potential background search.
There is, needless to say, no ethically or intellectually supported reason why a trans woman or
a  trans  man could  not  be  referred  to  by their  correct  identified  gender  by default.  Adopting  a
person's current gendered terms and using these in a consistent manner irrespective of the person's
past status so as to preserve privacy and show a basic modicum of respect for the person's gender
identity  is  actually  the  recommended  standard,  as  reported  e.g.  in  TGEU's  Best  Practices
Catalogue.248 The fact that the authors felt so conflicted on this matter says less about trans men and
trans women's gender status and more about the authors' reluctance to accept trans* people's gender
status as a valid one without reservations. The whole situation can perhaps be seen as an example of
how mere  “tolerance”  does  not  result  in  human  rights  advancement.  The  publication  certainly
“tolerates” and even promises to assist trans* people as long as their identities are articulated within
a certain prescribed norm, but to achieve full acceptance of gender diversity as a non-pathological
fact of life, there is still a long way to go.
8. Missing Critical Links: Apologia in the Guise of Analysis
It would be misleading to say that the authors never make an attempt to include non-medical
perspectives at  all,  although their  inclusion is  limited and markedly absent from the most  vital
sections, such as the normative definition of transsexuality as a disorder. A relevant question would
thus be whether the minority of non-medical perspectives included are permitted to challenge any of
the deterministic claims elsewhere in the text. The chapter “Sociological Aspects”, where this does
happen to some extent, is a departure from the others and will be  addressed separately due to its
relative complexity.  “Transsexuality and Religion” is an exception in that the authors explicitly
decline to comment on the various religious viewpoints presented. This leaves “Transsexuality and
Parenthood”  and  “Legal  Aspects”  as  chapters  where  social  as  well  as  medical  norms  could
potentially be interrogated. 
The inclusion of parenthood as something that can, despite state-mandated sterilization, still
be of relevance at least to some trans* people is a positive choice. In a discourse characterized by its
emphasis  on  prescribing  changes  to  the  individual  body,  it  would  have  been  easy  to  omit
considerations of parenthood as an option altogether. On the other hand, the options recognized by
248 Silvan Agius, Richard Köhler, Sophie Aujean, Julia Ehrt, Human Rights and Gender Identity: Best Practices 
Catalogue (TGEU, 2011) 19.
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the publication are far from limitless or even basically inclusive. “Transsexuality and Parenthood”
opens with this:
A transsexual person can become a parent after a sex change via
several standard methods: adoption, gaining custody of a child,
and in the case of FtMs by artificial insemination of a [female]
partner with the sperm of a donor.249
This statement not only implies that it is desirable for trans* people to become parents after a
“sex change” (by which it is reasonable to assume in this context that legal gender recognition is
meant,  which  follows compulsory sterilization),  but  it  goes  as  far  as  to  provide  a  list  of  three
“standard” methods that should be adhered to. The assumption that sterilization, particularly in the
case  of  trans  men,  will  have  already happened  is  in  line  with  an  earlier  chapter  in  the  book
(“Surgical Procedures in  FtMs”) also insisting that without at  the very least  the removal of the
ovaries, it is “impossible to fully normalize their life” or to achieve “full effect” of therapy.250 All
this makes the situation appear as though state-mandated sterilization were for the person's own
good, even though there are few longitudinal studies on HRT and the effect of hormonal transition
is demonstrably not stalled just by virtue of not having undergone a sterilization procedure.251 The
chapter  on  surgeries  also  claims,  without  citing  the  highly  specific-sounding  information,  that
ovarian and uterine cancer is a likely scenario in the absence of oophorectomy/hysterectomy and
that  these  two  procedures  can  even  lessen  the  risk  of  breast  cancer.252 According  to  WPATH,
however, the risk of ovarian, uterine, cervical and breast cancers in association with androgen HRT
is in the “no increased risk or inconclusive” category of risk assessment.253 Moreover, even if the
risk  did  demonstrably  increase,  regular  health  monitoring  could  be  chosen  to  manage  it,  with
hysterectomy and/or other sterilization surgeries being optional. Of course, it is the mixing of male-
and female-coded hormones and organs that is  discursively made to appear impossible here, even
though the many differently embodied realities of trans* and intersex people call into question the
usefulness  of  the  commonplace  notions  of  “male”  and  “female”  bodies  as  a  whole.  The
accompanying  conviction  that  “estrogens  […]  represent  the  opposite  of  male  sex  hormones  –
androgens”254 is typical of the discursive construct that results when “despite the fact that both
hormones seem to pop up in all  types of bodies,  producing all  sorts  of different effects,  many
reporters and researchers continue to consider estrogen the female hormone and testosterone the
249 Fifková in Fifková et al. 101.
250 Marešová in Fifková et al. 73.
251 R. Nick Gorton, Jamie Buth and Dean Spade, Medical Therapy and Health Maintenance for Transgender Men: A 
Guide For Health Care Providers (San Francisco: Lyon-Martin Women's Health Services, 2005) 51.
252 Marešová in Fifková et al. 73.
253 Coleman et al. 190.
254 Marešová in Fifková et al. 73.
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male hormone.”255 All in all, this particular example of a trans* body is being gendered as internally
incompatible so as to legitimize the demanded interventions, not because these individual organs
and hormones could empirically not coexist.
And yet, past this hurdle of body policing, some compliant forms of parenthood still remain:
the  ones  outlined  in  Fifková's  summary  of  parenthood  “after  a  sex  change”.  The  degree  of
specification in the last method listed also indicates that parenthood – and by extension, the nuclear
family – is understood solely as a heteronormative unit (the potential parents are “a FtM and a
[female] partner”) that should go with heteronormative gender roles (only the “[female] partner”
should consider pregnancy, not the “FtM”, barring that of course the Czech legal system itself is set
up to prevent that scenario from occurring). Nor is it mentioned that two trans* people possessing
the  applicable  organs could  date  and  consider  starting  a  genetic family  with  each  other.  It  is
fascinating that Fifková considers finding a sperm donor for a partner to always be more expedient
or more applicable than the event that the trans man in the relationship could keep his reproductive
capability and go through with the pregnancy himself (say, for example, with a cis gay man  or a
trans woman who has retained her reproductive capacity, or with the assistance of IVF in other
scenarios). While trans men becoming pregnant are not commonly heard of and the action should
not be expected of them by default (nor, for that matter, should cis women be uniformly expected to
have children just  by virtue of their  reproductive capacity,  although in a chapter  that  defines a
“female” body's  role in intercourse with a cis  man as “being given up for sex”256 some casual
misogyny is to be expected),  genetic reproduction should still be acknowledged as  a possibility.
That is precisely what does not happen, be it as a result of the legal system or as a legitimization
strategy to keep that same legal system unchanged. The first paragraph is literally one sentence, and
it lists the only approved forms of becoming a parent as “a transsexual person”. Using one's own
reproductive organs in a way that is at odds with the dominant conceptions of male or female status
is not among them. 
Within its limitations, the chapter does keep the idea of parenthood open to at least some
trans*  people  in  some  situations,  though  it  repeatedly  stresses  that  being  anything  other  than
cisgender in a family with children requires “utmost caution” on the part of the trans* person in
particular.257 Along with the three above “standards” for becoming a parent, it is acknowledged that
sperm or fertilized eggs can be harvested and frozen in some “extremely rare attempts”,258 though
their  intended  use  is  not  elaborated  on  and  likely presumed  to  fit  into  the  “standard”  scheme
255 Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body 179.
256 Fifková in Fifková et al. 101.
257 Fifková in Fifková et al. 104.
258 Fifková in Fifková et al. 101.
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somewhere down the line. The rhetoric of parenthood is wrapped in essentialism and, paradoxically
given that most trans* people will be rendered sterile in the Czech Republic, unabashedly derisive
of people who do not wish to have any offspring. Rather than framing parenthood or lack thereof as
value-neutral  options  that  should  be  autonomously  decided  on  without  the  intervention  of
gatekeepers,  Fifková instead  claims  that  it  “mainly brings  the  possibility of  experiencing,  as  a
parent,  the full  value of one's  own existence and natural happiness.”259 Aside from the obvious
difficulty  in  defining  “natural”  or  indeed  “happiness”  in  anything  even  beginning  to  approach
universal terms, the notion that people who do not become parents for any number of reasons fail to
realize “the full value of their existence” can only be described as bigotry. It is, however, precisely
this  normative  grounding  that  serves  as  the  legitimizing  moment  for  parenthood  “after  a  sex
change” in the chapter. Liberal concepts such as equality or the freedom of choice are absent from
its reasoning; it is all about essentialist and  de facto conservative claims that “nature” should be
followed (as long as it can be appropriated by the current social norms) and that being a parent is
morally superior to not being one. 
The glorification of parenthood as a normative concept (rather than as a possibility that may
be desired by some people and not others, for which neither group needs be negatively judged)
probably  contributes  to  the  overall  rhetoric  of  intended  beneficence  in  the  chapter  –  in  short,
because parenthood is so good, it should not be denied to those trans* people who make an effort to
comply with all the prescribed standards for “correct” reproduction and gendered behaviour towards
their children, extended family, wider social structures, etc. The bulk of the responsibility for getting
all this “right” is noticeably projected onto the trans* parent, even superficially legitimized by a
quote from a member of a  US-based support group who likewise seems to believe that  trans*
parents  cannot  “force”  others  to  accept  their  gender  “right  away”  and  that  they  need  to  be
“reasonable” most of all.260  On one genuinely positive note, Fifková highlights the fact that a parent
being trans* per se is not a “threat” to a child's well-being.261 Unfortunately, similar sentiments are
scarce in the chapter, and its normative tenor culminates at the end:
It can be expected that as diagnostic and therapeutic services as
well as the information available to society at large improve, the
number of cases when a transsexual person becomes a parent in
their original gender role will decrease over time.262
Let us focus briefly on the terms “gender” and “gender role”, given their ambiguity in this
paragraph. The narrative presented by Fifková only covers one of the identification possibilities of
259 Fifková in Fifková et al. 101.
260 Fifková in Fifková et al. 104.
261 Fifková in Fifková et al. 102, 106.
262 Fifková in Fifková et al. 106.
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trans* people who become parents through sexual intercourse with a reproductive partner: it  all
happened “before they knew”, hence it was parenthood in their “original gender role.” Such cases
may of course happen, particularly for trans* people who do not explore their gender identity until
later in life. They do not represent the only identification possibility in this scenario, however. A
trans* person may be well aware of their gender and still choose to biologically reproduce in what
the larger society may mistakenly believe is still their “original gender role”, but this “original role”
may only exist on paper (for instance, so as to appease the institutions that monitor and usually
handle biological reproduction, or because gender recognition without sterilization is not legally
possible yet). Assuming the person in question knows already what their gender identity is and does
not find it conflicting with biological parenthood, they are hardly living in their “original gender
role” at this point. The only thing that, under the state apparatus of the Czech Republic, remains
“original” is the gender category in which the state and its institutions perceive the person to belong.
Additionally, trans* people with non-binary genders may lack even an easily understandable way to
express  their  gender  identity  to  strangers,  especially  in  situations  that  involve  a  great  power
disparity, such as the doctor-“patient” relationship relevant particularly in pregnancy.
What Fifková means is likely that it is not desirable for trans* people to become parents while
still listed as their original legal gender. Such a statement would be prescriptive but not otherwise
problematic if multiple ways to change one's legal gender were accessible on the basis of personal
decision and not subject to arbitrary gatekeeping, and if parenthood were not treated as a priori  a
gendered  phenomenon  in  an  essentialist  way.  The  more  insidious  and  potentially  destructive
problem with Fifková's quoted statement becomes apparent when we take into account the current
prerequisite  for changing one's  legal gender  in the Czech Republic:  compulsory sterilization.  If
Fifková assumes here that gender role corresponds to legal gender and supports the procedure for
legal gender recognition as it stands, her position rewrites itself: it is not desirable for trans* people
to  become  genetic parents,  period.  Much  as  the  rhetoric  of  the  paragraph  may be  cloaked  in
assertions of beneficence (and in many cases,  more information and more transition options do
indeed help), there is a term for targeting a specific group of people and taking systemic measures
against allowing members of that group to genetically reproduce: eugenics. 
The chapter that follows, “Legal Aspects”, is free of the kind of extreme commentary found in
the chapter on parenthood, but shares its problem of insufficiently critical outlook on normative
institutions. Its main purpose seems to be a guide to the legal system as it stands at the time of
writing, which is not particularly conducive to questioning it. The only substantive criticism argues,
quite progressively even by today's standards, that puberty blockers should be made legal in the
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Czech Republic  so as  to  prevent  irreversible  changes  in  trans* adolescents  who wish to  avoid
them.263 Other  than  this,  the  tone  of  the chapter  is  conciliatory with  the  institutional  and legal
principles governing gender recognition, HRT, genital and/or sterilization surgery, marriage/divorce
arrangements and other areas of interest in transition (going as far as to call the divorce requirement
“quite understandable” because of the non-heteronormative marriage that would otherwise result).264
Even when it comes to the definition of “sex”, the chapter is consistent with the simplistic binary
pertinent to the rest of the book; the most leeway it offers is in the patronizing reassurance that a
trans* person will be treated “as if they really were of the sex they desire” post-legal recognition.265
There is thus no conceptual challenge to the essentialist paradigm of the “core” chapters here either.
One statement  in  particular  stands  out  as  the  cornerstone  of  legitimizing  the  medicalized
model of trans* identity: 
Some attempts to de-medicalize the problem of transsexuality on
the part of patients may lend credence to the opinion that such
health care should be self-financed. Because if it really was no
health  disorder,  then  the  demand  for  the  patient  to  cover  all
financial cost related to sex change is legitimate.266
The rhetorical strategy is potent: “patients” who oppose being treated as though their gender
identity were a medical condition are the really dangerous people in the equation, because their
efforts  will unquestionably lead to the loss of public health funding. However, the statement runs
into  obvious  objections,  starting  with  objections  to  the  idea  that  only “disorders”  ever  receive
institutional support. It  also needs to be said  that the notion of an inherently disordered state of
trans*  people  is  outright  rejected  in  the  WPATH  SoC  V7,  which  clarify  that  “transsexual,
transgender,  and  gender-nonconforming  individuals  are  not  inherently  disordered.  Rather,  the
distress of gender dysphoria, when present, is the concern that might be diagnosable and for which
various treatment options are available” [emphasis mine].267 Clearly,  this understanding is more
complex than summarily pathologizing trans* existence and hinging treatment options on it. More
broadly than this, we can turn to the example of pregnancy, childbirth and early natal care as a
condition that cannot in itself  be called a disorder or disease by any stretch,  yet systematically
enjoys  financial  assistance  from public  health  funds  (at  least  in  the  case  of  cis  women).  This
suggests that whether or not some form of health care will be financially supported is not contingent
on its status as a disease or not, but on the perceived benefit of said “free” health care to society.
The  ultimate criterion is a  social  one. One can easily argue from the same basic premise that if
263 Raichlová and Procházka in Fifková et al. 110-111.
264 Raichlová and Procházka in Fifková et al. 108.
265 Raichlová and Procházka in Fifková et al. 107.
266 Raichlová and Procházka in Fifková et al. 110.
267 Coleman et al. 169.
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gender  diversity  came to  be  depathologized  and the  comfort  of  trans*  people  seeking medical
transition were regarded as a social good, the rationale for covering its costs from public insurance
would be in principle the same as the rationale for covering childbirth and neo-natal care, only the
specifics of  each  situation  would  be  distinct. What  sexology forgets  in  styling  itself  as  trans*
people's sole saviour from exorbitant health care costs is the fact that the  moral, social good of
bodily self-determination – inclusive of medical therapies or not – will remain unrecognized as long
as certain forms of self-determination are  viewed  negatively  as disorders.  In addition,  there are
countries, such as Poland, where medical gatekeeping and testing of an even more invasive stripe
than in the Czech Republic are performed by default, legal gender recognition involves “assessment
suits” in court that can span years, and trans* identities are thoroughly pathologized – and yet the
national health care plan does not cover any surgeries that can be part of a medical transition. 268 The
Polish situation  rather  drives  home the  point  that  pathologization per  se is  no guarantee  of  an
alleviated financial burden.
Even if the authors' argument about the costs of HRT and sterilization/genital surgeries were
left untouched, there would still be no inevitable link between the state covering medical transition
costs  and  demanding some  transition  procedures  (like  sterilization)  as  prerequisites  of  gender
recognition.  While  the  authors'  concern  with  preventing  a  gross  financial  burden on individual
trans* people is likely a genuine one, any type of argument that stems from the premise that only
“disorders” merit financial assistance results in precisely the kind of apologism that has allowed
gender  diversity  to  be  pathologized  and  sterilization  to  be  a  required  step  towards  gender
recognition in the Czech Republic for decades.  It is not necessary for medical assistance to stem
from medical stigmatization.
9. Partial Morality: Religion As an Isolated Zone of Deference
It is interesting that in the famously secular Czech Republic, “Transsexuality and Religion” is
the only time in the entire book when Czech trans* people are quoted as speaking for themselves
aside from Appendix 3. They are, however, only granted this space after cisgender religious figures
have been quoted first, including a detailed overview of what can only be described as one Catholic
bishop's transphobic screed. Its inclusion is puzzling in its irrelevance, since the authors then go on
to  interview  two  priests  (neither  of  whom  are  Catholic  themselves)  who  take  a  much  less
absolutistic  stance  on  the  issue,269 and  even  the  theologian  who  first  provides  the  transphobic
268 Wiktor Dynarski, “Poland's Route to a Transgender (R)evolution” in Gender Recognition in Poland: A Report on 
Court and Administrative Procedures (Trans-Fuzja Foundation and the Polish Society of Anti-Discrimination Law, 
2014) 4-7.
269 Jiří P. Štorek and Bohumil Baštecký's takes on the issue are reprinted in full in Fifková et al. 115-116.
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overview makes objections to it.270 It is difficult to imagine why the overt transphobia needed to be
included at all if it  does not correspond to the actual beliefs of these relevant religious figures,
unless  of  course  it  was  to  ground even  the  moral  discourse  on  gender  diversity  in  a  primary
rejection of trans* legitimacy.
“Religion”,  although  the  chapter  should  really  have  been  called  “Transsexuality  and
Christianity” since no other faiths are represented in the authors' sample, can be said to assume the
place of morality, as if all non-medical morality were predicated on religion. Either the singling out
of religion is indicative of the limited scope of non-medical fields explicitly identified in the book,
or its exceptional treatment could signal that religious faith is seen as personal domain that cannot –
unlike gender, sex, sexuality, and the body itself – be regulated by a state institution. Even Fifková
as the author of the chapter steps back with the assertion that “from a purely medical perspective, it
is not up to us to influence our religious clients' decisions in any way”.271 This is both deferential
and  alibistic,  because  the  rest  of  the  publication  constantly  makes  statements  with  ethical
ramifications (such as the claim that compulsory sterilization is a defensible and even beneficial
practice); the only difference is that they are not addressed to religious ethics. The singling out of
religion  for  respect  produces  the  strange  double  standard  in  which  religious  trans*  people  are
“qualified” (povolaní) to discuss their experience as fas as their identity as religious persons goes,
but the same is not acknowledged by the authors as being true about trans* people's qualification to
discuss their distinctly trans* experience in isolation.  Still, the deference  to specifically and only
religion in this chapter produces some intriguing dynamics, which will be given in brief below.
The three trans* respondents in the chapter seem to be treated differently from the ones in
Appendix 3. Their comments do not centre primarily on the transition process, but deal with more
general questions of morality and self-acceptance. Some explicitly question or condemn authorities
who have made it difficult or impossible for them to find adequate support within the community:
“The church will be a good place when it realizes it can't be a prison where God is the  top-tier
guard” (respondent identified as D.A.), “I consider the church's [transphobic] behaviour incorrect”
(respondent  D.K.).272 The  respondents'  names are  anonymized  as  initials,  but  not  in  the  [birth
name]-[current name] format assigned to the respondents in Appendix 3. Another point of interest is
that their responses do not appear to be curated or brought into line with one another (unlike the
responses  in  Appendix  3,  which  are  overwhelmingly  focussed  on  transition  and  childhood
dysphoria, and we can only speculate whether they were chosen to be included because they were
mostly in line with the idea of transsexuality as a disorder). In the chapter on Christianity, some of
270 Jiří Skoblík in Fifková et al. 114.
271 Fifková in Fifková et al. 117.
272 Fifková in Fifková et al. 116-117.
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the responses actually sound empowering rather than resigned to the status quo: “What I used to be
angry with God over, why he did that to me, I thank him for nowadays” (respondent M.N.).273 The
same respondent also identifies a need for a “better” language to speak about trans* issues: “One
day I found out I was also a transsexual (I very much dislike that word, but there probably isn't a
better one)”.274 The “better words” the respondent implicitly wishes for have existed for quite some
time by 2002, but they had not been able to flourish in the atmosphere of medicalization that has
pervaded the Czech discourse on gender diversity. Nevertheless, readers can only wonder how the
client testimonials in Appendix 3 would have come across had the respondents been granted the
same deference as the kind that religious affiliation extended to the above three.
10. “Transsexuality” As a Gender Stereotype
Despite the copious amounts of medical and often pathologizing terminology, it  gradually
becomes clear that the normative definition of transsexuality presented in the publication  mostly
hinges on gender stereotypes. To an extent, stereotyped “common sense” knowledge of what men
and women are supposedly like is necessary for “diagnosis”: the client is presumed to identify with
one set of gender-stereotyped traits to the exclusion of the other set, a situation viewed as one of the
preconditions of “legitimate” transsexuality. Questioning of the rigid gender binary is not welcome
in  this  paradigm;  more  than  that,  not  adhering  strictly  to  gender  roles  can  even  threaten  a
“diagnosis” being made at all. There is little to no concern over the impact of gatekeeping practices
and how they contribute  to  existing  power  disparities.  Last  but  not  least,  blatantly stereotyped
notions of gender/sex and sexuality are imposed upon trans* people by (in this case) the medical
establishment, yet treated as if they had originated from trans* people themselves, in 
confusing our [trans* people's] psychiatric oppression with our
own deeply held desires. We are certainly forced through cookie
cutters  of  gender  at  the  hands of  conservative  psychiatrists  –
much more so in the past than today, but this still happens – and
were often made to fit hetero and cisnormative perceptions. But
we were blackmailed into doing so. [...]  We did not willingly
and lovingly submit  to  it  anymore than cis  women loved the
suggestion of having “hysteria.”275
It should be clear from this context that what I aim to deconstruct is not the fact that some
trans* people use the word transsexual for themselves and attach their individual meanings to it, but
the normative notions tied to the term when it is employed as a vehicle for pathologizing gender
diversity.  As  for  what  definition  the  authors  of  Transsexuality  find  pertinent,  there  are  several
mentioned, all of which fit in the top-to-bottom paradigm; that is, they are authoritatively outlined
273 Fifková in Fifková et al. 117.
274 Fifková in Fifková et al. 117.
275 Cross, “I Am Whoever You Say I Am” <http://quinnae.com/2010/10/01/i-am-whoever-you-say-i-am/>.
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by institutions and/or academic experts, and it is presumed that individual trans* people will adopt
them so  as  to  be  intelligible  to  the  discourse.  This  approach is  symptomatic  of  the  normative
transsexuality discourse as a whole: very little attention is paid to trans* people's own voices  and
views, and when there is, they are curated and relegated to an appendix designed to be simply
illustrative of what “the experts” have already “proven” about gender “disorders” in the text body. It
is  therefore  not  surprising that  the  authors  provide  several  definitions  made by other  positivist
academics. The sources are given in the text as Meyer (1974), Brzek and Šípová (1979), Kuiper and
Cohen-Kettenis (1988), and Meyer and Kampfhammer (1993). In addition to being more than a
little dated in light of all the scholarship on (trans*)gender that had already emerged by 2002, all
these definitions hinge on the premise that being trans* is  a disorder to be “diagnosed” and is
constituted on the basis of two rigidly defined “opposite sexes” and the individual's “instinctive
desire for a sex change.”276 In other words, these are theories based on biological essentialism and
on the idea that there is no continuity between male and female (they are “opposite” sexes) and that
the defining characteristic of all trans* identities is dysphoria and unhappiness (this is explicitly
articulated  in  the  segment  by Kuiper  and Cohen-Kettenis,  while  in  the  others  it  is  an  implicit
presupposition).  Besides  these  individual  academics,  there  is  a  mention  of  the  European
Parliament's  1993  “dual  personality”  definition  of  transsexuality,  which  the  authors  distance
themselves from.277 While “dual personality” is far from the definition of trans* identity preferred
by critics  of  the medical  discourse as  well,  it  is  intriguing that  the  only definition  the authors
actually feel the need to present as likely false is the one coming from the European Parliament,
given the role of EU as one of the international bodies that recommend non-discriminatory access to
legal gender recognition (including a recommendation against compulsory sterilization) and collect
data on LGBTIQ* human rights abuses. The contrast is made still more striking by the fact that the
EP's definition is followed by a full  quoting of the ICD 10 (F 64.0) in bold letters, effectively
silencing any possible discussion on whether the ICD model is accurate for all people who identify
as trans* and whether it preserves their agency and right to self-determination. That the discourse is
pathologizing and makes gender diversity into an illness goes without saying, considering that the
ICD is being quoted as the ultimate authority. 
Besides  the  ICD,  one  of  the  aforementioned  academic  definitions  is  given  a  somewhat
preferential treatment: Meyer's “four conditions” of transsexuality as defined by the author in 1974.
These are quoted in full at the beginning of the chapter, setting the tone for the other definitions,
which appear to corroborate rather than dispute them. Meyer's criteria are paraphrased as follows:
276 Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 17.
277 Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 17.
102
• The feeling of inappropriateness or inadequacy of the role anatomically given.
• The belief that change will bring improvement.
• Selection  of  partners  of  the  same  anatomical  gender  along  with  perceiving  oneself  as
heterosexual.
• The desire for a surgical sex change.278
Like the others, the definition is predicated on the idea that there are exactly two “opposite”
genders/sexes which are “anatomically given” and can only be traversed in a linear, irreversible
fashion by means of a “sex change”. Hormone replacement therapy (HRT) is not even mentioned as
something the individual could “desire” as a way to achieve the presumed improvement brought on
by surgery, which perhaps illustrates the totalizing discourse of binarism and biological essentialism
(one can either have a “sex change” or one is bound to one's “anatomically given” role).  Further
cause for alarm is  in that heterosexuality is not only automatically assumed to be the case for all
trans*  people  here,  but  it  is  actually  conflated  with  gender  identity  and  used  as  one  of  the
“diagnostic” criteria. Even within the limits of the binarist discourse, it would have been possible to
include a caveat that the selection of partners of the “opposite anatomical gender” would have come
with the self-perception of homosexuality – and yet, it is only the notion of heterosexuality that is
treated as so central to gender identity that it becomes a diagnostic criterion, lending credence to
Dvořáčková's  observation  of  “the  key  role  heterosexuality  plays  in  the  sexological
conceptualization of normalcy.”279 It  is  only in  later  chapters that  the authors acknowledge that
homosexuality – but not bi- or pansexuality – in trans* people is possible (but rare). No issues are
raised with Meyer's claim itself. The resulting impression is that the chapter featuring the strictly
heteronormative  quote  is  meant  to  symbolize  the  “ideal”  definition  on  the  most  general  level,
whereas the later isolated acknowledgements of homosexuality are treated as minority concerns or
exceptions. When Adrienne Rich and later Judith Butler spoke of compulsory heterosexuality as
part and parcel of gender performance, they need not have looked farther than these medicalized
“conditions of transsexuality” for an example. 
While text analysis is required to read between the lines in order to address the implications of
the given material, the authors are often quite up-front about what they perceive as the inevitability
of policing:
The  sexological  examination  must  not  stop  at  confirming  the
duration  of  the  patient's  motivation,  but  it  must  focus  on  the
typical signs of transsexual development, objectivize anamnestic
data and evaluate the differential diagnostics. An important and
278 Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 17
279 Dvořáčková 62.
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indispensable part of the diagnostic process is cooperation with a
psychologist.280
The underlying message of these meticulously enumerated requirements for “diagnosis” is
clear: trans* people cannot be trusted to know their own identity, and they especially should not be
given  the  authority  to  determine  their  identity  without  supervision.  If  they  are  not  properly
“cooperative”, they will not be “diagnosed”, which will place medical transition options beyond
reach. The “sexological examination” is preoccupied with fitting every client into a non-inclusive,
textbook model based on “typical signs” and diagnostic evaluation. Like elsewhere in the book,
“transsexuality” is only legible (and controllable) if uniform. Everything  other than how a trans*
person  may  define their identity is being prioritized, as though to reassure readers that no one is
going to “make stuff up” about their gender identity, because “experts” will sort the people who
would dare right out. This interpretation is notably supported by the “Legal Aspects” chapter, which
reassures readers of how “positive” it is that the stamp of approval for surgery is “unequivocally
relayed into the hands of experts”,281 and later in the reference to the “strict criteria for diagnosis”
established by Czech sexologists (which is rather unabashedly glorified by Fifková as “a liberal and
revolutionary  act  for  its  time,  which  only  solidified  the  gains  of  Czech  sexology on  a  global
scale”).282 It does not require scholarly analysis to see that what may have been revolutionary in the
1960s is not likely to be so in 2002, let alone as of my writing in 2014 when major international
organizations are taking a stance precisely against the idea of “strict diagnostic criteria” in assessing
gender diversity. What is “liberal and revolutionary” today is arguably what Czech sexology has
come not to signify in the evolving context. The valorization of external authoritative management,
as opposed to respecting people's identified genders on their own merits, is still indispensable to the
discourse of Czech sexology.
The fact  that  the  discourse  of  transsexuality  capitalizes  on  gender  stereotyping is  further
driven  home  in  the  chapter  titled  “Differences  between  FtM  and  MtF  Transsexuals”.  In  this
segment,  the  authors  posit  a  taxonomic  division  of  sorts  between trans  men and trans  women.
Barring that none of the “insights” presented here have actually been spoken by trans* people (as
surely those would have been too “subjective” for the modus operandi of positivist academia),  the
taxonomy provided reads as little more than a  game in free association of stereotyped traits with
trans men and trans women. The style of writing is designed to read as simple description – there is
little effort to explain where these presumed differences are thought to have originated from, and the
general tone of the chapter is not dissimilar to pop-psychology books and their generalizing claims
280 Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 18.
281 Raichlová and Procházka in Fifková et al. 110.
282 Fifková in Fifková et al. 43.
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about “how men are, how women are.” Both trans men and trans women are expected to conform to
sets of arbitrary stereotypes associated with “men and women” as well as to various authoritatively
imposed  attributes of  “transsexuality”, such as negative attitudes to their bodies, heteronormative
identification, particular activities in childhood, and other similarly genre-defining considerations.283
Because the authors are almost never open to social constructivist ideas, they fail to account for how
these supposed “facts” about trans men and trans women are shaped by sociocultural factors, nor for
how the narrative of transsexuality itself presupposes that trans men and trans women must adhere
both to gender stereotypes in general and to the tropes of transsexuality as a normative condition. 
Absolutist formulations, usually not even sourced from the kind of self-fulfilling research that
is sometimes mobilized to “explain” trans* etiology, are frequent in the authors' coverage of the
interplay of gender and sexuality, almost to the point of defensiveness. The fixation on etiology
itself, of course, invokes the question of why etiology is covered “to the exclusion of more directly
beneficial research, like longitudinal studies on the long-term effects of hormone treatment on trans
people”284 in the discourse, but at the same time it is clear that privileging normative notions of
etiology goes hand in hand with policing and universalizing subsequent behaviour. A particularly
egregious example of disciplining sexual habits reads as follows:
If  transsexual  individuals  are  capable  of  starting  sexual
relationships or at least having random sexual encounters before
a sex change, the realization of sexual activity is defined by their
limitations  within  their  bodily scheme.  Especially  FtMs often
refuse to undress in partnered activities, they usually remain in
underwear and a T-shirt. They also refuse their [female] partner's
touches on the breast or often genitals. Some experience orgasm
through clitoral  stimulation,  but  they need a  long-term,  stable
and  safe  relationship  as  well  as  an  understanding  [female]
partner.  They are  more  oriented  towards  her  satisfaction  than
their own. Sometimes they use a vibrator or another erotic toy
[unclear  on  whom].  If  the  FtM is  homosexually  oriented,  he
picks gays for sexual partners and would absolutely not allow
vaginal intercourse with them (but anal sex may sometimes be
acceptable).285
It is difficult to read this passage as anything other than an attempt to deny trans* people
access  to  their  own  bodies  by  gross  generalization.  If  one  of  the  foundational  claims  of  the
cissexist/transphobic discourse is, in this context, that a man cannot own a vagina, the discourse of
medicalized transsexuality furthers that prescriptive claim by phrasing itself in a way that really
makes it sound as though trans men do not own the sum total of their genitals (and, by extension,
should refrain from using the “forbidden” parts for pleasure). Even the occasional claims that could
283 Dvořáčková 69-71.
284 Cross, “Raiders of the Lost Etiology” <http://quinnae.com/2011/01/27/raiders-of-the-lost-etiology/>.
285 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 32-33.
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have been positive in another context, such as the one about trans men taking care to please their
partners  during  sexual  activity,286 unfortunately presuppose  that  this  is  only because  trans  men
cannot enjoy themselves, not because they would be attentive lovers  and capable of experiencing
their own enjoyment at  the same time.  It is times like these when Transsexuality hits  the point
where readers' suspension of disbelief becomes a relevant question. Have the authors honestly asked
all trans men they could whether they would have vaginal intercourse and received a unanimous,
unconditional negative in response? Have they asked a representative sample of trans men? Have
they consulted trans men at all, or simply extrapolated from other normative studies grounded in the
same  self-fulfilling  outlook on normative  transsexuality?  Is  it  even  possible that  any group of
individuals – trans*  or otherwise – would have such a uniform opinion of certain sexual practices?
Of course, these are rhetorical questions, purposefully exaggerated to be on the same level as the
authors' blanket assertions. This expropriation of body parts and the consequent erasure of sexuality
(or at least sexuality that takes on forms that may differ from the normative ones) is a classic in
pathologizing transsexual narratives. Sandy Stone reports an analogical construct imposed on trans
women:
By textual authority, physical men who lived as women and who
identified  themselves  as  transsexuals,  as  opposed  to  male
transvestites for whom erotic penile sensation was permissible,
could not experience penile pleasure. Into the 1980s there was
not a single preoperative male-to-female transsexual for whom
data  was  available  who  experienced  genital  sexual  pleasure
while living in the “gender of choice”.287 
“Textual authority”, not universally observable empirical fact, is  likewise at the heart of the
assumption that vaginal sex should be verboten for all trans men, as if trans men were a monolith
united in some perceived hatred of vaginal stimulation by a partner (who, contrary to the authors'
binarist definitions of gender and sexuality, may not necessarily be a cis gay man).  The drive to
pigeonhole trans* people seems to turn particularly vehement when it comes to the fact that like any
other group of individuals, trans* people have individual preferences in sexual practice, some of
which may not neatly fit  into the archetypal divisions  between masculinity and femininity.  For
instance,  a trans man who enjoys  vaginal intercourse would call  into question the idea that all
masculinity must be predicated on cis men's masculinity, in which receiving vaginal stimulation is
absent. Of course, a trans man who openly articulates such a position will no longer “pass” as cis.
There is no reason why not being perceived as cis should have to be automatically negative or
lesser,  though.  On the  contrary,  “to  be  consciously  'read',  to  read  oneself  aloud – and by this
troubling and productive reading, to begin to  write oneself  into the discourses by which one has
286 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 33.
287 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text.
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been written”288 is  precisely the  kind  of  intervention  that  is  necessary to  counter  the  dominant
discourse, in the sphere of sexuality as well as elsewhere.
Transsexuality's lack of  accountable  methodological grounding and  transparent sourcing of
the data  in this section,  coupled with its dogmatic presentation of gendered self-perception and
sexual embodiment, the expectation that sweeping statements about the sex lives of trans* people
will be taken at face value rests solely on the assumption of authority. The authors effectively deny
that their findings could ever be falsified in their phrasing, even though falsifiability is precisely
what  sets  apart  scientific  research  from dogma,  as  established in Karl  Popper's  comprehensive
theory of the scientific method.289 Their insistence may perhaps be a defensive strategy of sorts –
after all, it takes only a single trans man saying “I am all man and I love my vagina” 290 for their
overly generalized premise to crumble like a house of cards under the principle of falsifiability. 
11. “Transsexuals” As Generic Men or Women
Earlier in my analysis, I focussed on the issue of corporeality and outlined how the ownership
of trans* people's bodies is undermined in the master narrative of transsexuality. I will now return to
this subject to see how this denial of body ownership, based on the invalidation of trans* identities
more  broadly,  goes  on  to  assign  generic  masculinity  and femininity  (as  derived  from cissexist
stereotypes of men and women) to trans* people in place of masculinity and femininity shaped by
each  individual's  unique  context.  Because  the  conceptualization  of  gender  in  Transsexuality is
strictly binary, I will address mainly the generic and uniform representation of trans men and trans
women in the text, since any affirmation of non-binary identities is missing from the publication's
normative  foundation.  This  will,  I  hope,  help  articulate  another  core  notion  that  makes  the
transsexuality discourse as a whole so rife with problems.
On a general level, we have seen so far that in the normative transsexuality discourse, trans
men and women (or FtMs and MtFs, as they are almost exclusively referred to in the text studied)
are not considered to be men and women based on their identification alone. This is evidenced not
only by the language employed but also by the character of the transsexual narrative: a clear one-
way transition trajectory (the consent forms for HRT and sterilization surgery actually contain the
condition  that  the  client  will  not  seek  to  reverse  its  effects  in  the  future,291 which  explicitly
condemns  at  least  one  potential  manifestation  of  gender  fluidity)  monitored  by  the  medical
288 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text.
289 Stephen Thornton, “Karl Popper” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2014 Edition) <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/popper/> 13 Nov 1997 (revised 17 May 2014), 
retrieved 23 Jun 2014.
290 Such as YouTube user thepowerisyrs says in the video My Genital Affirmation: A Transgender Vagina Talks Back  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j_IA1bJH4bU> 24 Jan 2011, 1 May 2014.
291 Fifková et al. 159-160.
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establishment and its gatekeepers is treated as the means by which “FtMs and MtFs” become men
and women. In such a system, the recognition of binary-identified trans people as men and women
is not contingent upon their identity, but upon various seals of approval for each “step” of transition
(controlled by the aforementioned gatekeepers) and upon the physical effects of transition as such.
This represents a kind of “flipped” ontology from the one that conceives of gender identity as being
primary, as in the following guidelines for trans men:
Deciding not to take testosterone, to delay taking testosterone,
or to  take a  lower dose than others does not make you “less
trans.” Gender identity can only be determined by you based on
how  you  feel  inside,  not  the  choices  you  make  about  your
medical care.292
In  Transsexuality,  however,  the perceived validity of trans men and trans women in their
genders is based on everything other than what the people concerned have to say about “how they
feel inside.” Identity itself is  sometimes  co-opted as  a  “biological identity” that does not refer to
each trans* person's unique biological configuration, but merely stands in for “biological sex.”293
Every component  that  could have constituted an independent  trans* identity,  psychological  and
physical, is expropriated and reframed in a way that “confirms” the presumption of a universal
gender binary instead of threatening it. This strategy is founded upon the “devaluation of alternative
definitions of reality […] and in the final stage, giving these 'misguided' definitions the 'correct'
meaning by reformulating them through [the dominant discourse's] own categories, which at the
same time reaffirms the validity of the [dominant] definitions of reality.”294 Its perceived necessity
on the part of the dominant discourse is a testament to the status of gender diversity as “something
that significantly disturbs the symbolic order”.295
When someone is thought of not as a man or a woman, but as someone who “wants to be” one
of these genders and can only expect to “become” it through an official channel of transition, that
person's  subjectivity  is  obviously  suppressed.  While  the  discourse  may  presume  individual
subjectivity to be the source of this “desire” to be a man or a woman (though some pathology or
disorder is presumed to be the source ultimately), it does not validate the person's gender status by it
alone; instead, it weaponizes this subjectivity against the person and transforms it into a tool of
“wanting” to be that identified gender.  This is  what I propose to call  aspirational transness.  Its
premise is simple: if you are “FtM”/“MtF”, you only “want to be” a man/woman, but you are not
one until you have followed the “correct” transition path prescribed for your gender and internalized
292 Gorton, Buth and Spade 29.
293 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 30: “Sometimes they succeed in concealing their biological identity 
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the “correct” values of masculinity/femininity. The medical establishment exercises its Foucauldian
pastoral power,  combined with its workings as “a technology of inscription” inseparable from “a
tactile politics of  reproduction constituted through textual violence”,296 to promise the benefits of
medically assisted transition as long as the arbitrary conditions of access are (at least superficially)
accepted on both sides of the equation. Along with these specific conditions, it is also expected that
the transition-seeking person will internalize the idea of not “yet” being a man/woman and needing
to undergo X number of procedures  before “becoming” one.  Once these procedures have been
carried out, it is viewed as morally and developmentally appropriate that the person will eschew
their trans* history altogether, otherwise their integration into society as is has failed: 
[A]fter  one  gender  transitions,  one  is  no  longer  trans,  but  a
“real” man or woman, and people who don't live mostly stealth
lives are exhibiting some sort of arrested development. Stealth
living is presented as a matter of personal maturity, rather than
of  having  the  luck  and  resources  to  have  a  body that  meets
cissexist expecations, and of making the decision to avoid risk
by choosing to conceal one's trans status.297
Making a person aspire to be their gender rather than simply letting them be it (in which case
medical  transition  procedures  would  be  available  but  optional,  and  not  treated  as  the primary
determinants of gender status or authenticity) has another downside besides the denial of bodily
autonomy and the validity of gender identity on its own merits. It also rests upon the assumption
that, say, a trans man does not only “want to be a (real) man”, but that he wants to be any man. His
masculinity is generic masculinity. All the simplistic taxonomic divisions between trans men and
trans women, all the gender stereotypes ascribed to “FtMs and MtFs” as alleged proof of their male
or female identification, all the sexual prescriptivism (including the assumption that trans men and
trans  women would  never  enjoy certain  activities)  and,  last  but  not  least,  the emphasis  on the
“wrongness” of trans* bodies in relation to the people inhabiting them can be traced back to one
central axiom: there is an “ideal” masculinity complementary with an “ideal” femininity, and trans
men and trans women should match these polarized concepts in all areas of their lives if they are to
be recognized in their genders. This approach insinuates that the universal goal of all trans* people
is not only to assimilate into a binary society, but to do so in a way that makes them generic. The
fundamental  erasure  of  individuality  and difference  exemplified  by this  goes  beyond  even  the
gender stereotypes associated with cisgender men and women, because it posits trans* people as at
best pale imitations of those.  
The  most  persistent  of  the  tropes  that  deny agency and  body ownership  exhibit  striking
characteristics  of  genericization  as  well.  The  “wrong  body”  trope,  that  arch-metaphor  for  the
296 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text.
297 Costello, “On Passing” <http://trans-fusion.blogspot.com/2011/07/on-passing.html>.
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dysphoria that some trans* people may experience, is among the first things treated as relevant in
the chapter on definitions; the phrase there literally says that “[transsexuals] feel trapped in a false
body and instinctively feel a strong desire for a sex change”.298 The reference to “instinct” (pud) is
itself convenient for the paternalistic discourse of medicine because it relegates trans* people into
an  inarticulate  realm  of  “instinctual”  cravings,  denying  their  ability  to  speak  for  themselves.
(Presumably, this is why “our transsexual clients and their loved ones” should read the book rather
than discuss gender/sex together and potentially come to different conclusions than the ones viewed
as desirable by the medical establishment.) It is also interesting that in a text that is concerned with
imparting allegedly expert knowledge, we find such metaphorical and euphemistic language being
employed  (“false  bodies,  instinctual  cravings”).  Regardless,  the  main  problem is  that  a trans*
person's identity and their “wrong/false” body are both ultimately treated as generic, shoehorned
into mutual incompatibility because the generic (“ideal”) forms of masculinity and femininity are
incompatible.
The generic forms of trans men and women are even occasionally personified in the book. In
“The Diagnosis of Transsexuality”, it is claimed that trans* people can be “diagnosed” by exhibiting
certain  highly  stereotyped  traits  in  several  categories:  their  preferences  in  pre-school  toys  and
games, preferences in clothing, exhibiting a “distaste” (odpor) for their primary and secondary sex
characteristics  and  for  the  biological  aspects  of  adolescence,  their  non-erotic  dreams  and
daydreams, masturbation fantasies and wet dreams, romantic relationships, sexual activities, and
gender  role  characteristics.299 Even without  discussing the problematic  content,  the selection of
categories  alone  creates  a  spotty  retrospective  narrative  that  has  more  in  common  with  the
archetypal  clichés of  classic  psychoanalysis  than  with  any  account  of  individualized  personal
development. Generic traits are trumpeted over and over in this section, culminating every now and
then in suggestive passages such as the one below:
From the  beginning  of  auto-erotic  activity,  sexual  arousal  is
usually associated with imagining oneself as a member of the
opposite  sex  with  all  its  attributes  during  intercourse:  FtMs
imagine  themselves  with  a  penis,  making  love  to  a  [female]
partner; MtFs imagine making love with a [male] partner in a
woman's body with breasts and female genitalia.300
The  fact  that  this  is  followed  with  a  converse  description  of  the  same  situation  for
“homosexually-oriented transsexuals” may be better than the compulsory heterosexuality found in
the basic definitions chapter, but it offers no way out of the cissexist discourse of “right” bodies, of
binaries and opposites (which is, after all, exemplified even by the inclusion of heterosexuality and
298 Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 17.
299 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 27-36.
300 Fifková, Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 30.
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homosexuality  and nothing else).  The often euphemistic language employed to describe genitals
(instead of calling a vagina by its term, which is  in itself gender-neutral and might not  always  be
associated with cis women, they call it “[implied cis] female genitalia”) is another subtle way to
solidify the normative notions that specific body parts always go with specific genders, even in a
book that is ostensibly about how they might not.
My purpose is not to insist that those trans men and women who have fantasies like the one
described by the authors are unenlightened or  wrong, but that presenting the above quote as the
model and most correct fantasy for trans men and trans women is an indefensible generalization that
should not be treated as something that in itself predicates gender identity. Instead of allowing the
existence of trans men and trans women to contribute to a more inclusive vision of maleness and
femaleness  in  which  the  presence  of  a  penis  or  a  vagina  is  not  necessarily  constitutive  of
gendered/sexual belonging, the discourse makes these traits constitutive. Instead of acknowledging
the observable and ultimately quite obvious fact that “the  concept of binary sex is based on the
fallacious idea that multiple sex characteristics are immutable and must always go together, when in
fact  many of  them can be changed,  many erased,  and many appear  independently in  different
combinations”,301 the sex and gender binary is preserved at all costs, simultaneously serving as a
reference point for “transsexuality”  and delegitimizing trans* people for never conforming to it
“well enough”. Erasure, not accurate representation of trans* existence, is the result. 
Consider, also, that  although the authors of  Transsexuality do  implore  health care providers
not to  consciously impose their personal beliefs on clients,302 they fail to take this caution all the
way and realize how the very act of publishing a normative text that defines trans* existence  in
itself  imposes  an  authoritative  belief.  This  problem  of  systemically  privileged  interpretations
becoming  indefinitely  reproduced  “facts”  is  nothing  new in  the  discourse  of  transsexuality,  as
pointed out by Stone with regards to the early stages of trans* clinical practice in the US:
It  took  a  surprisingly  long  time  –  several  years  –  for  the
researchers to realize that the reason the  candidates' behavioral
profiles  matched  [Harry]  Benjamin's  so  well  was  that  the
candidates,  too,  had read Benjamin's  book, which was passed
from hand to hand within the transsexual community, and they
were  only  too  happy  to  provide  the  behavior  that  led  to
acceptance for surgery.303
This kind of effect, when “authentic experience is replaced by a particular kind of story, one
that supports the old constructed positions”,304 can occur with any normative text, particularly when
301 Bauer, “Not Your Mom's Trans 101” <http://tranarchism.com/2010/11/26/not-your-moms-trans-101/>.
302 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 58-59.
303 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text.
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it is known that its authors may well soon be personally passing judgement on the prospective client
who is  reading the  book in  preparation,  as  Fifková  herself  candidly stated  in  the  Foreword to
Transsexuality. Proceeding to the logical extreme of this conundrum, we might conclude that it is in
fact impossible for sexology to accurately hear and interpret trans* people's identities and lived
realities, because the very existence of its normative texts confers hints as to which components of
one's identity should not be revealed to health care providers if one hopes to access the resources of
medically assisted transition. In the end, whether the identity being performed is genuinely felt or
not, expecting and getting a normative performance is intrinsically how the medicalized narrative of
transsexuality operates. Its ideal subject is a generic troubled “transsexual” who follows a generic
transition path riddled with admonishments on how to best “become” a generic man or woman who
confirms  rather  than  disturbs  the  ideology  of  binarism,  again  construed  as  generic  and  all-
encompassing. The prevailing treatment of “transsexuals” in normative texts furthers just such an
image: passive, depersonalized, silent unless it is to verbalize suffering, lacking in any meaningful
agency, and most importantly uniform. The discourse of pathologized transsexuality is  in effect  a
discourse of generic and generalized claims that reinforce culturally privileged “truths” about men
and women.
12. What Happens in the West...
It  has been noted that gender stereotypes presented in the publication are pertinent to the
Western cultural context and, despite the illusion of universality most of the book imparts, do not
represent every culture – or even the Western culture at every point in time. Yet, because of the
decontextualization  that  plagues  the  medical  account  of  “true”  transsexuality,  meaningful
acknowledgement of this fact is not part of the discourse. There may occasionally be brief allusions
to gender and sexuality operating under different premises in different societies, but the underlying
assumption remains firmly Western and represents a quintessentially colonial logic. Stone helpfully
traces the genealogy of this conceptualization:
Suddenly the old morality tale of the truth of gender, told by a
kindly  white  patriarch  in  New  York  in  1966,  becomes
pancultural  in  the  1980s.  Emergent  polyvocalities  of  lived
experience,  never  represented  in  the  discourse  but  present  at
least in potential, disappear; the  berdache  and the stripper, the
tweedy housewife and the mujerado, the mah'u and the rock star,
are still the same story after all, if we only try hard enough.305
And try the dominant discourse does. In Transsexuality, there are some minimal nods given to
cultural  differences  per  se in  the  “Sexual  Identity”  chapter,  but  these  nods  are  internally
inconsistent, probably because the discourse is structured in such a way that makes it difficult not to
305 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text.
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resort to pathologization that inevitably points to the Western set of norms. The authors state:
From  a  trans-cultural  perspective,  various  alterations  and
disorders  of  sexual  identity  can  be  considered  a  ubiquitous
phenomenon. It would however be short-sighted to label all such
expressions transsexuality or another disorder of sexual identity,
as  research  carried  out  in  cultural  anthropology  shows
considerable  variation  and  cultural  diversity  in  similar
behaviours.306 
It feels  as though the authors want it  both ways.  On the one hand, they acknowledge the
existence of cultural diversity and the fact that not all gender expressions considered to be non-
normative in the West are “transsexuality” or “disorders of sexual identity”, but on the other hand
they still  operate  within the framework of “sexual  identity disorder” as  if  it  did  apply to  non-
Western gender norms and expressions. That makes the formal mention of cultural diversity little
more than lip service. They are, in other words,  engaging in those “ahistorical and ethnocentric
projections”  that start by extending  the normative notion of sex  without qualifying it in the first
place.307 The introduction into this section of Transsexuality sets the tone for the attitude:
Historically,  first  descriptions  of  behaviour  resembling  sexual
identity disorders come from the period of antiquity. Herodotus
describes  the  disease  of  the Scythians,  a  nation  living on the
coast of the Black Sea. Some men wore feminine dress, engaged
in  female  labour,  and  were  distinguished  by  their  feminine
behaviour  and  character.  Their  role  was  mostly  that  of
priestesses.308
Whether or not this really is the first description of gender diversity in world literature, the
whole paragraph is remarkable: it exoticizes gender diversity as something associated with a foreign
religion and nation, so unknown it needs to be introduced to the reader along with its geographical
location,  and  simultaneously calls  this  gender  diversity  a  “disease”  (choroba),  establishing the
perspective “we” should adopt along with Herodotus as we view the Scythians from the outside.
The exoticization returns in the descriptions of Indian hijras (referred to in the generic masculine in
Czech)  and  a  few  other  identities.  Some “famous  suspected  transsexuals”  are  name-dropped,
including  Joan  of  Arc,  Pope  Joan,  and  James  Barry,  all  referred  to  by  their  birth  assignment
regardless of how these people (whether provably or supposedly) identified during their lifetimes.
There is also a mention of Fielding's Female Husband, “about a woman who pretended [feminine
suffix] to be a man and married [feminine suffix] another woman.”309 Clearly, none of this offers a
glimpse of trans* people's own subjectivity – the perspective is firmly external and does not convey
these  people's  identified  genders (rather,  their  identified  genders  are undermined  by using  the
306 Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 15.
307 Dvořáčková 65.
308 Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 15.
309 Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 15.
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assigned  gender  forms).  The  problem  is  not  new  in  the  publication;  it  is  part  of  the  overall
reluctance to refer to trans men as men and to trans women as women. Non-binary and genderqueer
identities  are  totally  invisible.  Even  the  one  time  the  authors  acknowledge  Leslie  Feinberg's
Transgender  Warriors,310 they omit  Feinberg's  radical  objections  to  the  normative  discourse  of
transsexuality and/or strictly dual sex and simply state that Feinberg “describes this altered [Two-
Spirit]  gender identity in contemporary Indians [sic].”311 Feinberg is  never treated as a relevant
author in the sections that deal with the definition of trans* identity for the generic Czech/Western
“us”. This not only further compounds the othering of (what the Western discourse may call) trans*
identities in,  broadly speaking, non-Western cultures, but also serves to silence even high-profile
trans* people in the West on matters of gender identity that directly concern them.
The word “altered” (změněný/á) itself presents a conceptual challenge. In the above example,
the authors referred to Two-Spirit Native Americans as having an “altered” gender identity, though
they give no indication of  what  that  identity is  supposedly altered from.  Given that  Two-Spirit
identities have historically been part  of Native American societies in various  culturally specific
forms, it hardly seems appropriate to describe this reality as an “alteration” of something. Of course,
the intended reader of the text would identify the Western gender binary as the norm, making Two-
Spirit identities a deviation from and alteration of those standards, without recognizing the Western
gender  binary as  an  imposition  in  the  first  place.  In  her  analysis  of  Czechoslovak  sexological
writings of the 1948-1989 period, Sokolová notes just such an internal conflict in the discourse:
Czech sexologists were the whole time struggling between their
efforts  towards  emancipation  of  non-heterosexual  sexuality  in
socialist Czechoslovakia […] and at the same time their inability
to step outside their own prejudices and beliefs in “normality” of
heterosexuality and strong essentialist interpretations of gender.
Logically, their writings are locked in conceptual imperialism,
an uncritical acceptance of cultural categories without the ability
to  reflect  their  instability  and  dependence  on
contextualization.312
Transsexuality, written a good while after this time period, does recognize that there should be
at least a formal nod to context and how it varies across cultures, but in the absence of an in-depth
understanding of contextualization and just how far cultural diversity extends (and that it must be
extended in both directions;  that  is,  against  “our” culture)  there is  no way to break out of the
310 The Czech translation of the book's title as given in the text is Pohlavní štvanci, which would have much better 
corresponded to Kate Bornstein's Gender Outlaws. This suggests that either the word “warrior” was considered 
inappropriate for the discourse by the book's translator or that Feinberg and Bornstein were on some level 
erroneously conflated. 
311 Procházka and Weiss in Fifková et al. 18.
312 Sokolová, State Approaches to Homosexuality, Sexological Discourse and Non-Heterosexual Lives in Socialist 
Czechoslovakia, 1948-1989 100.
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conceptual imperialism Sokolová identified as ubiquitous in the earlier period. Subtle ethnocentrism
thus underscores the rest of the section, without regard for the fact that sociocultural categories “are
invested with the power to project themselves beyond the culturally constructed border between the
social and the psychological – they have the power to form (self)perception, emotions, actions, and
attitude to the body, which means the power to generate difference even at the 'innermost' levels.”313
A superficial  acknowledgement  of  strictly  “cultural”  differences  does  nothing  to  explain  the
interconnected operation of “nature” and “culture”, but it does serve to cast the debate in terms that
are  difficult  to  dismantle.  The  difficulty  is  not  caused  by  those terms  being  superior  in  logic
because, as  Hird  says,  “[t]he  strict  division  between  'nature'  and  'culture'  evinced  in  many
'essentialist'  versus  'constructionist'  debates  thus  does  not  make  sense  insofar  as  it  artificially
separates two aspects of what ultimately produces behavior.”314 Fausto-Sterling offers an overview
of  empirically  tested  brain-/gender-related  phenomena that  “back  up  an  insistence  that  the
environment  and the body co-produce behavior  and that  it  is  inappropriate  to  try to  make one
component  prior  to  the  other.”315 In  short,  if  the  simplistic  framing of  transsexuality  in  Czech
sexology serves any purpose, it is not the purpose of reporting facts, but the purpose of building an
authoritative  take  on  how “facts”  are  construed  and  perceived,  including  the  conceit  that  one
behaviour-influencing  sphere  is  antecedent to  the  other  (and  that  there  are  only  two  of  them,
“nature”  and “culture”).  That  not  being  in  line with the Western  binary norm is  viewed as  an
“alteration” is, again, indicative of the pathologization of trans* identities  and  of intersex status,
which is itself “distinctly Western […] non-Western cultures do not routinely medicalize intersex
conditions, and so do not advise surgical and hormonal treatment.”316 Viewing trans* and intersex
status  as  “a 'problem'  in  need of  solution”,317 then,  already indicates  a  limited  outlook that  by
definition cannot do justice to non-Western outlooks. Due to the medicalized vocabulary employed
in this section of Transsexuality, we may argue that it cannot even convey the general content of the
concepts employed by at least some non-Western cultures without linguistically  and symbolically
manipulating them in the process.
13. Exclusion through Lip Service: The Marginalization of Gender Theory in the
Discourse of Transsexuality
So far, I have illustrated some key points in how gender/sexual identity is conceptualized in
the  core  of  the publication.  Gender  is  not  employed  as  much  of  an  analytical  category  in
313 Dvořáčková 68.
314 Hird 8.




Transsexuality, as evidenced by the fact that gender stereotypes are accepted as primary qualifiers
for identity or by the book's trivialization of social factors as definitive components of gender and
sexual development, even though arguably “development within a social system is the sine qua non
of human sexual complexity.”318 At the same time, the authors seem to have been aware of the fact
that outright concealing the existence of gender theory (and, more broadly, of social constructivism)
would not reflect well on the ethics of their publication. Holding back on such information would
have made it far more difficult to maintain the argument that their position was impartial from the
start. In this section, I will examine the context in which the chapter “Sociological Aspects” finds
itself more closely.
 As  I  mentioned when dealing  with  the  structure  of  Transsexuality,  the chapter  covering
sociology is short (only four pages total) and comes as the very last of the chapters featured. Its
author, Marcela Linková, is not part of the collective given in the book's bibliographic data (see my
bibliography for the list that does appear there), though she is mentioned  in Acknowledgements.
While there is nothing questionable about inviting a contributor on a subject that falls outside one's
purview (as sociology often does for medical doctors), this usually relies on respecting the invited
contributor as an authority, an “expert” in their field. Is this how Linková's guest contribution is
treated; is her contribution to Transsexuality on par with Fifková's contribution to the “transgender
issue”  of  Gender,  Equal  Opportunities,  Research?  The  preliminary  introduction  provided  by
Jaroslav Zvěřina (“Excerpt from Peer Review”) suggests that rather than respect, there is distance
between her (as a representative of gender studies/social constructivism) and the other contributors
(as representatives of the medical establishment/positivism):
The text by sociologist M. Linková is an interesting example of
the  thought  process  of  today's  fashionable  “gender  research”,
which is not yet well known to Czech medicine. 319 
Certainly,  this  sentence  conveys  much,  starting  with  the  fact  that  this  is  not  the  kind  of
utterance that would typically be said of a colleague. At the discursive level, Zvěřina manipulates
the image of gender theory/research and casts it as the following:
• A fad (“today's fashionable 'gender research'”);
• Not a legitimate scientific discipline (the scare quotes around “gender research”);
• A curiosity (the value of Linková's text lies only in being “an interesting example”);
• New and alien (“not yet well known to Czech medicine”).
This is less than lip service or tokenization; this subtly but effectively undermines the entire
field of gender studies on a clearly arbitrary basis. If, as has been discussed earlier, the hermeneutics
318 Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body 243.
319 Zvěřina in Fifková et al. 9.
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of  sexology needs  to  reformulate  gender  diversity  into  pathologized  transsexuality  in  order  to
maintain  the  symbolic  order,  it  doubly  needs  to  reformulate  potentially  dissenting  scientific
disciplines into harmlessness by presenting them as intrinsically less credible. (This tactic occurs in
the main text of the book as well, e.g. when the authors seemingly neutrally state that despite what
they view as sound empirical grounding for their claim that gender/sexual identity is determined by
the  same influence  of  prenatal  androgens  in  animals  and  humans,  “some experts  still  mistrust
biological theories”,320 framing these dissenting experts as a fringe group that simply refuses to be
“enlightened”  by  biological  determinism.) While  no  one  can  pressure Zvěřina  to  accept  the
legitimacy of gender theory or to familiarize himself with its contents, it is not unreasonable to
expect  him  to  follow  the  minimum  standard  for  academic  writing  and  refrain  from  outright
smearing  the discipline before readers have even had a chance to skim through the brief  (and in
some respects quite conservative) article Linková contributed to the publication. This is leading up
to the fact that “Excerpt from Peer Review” meets no criteria for actually being an academic text.
For  comparison,  this  is  how Zvěřina refers  to  the chapters  written from the perspective of  the
medical establishment [emphasis on key words mine]:
The clinical experience of H. Fifková and I. Procházka offers the
reader  exceptionally  valuable  information about  often  very
sensitive and subtle topics. It is important that the authors follow
internationally recognized standards, especially those  regularly
published by the American Harry Benjamin Society, a  medical
classic of transsexualism.  Also  valuable is  the information on
legal  aspects[,] treatment  methods  and  family  situations  of
transsexual  persons  (chapter  11,  12).  The  psychological  and
psychodiagnostic chapters were written in a very erudite manner
by  psychologist  Petr  Weiss,  who  has  been  dealing  with
transsexuality consistently for many years.  Very interesting are
also  the  chapters  about  surgical  procedures  leading  to  sex
change. These were written by experienced surgeons […]321
It would appear that medical practitioners and authoritative organizations personally respected
by Zvěřina are all unquestionable in their expert knowledge, while researchers in fields marked by
constructivist  approaches  will  be  presented  in  a  way  that  automatically  casts  doubt  on  their
expertise.  The  emphasis  on  “value”  and tradition  (“dealing  with  transsexuality  consistently  for
many years”, “regularly published”, “a medical classic”) assigned to the core chapters and their
authors is especially striking next to Zvěřina's framing of gender studies as something that is at best
“fashionable today”. In sum, Zvěřina is a priori dismissive of gender studies, but the medical field
he hails from he treats with near reverence in the review. This is at odds even with Fifková's take on
the  foreword  to  the same  publication,  as  she  does  at  least  formally  acknowledge  that
320 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 23.
321 Zvěřina in Fifková et al. 9.
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interdisciplinary  ties  are  needed  for  “a  modern  holistic  approach  to  medicine”.322 While  the
publication can hardly be called sufficiently interdisciplinary in its  execution,  Zvěřina's  zealous
dismissal of gender theory as a valid discipline may actually be detrimental to the credibility of the
author collective as a whole.
In terms of language, the high incidence of intensifiers in the peer review (“in a very erudite
manner”, “very interesting”, “exceptionally valuable”, “very sensitive and subtle topics”) is not only
out of place in academic writing, but also  pays homage to  Zvěřina's  insistence on his preferred
mode of inquiry being the one that offers the most value, erudition, and “objectivity” of data. The
fact that Weiss is the only contributor who is mentioned by full name in the review hints at some
hierarchy  of  rank  among  the  “core”  authors  as  well,  though  this  is  understandably  tricky  to
determine from text analysis alone. 
As far as the lack of familiarity of Czech medicine with gender studies is concerned, Zvěřina's
assertion appears to be honest – after all,  the publication he introduces is untouched by gender
theory except in that last marginalized chapter, contributed by an author who does not represent the
medical establishment unlike the others. The question should nevertheless be asked to what extent
this apparent honesty is also a function of alibism. Transsexuality came out in 2002, the same year
that  Gerlinda Šmausová had “Against a Relentless Conviction of Belief in an Ontic Existence of
Gender and Sex” published in Sociální studia, 7/2002, a major academic outlet. A year before that,
the journal Gender, Equal Opportunities, Research (Gender, rovné příležitosti, výzkum, 3/2001) had
its special “transgender issue”, which, despite the problems already discussed around its sexological
framing, focussed on many of the social aspects of trans* status and its marginalization. It is worth
noting that this journal, expressly dedicated to academic analyses of gender and related phenomena,
has been in print continuously since 2000 and its archives are fully accessible online except for the
latest issue. For Czech feminist and gender-related texts dating from even earlier than the 2000s, we
find a whole list of them in an article by Věra Sokolová when she criticizes these older feminist
publications for not making their theory inclusive of queer perspectives;323 all these texts existed in
the  1990s  and  beyond.  There  was  no  shortage  of  gender  research  in  the  Czech
Republic/Czechoslovakia in the decade preceding the publication of Transsexuality. There were also
the activities and publications of Charles University's former Centre for Gender Studies (today's
Department  of  Gender  Studies)  founded  in  1998324 in  collaboration  with  the  Gender  Studies
322 Fifková in Fifková et al. 11.
323 Sokolová, “Identity Politics and the (B)Orders of Heterosexism: Lesbians, Gays and Feminists in the Czech Media 
after 1989” 30.
324 “Department of Gender Studies, Faculty of Humanities, Charles University: About Us” <http://gender.fhs.cuni.cz/
KGS-4.html> 12 May 2014. 
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Foundation, which has been active since 1991, complete with a library.325 In short, if gender theory
“is not yet well known to Czech medicine”, the root of this problem cannot be sought in some
supposed failure of gender studies to reach out to society or to establish itself as a full-fledged
discipline. The considerable variety and availability of the materials outlined above suggests it must
have been the unwillingness of the Czech medical establishment to learn about gender theory that
caused the fundamental lack of knowledge Zvěřina openly admits to. It is safe to say that by 2002,
academic research into gender was nothing new under the Sun, not even in the Czech Republic.  
Regarding the allegedly “fashionable”  status  of gender theory, that too appears to be little
more than the author distancing himself from the field by appealing to elitist notions of “tradition”
versus “fashion”.  The claim that gender-oriented research has  become fashionable in the Czech
Republic is not limited to Zvěřina's introduction, but it seems as though its “fashionable” status is so
often referenced without actually pointing to any  practical instances of it. A conundrum emerges
where gender and feminist theory is vilified for being “too popular”, even though its status as a
“fashionable” science in the given context is debatable. In an article outlining the mutual exclusion
of  feminism  and  the  gay  (markedly  not  LGBTIQ*  or  queer)  rights  movement  in  the  Czech
Republic, Sokolová makes the argument that the marginal status of feminist and gender theory is
characteristic of the Czech cultural milieu to the extent that it precludes potential alliances between
feminist and gay and lesbian/queer activism. She emphasis the role of the media in the development
of this problem, having analyzed a representative sample of 587 texts from 1991 to 2004:326
The discourse on gender and feminism has been characterized
by  strong  heterosexist  undertones.  The  discourse  on
homosexuality,  on  the  other  hand,  has  had  a  distinct  anti-
feminist  character.  In  other  words,  heterosexism  and  anti-
feminism  have  been  integral  parts  and  one  of  the  defining
characteristics of Czech media discourse after 1989. […] As the
identities of feminists and homosexuals have been stigmatized,
both discourses have had the tendency to articulate their  own
legitimacy  through  the  exclusion,  ignorance  or  silencing  the
other.327 
Where is the “fashionable”  status of gender as an analytical category  that  Zvěřina uses to
demonize it? What this situation resembles is much closer to a competition for survival between two
heavily stigmatized discourses, a  conceptual Hunger Games between two underdogs. Just as the
(highly sexist and essentialist, as Sokolová examines at length in her article) discourse of normative
325 “The History of Gender Studies, o. p. s.” <http://www.genderstudies.cz/gender-studies/historie.shtml?x=237046> 
12 May 2014.
326 Sokolová, “Identity Politics and the (B)Orders of Heterosexism: Lesbians, Gays and Feminists in the Czech Media 
after 1989” 31.
327 Sokolová,  “Identity Politics and the (B)Orders of Heterosexism: Lesbians, Gays and Feminists in the Czech Media 
after 1989” 30-31.
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homosexuality is  treated with hostility in a heterosexist  environment,  so is the feminist/gender-
aware one. Though it would be hard to quantify which of these marginalized discourses “has it
worse”, it  is clear that there is no overwhelming popularity or “fashionableness” to speak of in
relation to gender and feminist theory. In fact, anti-feminism  and heterosexism are identified by
Sokolová as an “integral part” of public sentiment in the Czech Republic post-1989. Sokolová does
not directly reference the transsexuality discourse when she speaks of “the persistent monopoly of
sexologists,  psychologists  and psychiatrists,  who have  dominated  discussions  of  homosexuality
(and sexuality in general, for that matter) at the expense of qualified gender analysis by sociologists
or  historians”,328 but  her  observation  applies since  the  pathologizing  attitudes  towards
homosexuality and transsexuality are  couched in the  same basic  presuppositions  and shape the
discourse around each topic in a similar way. Merely being associated with feminist thought in this
climate is seen as grounds for suspicion (see the rest of Sokolová's article for a detailed analysis of
sexism and anti-feminism as a characteristic of the Czech media landscape, including  in articles
produced by widely respected public intellectuals, academics and writers). It seems that rather than
gender  theory being fashionable,  it  is  perceived as  dangerous.  Its  detractors  – be they medical
doctors, journalists, public figures or others – fear the possibility that it might become popular if not
exposed to all this backlash, and they fear it to such an extent that they act as though the possibility
had already been realized. This also offers them the advantage of painting gender theory as nothing
more than a sweeping fad, even though it has not reached any widespread popularity or acceptance
to begin with. 
Why  is  this  much  derision  needed  at  all?  Though  it  may  be  tempting,  in  the  case  of
Transsexuality, to transfer the problem onto the personal level and conclude that it was simply the
authorial collective being dismissive of gender theory, the contextual analysis I have performed so
far  suggests  that  the  problem  is  both  more  general  and  more  insidious  than  veiled  personal
antipathy. There is also another, more obvious reason why the gender chapter had to be discredited
in order to maintain the integrity and authority of the rest of the publication, and that is the inherent
ability  of  social  constructivism (of  which  gender  theory  is  part)  to  dispel  essentialist  truisms.
Linková's  chapter  is  metatextual  in  the  same  way  that  Fausto-Sterling  explains  her  overall
methodology in “How to Build a Man”: refusing to treat texts produced by medical authorities as
being exempt from criticism. Linková interrogates the gender order and the way this same gender
order  has  shaped  existing research  into  “transsexuality”.  Needless  to  say,  this  is  a  threatening
prospect in the context of the publication being presented as the expert word on trans* status.
328 Sokolová, “Identity Politics and the (B)Orders of Heterosexism: Lesbians, Gays and Feminists in the Czech Media 
after 1989” 32.
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The chapter does touch upon some crucial  aspects on the nature of power in the medical
establishment and its relation to trans* people as subjects with marginalized gender identities, and
similarly to the “transgender issue”, it provides a glossary of gender-related terms. The glossary is
actually quite problematic from the point of view of gender analysis. For instance, Linková employs
the division between “sex” and “gender” as two completely distinct categories, of which of course
“gender” is the primary category imbued with social relevance:
Since approximately the 1960s, the study of gender has pointed
out the differences between (biological) sex, which is a category
demarcating  the  physiological  differences  between  men  and
women, especially those relating to genitalia and reproductive
dispositions, and gender.329
This  reification  of  the  nature/culture  dichotomy  is  the  very  problem  criticized  by
biologists/gender  theorists  like  Fausto-Sterling  and  Hird  among  others,  and  while  it  may  be
characteristic of the early stage of gender studies when such thought was productive in opening the
debate on the cultural construction of gender, it now presents a major roadblock to acknowledging
that “biological  sex” is  also much more complex than a neat  binary structured along universal
“physiological differences”. Linková's summary of gender theory unfortunately does not reject the
conceptual  primacy  of  “sex”.  Thus  the  outlook  it enables  is  already  robbed  of  some  of  its
deconstructive potential.
On the other hand, there are moments when Linková does challenge the normativity of gender
along with normativity of the body. Although she does not question the category of “sex” in the
introduction to the chapter, she goes head to head with the “Sexual Identity” chapter in stating that
“pupils and students are not told that our chromosomal make-up is not the only determining factor
of our sex, that a strict line cannot be drawn between XX and XY. This is of course the case with
other  physiological  factors as  well.”330 Despite  the reduced definition of  gender  and sex in  the
opening, here it is mentioned that “biological sex” is not a single, monolithic category. This section
makes it obvious why Linková's contribution is uncomfortable for the discourse of transsexuality as
an aberration from “normal” sex/gender.
Another subversive element in Linková's chapter is her reference to the “binary myth” as a
source of violence in disproportionately forcing trans* people (especially trans women) to adhere to
rigid standards for gender presentation and performance, even as the standards for cis people have
gradually  become  more  relaxed.331 In  realizing  this  double  standard,  Linková  brings  up a
perspective  that differs from only being concerned with  making trans* people conform to gender
329 Linková in Fifková et al. 118.
330 Linková in Fifková et al. 120.
331 Linková in Fifková et al. 120.
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norms as best as possible. Even more radically, she presents a Foucauldian critique of the dominant
mode of scientific knowledge production about alleged sex difference:
Our definition of what constitutes maleness and femaleness is
based on imperfect and prejudiced scientific knowledge, which
fetishizes certain traits at the expense of others. The importance
of genital configuration for an individual to be considered male
or female exerts pressure on transsexuals in that the need for a
sex change through surgery is scientifically preferred, because
the assertion “I'm a woman” or “I'm a man” alone is not enough.
The individual's feelings and experience in their own body must
be affirmed by the medical community by approving a surgical
sex change.332
Not  only is  the  criticism in  this  passage  remarkably direct,  it  also  points  to  the  unequal
distribution of power between trans* people on the one hand and the medical establishment as well
as  the larger  society on the other.  These statements  go contrary to  the essentialist  assumptions
underpinning the majority of the book no matter how we read them. Linková goes as far as to repeat
this point again before the end of the chapter: “We cannot be surprised that transsexual people who
are coming to their new role strive for the greatest conformity they can so as to assimilate into the
culture they live in. The culture that puts them under constant pressure”.333 While the passage may
be unnecessarily homogenizing (not all trans* people will react to this social pressure in the same
way), it is still valuable in the context of a publication mostly unable to analyze the power dynamics
that play  a  part in trans* people's  alleged conformity with preconceived gender roles in a hostile
cultural environment where the institutionalized medicalization of  trans* status can often be the
only recourse. Linková's contribution begins to read as almost a kind of damage-control in light of
the rest of the book. At the end, she concludes that “we [the society] have no right to tell others they
will never be a 'real man' or a 'real woman' […] there is no single definition of what being a 'real'
man or 'real'  woman means.”334 While these comments may appear trivial to readers familiar with
gender theory, their divergence from the normative content of the publication cannot be overstated.
Interestingly, though, Linková herself seems to be reluctant to claim an affinity with social
constructivism, although the fact that she even allows for the questioning of social and biological
categories no doubt makes her a constructivist. In the glossary, she limits social constructivism to
the  1960s  and  defines  it  as  having  “contributed  to  the  emphasis  of  the  construction
[constructedness] of our lives and our reality”, but immediately follows that with the assertion that
today's approaches to society and reality are “more balanced”335 without as much as elaborating on
332 Linková in Fifková et al. 121.
333 Linková in Fifková et al. 121-122.
334 Linková in Fifková et al 122.
335 Linková  in Fifková et al. 120.
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what is supposedly not “balanced” about constructivism itself. This kind of framing suggests either
a skewed understanding of what it means for something to be a social construct (and that it does not
mean an automatic denial of all things material) or an understanding of constructivism that does not
align with the scientific taxonomy provided by researchers like Egon Guba and  Yvonna  Lincoln,
according to  whom constructivism and critical  theory are (to simplify)  paradigms that  are not
positivism.336 The most helpful aspect of Guba and Lincoln's taxonomy is that it draws attention to
fundamental differences  between  the  paradigms,  elucidating  on  their  relative  privilege  or
marginalization  with  respect  to  the  Enlightenment  model  of  science  in  the  process.  In
Transsexuality,  we  are  seeing  a  paradoxical  situation  when  even  the  author  who more  or  less
represents constructivism in the book has to use discursive strategies to distance herself from it. Of
course, when viewed in context, this is no paradox at all but an indication of the enormous privilege
retained by positivism and its attendant constructs (objectivity, neutrality) in the Czech academic
sphere.  Guba  and  Lincoln's  allusion  to  the  paradigms  “competing”  with  one  another  is  most
certainly supported in the discourse of Transsexuality. To openly align oneself with constructivism
means to lose credibility.
The more problematic aspects of Linková's analysis harken back to her inability (whether real
or coerced by the context in which her contribution finds itself) to apply her brief acknowledgement
of the complexity of “biological sex” beyond the imagined binary when trans* people enter the
picture. A closer examination of the chapter reveals some of its central tenets to be equally steeped
in cissexism as the other sections of the publication, but in Linková's case, this ironically stems
from the fact that she does treat gender as socially constructed – yet still assumes the category of
“biological sex” to be foundational, even for trans* people. To illustrate, she has this to say about
trans women and their position in society:
I  daresay  that  the  social  expectations  of  the  MtF  group  can
become a schizophrenic prison. It is impossible to claim that the
early socialization of these biological men will just vanish with
the  realization  of  their  own  transsexualism.  Their  social
experience will thus always be located in a certain border zone
[…]  It  is  also  necessary  to  ask  whether  and  how  masculine
socialization and the representation of womanhood in men's eyes
influences the later self-perception of MtF transsexuals.337
Aside from the fact that this is,  just  like elsewhere in the publication, a cisgender person
usurping the right to speak on trans women's subjectivity, the paragraph offers an almost textbook
example of transmisogyny. There is the  Transsexual Empire-esque myth of trans women's “male
socialization” as something that prevents them from “really” being women and supposedly invests
336 Guba and Lincoln 109-116.
337 Linková  in Fifková et al. 120-121. 
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them with (by then long nonexistent) privilege, even though no converse claim is made about trans
men. The discrepancy makes this a clear example of how transphobia itself is gendered, something
that  Linková  writes  about  at  other  points  in  the  chapter  (trans  men's  relative  privilege  after
transitioning, the rigid standards for femininity required of trans women), without seeing how her
own analysis is  still  impacted by the same root problem. There is the standard metaphor of lived-
experience-as-prison, a cliché too tired to revisit at this point. There is the implicit refusal to refer to
trans  women  as  women,  instead  using  de-gendering  labels  such  as  “the  MtF  group”  or  “MtF
transsexuals” (in this respect Linková does not differ from the other authors, generic masculine even
when referring to trans women in particular included). There is also the sudden return of “biological
men” and the notion that “biological sex” is immutable, comes “before” society (although society
picks  up  on  it  to  initiate  this  inescapable  “male  socialization”),  and  should  somehow  take
precedence over a person's actual identified gender and perception of self. It is no coincidence that
the  paragraph  pivots  on  “the  realization  of  [trans  women's]  own transsexualism”  and  not  “the
realization of their own womanhood”. Finally, there is the essentialization of the “border zone” not
as something that can be actively and proudly occupied by some (e.g. non-binary) trans* people, but
as  something  that  prevents,  once  and  for  all,  specifically  trans  women  from  being  women
“completely”. All these assertions are framed in covertly ableist rhetoric that equates the experience
of social pressure with mental illness, while at the same time trivializing schizophrenia as nothing
more than an exaggerated metaphor for the unsubstantiated premise that all trans women must feel
irrevocably conflicted about their identity. 
The notion that trans women feel that their status is somehow deficient next to cis women is
one that pervades the attitudes of all the authors of the book. It is a particular shame in Linková's
case, because she otherwise does touch upon the “more radical demands on femininity” faced by
trans women338 and the fact that “the [gendered] standard expected of transsexuals [noun, generic
masculine] by society is not nearly as relaxed [as the standard expected of cis people from the 1990s
onwards].”339 Thus, unfortunately, even the one author whose contribution could have offered an
alternative to the positivist-essentialist paradigm espoused by the main collective of authors either
failed or was not permitted to treat trans* people with genuine respect for their gender identity,
preserve  their  agency,  or  bring  a  truly  deconstructive  perspective  that  would  not  call  out to
“biological  sex”  as  a  universal  and  unalterable  given  to  the  table.  The  shortcomings  of
Transsexuality as a whole are conceptual, but they are also, at the same time, the shortcomings of
privilege.
338 Linková in Fifková et al. 121.
339 Linková in Fifková et al. 120.
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IV. Conclusion
In the preceding chapters,  I  offered factual  and ethical  arguments  questioning the current
discursive framing and practical management of gender diversity in the Czech Republic. I hope this
has demonstrated that the system in which trans* people find themselves at the moment is damaging
and largely incompatible with accepted human rights standards, in spite of its possible belief that all
its current rules are beneficial to individuals. The final question to ask is to what extent this entire
system of policing sustains individual transitions versus to what extent it simply sustains itself. In
this respect we may notice a parallel with, or perhaps a continuation of, Václav Havel's commentary
on the pre-1989 political regime, which “serves people only to the extent necessary that people
serve it”340 while framing itself as “humanist, egalitarian and socially just.”341 Sexology probably
does not see itself as a system that does harm – it may well believe that it does just the opposite,
based on the bodies of research that constitute its discpline – but the combined impact of medical
and  legal  gatekeeping  on  those  who  do  not  “serve”  these  systems  in  the  way  that  leads  to
recognition does fall within the sphere of harm. Ironically, despite widespread public condemnation
of the former regime, its more insidious aspects such as the diffusion of ideology into “ideas that are
internalized and projected by people in order for them to negotiate their lives in accordance with
'official' norms”342 may well have become an enduring “genre” in their own right. As the generator
of “official norms” in relation to trans* identity, sexology is firmly in a position to demand the
internalization of ideas that can slowly erode the self.
The  coercive  character  of  the  Czech  medico-legal  system  as  it  stands  should  not  be
overlooked in light of the fact that some individual trans* people may obtain the assistance they
desire through its institutions. It is true that, for example, the designated medical professionals will
write confirmation letters for name changes or arrange for an appointment with a surgery-approving
commission if specific conditions are met on the part of the client, but neither of these “services”
would be needed if the Czech state did not police naming conventions, if commissions were not
utilized  to  approve  or  deny  anyone's  decision  to  have  transition-related  surgeries,  and  if  such
surgeries did not constitute the right to legal gender recognition. That the system currently in place
is a well-oiled machine successfully producing its own expected results does not in itself mean that
it is a machine that needs to exist, or exist in its present form, at all. 
Whether or not the sexological discourse will gradually lose its monopoly and whether the
340 Havel quoted in Sokolová, State Approaches to Homosexuality, Sexological Discourse and Non-Heterosexual Lives
in Socialist Czechoslovakia, 1948-1989 9.
341 Sokolová, State Approaches to Homosexuality, Sexological Discourse and Non-Heterosexual Lives in Socialist 
Czechoslovakia, 1948-1989 9.
342 Sokolová, State Approaches to Homosexuality, Sexological Discourse and Non-Heterosexual Lives in Socialist 
Czechoslovakia, 1948-1989 9.
125
law  on  legal  gender  recognition  will  eventually  follow  the  lead  of  more  ethically  conscious
countries is difficult to estimate. In the past few years, some significant developments have emerged
in the Czech Republic that may unsettle the status quo in the future. For example, the founding of
PROUD as a political platform for LGBTIQ* people and the inclusion of specifically trans* people
under  the  umbrella  of  PROUD's  emancipatory activities  is  unprecedented  in  the  symbolic  and
political arena the organization is located in.343 Last year, the self-representing trans* organization
Trans*Fusion  was  established  with  the  intention  of  working  in  cooperation  with  sibling
organizations in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.344 I was happy to present an earlier draft of this
study at the conference Transgender Bodies of Law, attended by prominent activists in the field of
trans*  rights  both  from the  Czech  Republic  and abroad.345 At  the  moment,  at  least  two major
projects are underway that aim to assess the situation of trans* people in the Czech Republic from
the perspective of human rights among other considerations, one sponsored by the Grant Agency of
the Czech Republic (GAČR) and one by ILGA Europe. To what extent these activities and the
information they provide will manage to engage the dominant discourse on the level of medical and
state institutions remains to be seen, but the developments suggest that despite the low interest in
changing the regulatory terms in which trans* identities are treated on the part of state and medical
institutions, challenges to the presiding norms are being mounted in largely unprecedented ways. 
On that note,  I would like to add that depending on the attitudes of the parties involved,
particularly on the willingness of those with institutional power to respond with responsibility to
criticisms  of  how  that  power  functions,  the  exchange  between  normative  sexology  and  legal
practice on the one hand and the outlooks that dissent from it in various fields on the other hand
need not always take the form of an all-out battle. To posit the situation as a battle between two
rivals  would  be  to  validate  the  discourse  of  strict  binaries  anew.  Some  of  the  well-known
sexologists, most notably Ivo Procházka,  have engaged in activism on behalf of non-heterosexual
people going as far back as subversive writing under the old regime,346 and there is no reason why
this activist  impulse  could  not  be  extended  to  trans*  issues  in  the  context  of  sexology  and
potentially legal standing as well. Though sexology as a normative force warrants much criticism in
my view, it is not in principle exempt from transformation and self-reflection. How it evolves, I
imagine, will be tied both to the shifting social attitudes to gender/sex and to what degree sexology
343  Sokolová, State Approaches to Homosexuality, Sexological Discourse and Non-Heterosexual Lives in Socialist 
Czechoslovakia, 1948-1989 169.
344 Trans*Fusion homepage, <http://www.trans-fusion.org/index.html> 20 Jun 2014.
345 Full programme of the conference, accessed from the Center for Law and Public Affairs: Institute of State and Law,
<http://www.ilaw.cas.cz/data/files/CeLAPA/Euroconference-CeLAPA-May2014-plakat.pdf> 22 Jun 2014.
346 Sokolová, State Approaches to Homosexuality, Sexological Discourse and Non-Heterosexual Lives in Socialist 
Czechoslovakia, 1948-1989 108.
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will be willing to perform meta-analyses of its traditional premises.  I emphasize that diachronic
evolution of beliefs can occur not only in societies, institutions, and paradigms, but also within
individuals in their interaction with these larger structures. Far from inferring personal culpability in
this  regard,  I  speculate  that  sexology has  acted  in  line  with  what  it  considered  to  be the  best
theoretical insights and guidelines available within its paradigm. What the discipline would now
benefit  from reflecting  upon is  that  these mainly normative  rather  than  descriptive  insights  no
longer cut it, if indeed they ever did.
Transsexuality  asks  whether  there  can  be  an  “adequate,  unified  concept”347 alternative  to
etiology through  biological  determinism,  and implicitly  to  the  entire  conceptual  scaffolding  of
trans* status as a disorder of gender/sexual development. To that question, I answer no, but not in
the sense the authors likely expected. There is no need,  and indeed no ethical justification, for a
“unified” concept governing trans* status because the notion that being trans* should be a unified
condition is a discursive imposition in and of itself, working to the exclusion of more nuanced,
context-conscious understandings. Moreover, it is this idea that  trans* status must have a unified
explanation,  manifestation and management  that  can be traced to  the core of the symbolic and
practical delegitimization of trans* identities that still permeate virtually every sphere of social and
institutional life in the Czech Republic. What we need is not  to formulate a superseding “unified
concept” for trans* status couched in the same old oppositional blueprint for reality, but to admit
and appreciate that the phenomena being addressed are not inherently unified. We need to see trans*
existence as “not an irreducible alterity but a myriad of alterities.”348 In this sense, I do not presume
to  speak for  some preconceived trans* monolith in my criticism of the sexological discourse; I
speak for myself from an ethical and epistemological standpoint grounded in theories and findings
that significantly differ from the standpoint of normative sexology. By the same token, I refuse to be
spoken for, be it by the sexological discourse or by those trans* people who personally identify with
the  categories  and  trajectories  set  out  by  it,  although  their  personal  identification  should  be
respected and is not the object of my contention.  
Accepting this multiplicity (and not merely as an afterthought or “exception” to an essentialist
master narrative, but as a vital component of our situation) and eliminating systemic pressures can
help pave the way for trans* agency and subjectivity to be respected on their own merits, rather than
to be used as pawns in regulatory discourses of the body and gender. If the blanket approach to
gender  identity,  gender  recognition  and,  when  applicable,  medically  assisted  transition  is
diversified, there can also be negotiation of the  responsibility  of trans* people for their personal
347 Fifková and Weiss in Fifková et al. 25.
348 Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto” rev. 4.0, page unnumbered in text.
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decisions in this area in a way that is currently not supported by a system that replaces it with state-
mandated non-choices.  I hold out hope that by raising awareness of the human rights of trans*
people and by promoting education on gender, sex and sexuality that stresses complexity rather than
simplification, we can  look  towards a Czech Republic where,  once the paradigms of reality have
developed beyond their current constraints, no further analyses of systemic pathologization will be
so urgently called for in the first place.
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